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Abstract  
This thesis examines the recent and high profile modernisation agenda within the Royal 
Mail, where a well organised union facing a unified employer has proven able to challenge 
market-driven change at both national and local levels (see Gall, 2003; Lyddon, 2009). Much 
of the study’s focus concentrates on the locus of the shopfloor itself by way of an in-depth, 
qualitative analysis of four individual Royal Mail workplaces which differ in terms of task, 
age, size and geographical setting. Of particular concern here is how restructuring is 
perceived by workers and how this is reflected in their collective and individual responses to 
managerial attempts to change established working practices and intensify workloads.  
While such a focus is best understood through a consideration of labour process theory, 
research draws heavily upon Edwards’ (1988) study of conflict and accommodation, which 
addresses the scope for individual and collective responses to a range of structural 
pressures in a detailed analysis of variety of workplace settings.  It will be recalled that in the 
case of Royal Mail, a set of relatively uniform industry-wide pressures have evoked a range 
of localised workgroup responses. Accordingly, a greater understanding of workers’ 
responses to managerial driven change is sought through a consideration of Batstone et al.’s 
(1977) workplace study of shop stewards. This provides an evaluation of the nature of local 
workplace organisation and the types of worker behaviour to which it may give rise. 
Together these form this study’s analytical framework.   
The findings highlight that postal workers and their union have, on the whole, been 
extremely effective in limiting the downward pressures of modernisation upon workplace 
organisation within the UK postal service and that, as with the wider public sector, market-
driven models of labour management have been mediated by both service context and 
worker agency (Thomas and Davies, 2005: 689).  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
In recent decades the UK public sector has become the focus for a modernisation 
programme which Bach (2010: 151) argues was intended to boost efficiency and 
effectiveness of the provision of state services. This has involved reform in the shape of 
radical changes to staffing structures and payment systems, and the organisation of work 
through labour management policies based on the unilateral principles of scientific 
management (Ironside and Seifert, 2004: 58). Whilst this may have served to de-grade 
and disempower many groups of public sector workers (Worrall et al., 2009; Mooney and 
Law, 2007; Whitfield, 2006), its effects have been mediated by a range of actors who are 
able, as Ironside and Seifert (2004: 69) note, to resist its logic.  Such a perspective 
underpins the central aim of this thesis, namely a consideration of the ways in which 
workers have met managerial-driven change within an increasingly marketized Royal 
Mail. 
Both Beale (2003) and Gall (2003) have noted the effectiveness of postal workers as an 
occupational group in tempering market-driven change in recent years. However, there 
have been important local differences with regard to this (Gall, 2003) in an industry 
where one relatively uniform group of workers are employed by one single employer. This 
means that an adequate analysis of worker reaction to market-driven change within the 
Royal Mail must be extended to examine a range of workplace settings and the context-
specific factors that may give rise to particular forms of action. Accordingly, this study’s 
research covers four individual Royal Mail workplaces which differ in terms of size, nature 
of work organisation, age and geographical setting. This provides a fertile environment in 
which to evaluate the effect of what Edwards (1988) refers to as a cluster of factors which 
shape the ways in which workers in their respective workplace settings respond to 
market-driven change in the way that they do.   
While such factors are important, they are not, as has already been suggested in the case 
of Royal Mail, determinate and are interpreted by the main sets of actors within the 
workplace themselves (Edwards, 1988: 201). Particular attention, therefore, focuses on 
the variety of responses through which workers mediate structural pressures and the 
factors which, in turn, shape the nature and efficacy of these responses. Central to this is 
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an analysis of the dynamic relationship between structure and worker agency and the 
ways in which this produces particular sets of social relations, understandings and modes 
of worker adjustment within the workplace itself. For Batstone et al. (1977) the outcomes 
of this process, which they refer to as the negotiation of order, are related to the manner 
in which workers and their representatives are organised within the workplace. This calls 
for an evaluation of power relationships and how these are created and maintained 
within the workplace itself (ibid). There is considerable focus throughout this thesis, 
therefore, on the interaction and relationships between workers, their union 
representatives and the wider network of their parent branch and its officials.   
In terms of its academic value, the study’s shopfloor-level analysis addresses what has 
been a dearth in qualitative, empirically-based research in recent times (Whitfield and 
Strauss, 2004: 145; Brown and Wright: 1994). It is this depth of detailed workplace focus 
that sets the study apart from the extant data relating to modernisation within the Royal 
Mail (see for example, Gall, 2003; Beale, 2003; Beale and Mustchin, 2013). In doing so it 
explains, in significantly more detail, the complexities of workplace relations in a range of 
Royal Mail sites. The study’s fieldwork took place throughout 2013-2014.  As such, it is the 
first of its kind to carry out an analysis of industrial relations within what was a 
transitional phase, during which the Royal Mail moved from a nationalised industry 
through to privatised entity.    
Finally, the study’s exposition of a range of effective worker responses both to 
technological-driven workplace change and methods of surveillance provides, in line with 
Belanger and Thuderoz (2010: 136), a counterweight to a narrative that is currently vogue 
in the world of social science. This is that confronted with the inexorable forces driving 
and supporting management control, workers have no choice but to comply and submit. 
This means that it makes an important contribution to the current industrial relations 
discipline and in particular on-going debates relating to the inevitable weakening of public 
sector trade unionism in the face unfettered marketization. The principle methods 
through which this research is conducted are discussed later in the following section 
which provides an overview of each of the study’s main chapters. 
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Chapter Two: The state, the public sector and modernisation 
This first substantive chapter outlines the wider Marxist framework that this thesis adopts 
which both shapes its central arguments and provides a foundation for conceptualising 
modernisation. Particular attention focuses on the role played by the state with regard to 
the marketization of public services and how this fits with regard to its wider objective of 
securing an economic structure to meet business needs.  From this viewpoint, it is argued 
that public sector reform within the UK has been driven by the essential maxim of the 
state within a capitalist economy; that of providing an infrastructure that facilitates the 
extraction of surplus value and generation of profit.  Accordingly, this chapter seeks to 
understand worker responses to modernisation within a wider evaluation of the state as 
employer, provider of public services and what Allen (1960: 113) refers to as regulator in 
chief of a capitalist society.   
While this study is primarily concerned with the current and on-going marketization of 
the Royal Mail, it is important to consider that contemporary trends do not exist within a 
vacuum (Corby and White, 1999, 3). Consequently, this chapter traces the historical 
development of industrial relations within the public sector within the context of the 
state’s inherent objectives within a capitalist economy. A longer range perspective here 
provides scope for a critical analysis of those more popular narratives which point to the 
traditional image of the State as that of ‘model employer’ (see for example Carter and 
Fairbrother 1999).  It is argued here that the periodic presence of more pluralistic 
approaches towards public sector management were borne more from political 
expediency than an acceptance of collective worker organisation, namely the avoidance 
of conflict. This sets the scene for a critical examination of the state’s modernisation 
programme which focuses on the ideology of neo-liberalism from which it has emerged 
and the tenets of new public management to which it has given rise. Such an analysis 
provides a sound basis from which to analyse the central theme of the following chapter. 
This concerns an in-depth investigation into labour management and the factors which 
influence the ways that workers respond to this within the locale of the shopfloor itself.           
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Chapter Three: The management of labour, trade unions and workplace industrial 
relations 
In following on from a more macro-level perspective, much of this chapter adopts a 
workplace-based focus to investigate how change is met by workers at the point of 
production or service delivery.  It begins however, by locating the logic of market-driven 
reform within a wider debate about the capital-labour relationship. This takes place 
within the framework of labour process analysis which recognises that the central job of 
those in control of the means of production is to tighten control over workers’ labour in 
order to realise maximum output and profit. It is argued here that managerial-driven 
attempts to reform long-standing working practices within the public sector, in tandem 
with a free market mechanism of service provision, is a proxy for capital accumulation 
(Mather et al., 2007: 109). Nevertheless, there is a recognition that such reform has been 
far from straightforward and has been mediated by the dialectic interplay between 
management action and worker reaction in different public sector settings (Worrall et al., 
2009: 120). Considerable attention is given therefore, to the different approaches that 
management might adopt when attempting to maximise output and the variety of ways 
in which workers seek to resist this. Of particular interest is the nature of worker 
organisation and the role played by workgroup leaders in developing and sustaining the 
collective consciousness upon which effective workgroup action rests.  
This chapter then returns to a more macro-level mode of analysis to examine some of the 
political and economic factors which have weakened the ability of many groups of 
workers to collectively regulate their workplaces in recent decades.  This involves an 
evaluation of the state’s deployment of a raft of neo-liberal based measures such as 
privatisation, restrictive labour laws, and workplace deregulation through which it sought 
to restructure employment relations within the UK (Smith and Morton, 1993). The effects 
of the non-standard forms of employment that this has ushered in, in conjunction with 
the upsurge in individually-centred human resource management initiatives are then 
considered. Whilst recognising that such staple features of marketization might serve to 
threaten the traditional collectivist methods of workers and their trade unions, this 
chapter moves on to provide a more optimistic prognosis for the future of worker 
collectivism. In doing so it again places emphasis on role of workplace leaders and their 
5 
  
potential in providing a narrative of common interest amongst an increasingly contingent 
and diverse UK labour force.               
Chapter Four: Examining industrial relations in the Post Office 
An analysis of the long-standing relationship between the Royal Mail, its workforce and 
their union representatives is the main focus of this chapter.  Central to this is an 
evaluation of how labour relations strategies within the Royal Mail have been developed 
by management, the relationship of these to wider corporate objectives and how in turn 
they have affected and are affected by union structure, strategy (Batstone et al., 1984:1) 
and organic worker agency. Historically the Royal Mail formed part of, and came under 
the jurisdiction of, the wider Post Office before becoming a stand-alone business unit in 
1986 (Gall, 2003: 24). As part of the wider public sector, the Post Office itself fell under 
the ambit of central government. This chapter, therefore, examines the ubiquitous 
influence of government policy upon industrial relations within the Post Office which it 
argues has been shaped by the political and economic imperatives of the wider state. It 
does so by adopting a historical perspective beginning with the emergence of early trade 
unionism and worker organisation within the Post Office.  From here, attention moves on 
to focus upon the main political, social and economic factors that have shaped both early 
and post-war developments within the Post Office before finally assessing the current 
effects of full liberalisation more specifically on the Royal Mail itself.  
Having set the scene for a discussion of the current marketization of Royal Mail, attention 
turns to what have more recently been a succession of new HRM-based employer 
initiatives and their impact upon the working practices, behavioural patterns and 
organisational characteristics of postal workers. It is argued here that the significant 
success of postal workers as an occupational group in mediating the effects of these 
(Beale and Mustchin, 2013: 5) is in part down to their capacity to mobilise on a national 
scale to secure meaningful and sustained influence over the modernisation process. In a 
workplace context however, levels of workgroup efficacy has varied being crucially, in line 
with Batstone et al.’s (1977) study of shopfloor organisation, dependent upon the 
presence of a well organised active cohort of experienced workplace representatives, and 
in many cases the use or actual threat of immediate union-sponsored action by the 
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workgroup itself. The issue of shopfloor agency and how worker action both shapes, and 
is shaped by, a host of structural factors is the central concern of this study’s next chapter 
which discusses the overall analytical framework. Again, this will be located within the 
wider debates relating to worker organisation and market-driven change within the 
context of the Royal Mail itself.      
Chapter Five: Analysing workplace industrial relations 
This chapter presents a discussion of the study’s analytical framework which integrates 
Edwards’ (1988) study of conflict and accommodation and Batstone et al.’s (1977) study 
of shop stewards in action. It is argued here that such a model offers a robust medium 
through which to analyse the central question of how workers react to market-driven 
change within an increasingly marketized Royal Mail. Edwards’ focus on how structural 
forces both impact upon, and are mediated by, workgroup agency contributes to an 
understanding of the manner in which traditionally well organised workers within the 
Royal Mail react to the pressures of modernisation. However, unlike the case of Royal 
Mail, Edwards’ account is based on different groups of workers in a number of industries 
subject to a range of forces relating to their respective product market and technical 
organisation of work. It cannot, therefore, provide a comprehensive means to an 
understanding of why a relatively homogenous group of workers, covered by a uniform 
agreement and facing a single employer, have displayed a variety of patterns of behaviour 
in response to market-driven change within their industry (see Gall, 2003). Such a 
situation calls for an analysis of the subjective processes through which similar structural 
forces are mediated at workplace level. This is provided by Batstone et al.’s study Shop 
Stewards in Action (1977) which examines the nature of local shop steward organisation 
and its effect on worker agency. Again, this is related to a wider discussion of industrial 
relations within the Royal Mail.  
Chapter Six: Researching Modernisation in the Royal Mail  
This chapter sets out and discusses the study’s methodology. In doing it seeks to justify 
the rationale of a qualitative analysis of four individual Royal Mail sites that focuses on 
the actions and viewpoints of postal workers and their representatives at the level of the 
shopfloor itself.  Following Edwards (1988, 188) this is central to this study’s main area of 
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concern with the way workers react to market-driven change at this level, since an 
understanding of worker behaviour must focus upon struggles between workers and 
management at the point of production itself. Further support comes from a range of 
research (Beale, 2003; Gall, 2003; Beirne, 2013: Beale and Mustchin, 2013) which has 
identified the shopfloor as a key location where Royal Mail has, in recent times, 
attempted to restructure its relationship with its employees and their union. As has been 
already argued, resistance to this, particularly that involving the use of the strike weapon, 
has varied amongst workgroups within the Royal Mail and has been dependent upon a 
range of context-specific factors. These include management approach and its interaction 
with the union, nature of task, workplace size and workplace tradition (Gall, 2003: 149-
163).  This highlights the case for a qualitative, comparative and in-depth case study 
mode of enquiry, which this chapter then moves on to evaluate.  
The choice of an in-depth, comparative workplace analysis leads logically on to a 
consideration of the case study approach to research which was this study’s central 
means of inquiry. As a research strategy, case study research often uses techniques such 
as semi and unstructured interviews and observation with regard to phenomena which 
require the close observation of the researcher and sensitivity and awareness of the facts 
from interviewees within the process (Webb and Webb, 1932: 41, 136).  It will be argued 
that the on-going popularity of case study in the field of industrial relations reflects its 
suitability as an approach which provides insight into complex social phenomena (Kitay 
and Callus, 1998: 101). Whilst this might be the case, attention will also be drawn to what 
has been regarded as a shift away from such qualitative forms of research in recent years 
towards more quantitative managerial-focused methods (Whitfield, 2000: 145; Brown 
and Wright, 1994: 154). This is, to some extent, a reflection of the reduction in trade 
union influence in workplaces (Brown and Wright, 1994: 160-161). However, it is argued 
here that in an industry in which trade unionism remains strong and reminiscent of a 
period in which qualitative, empirically-based research enjoyed significant success in 
providing insights into strike proneness, shop steward activity and restrictive practices 
(ibid., 1994: 158), the use of qualitative case study research remains a relevant tool of 
analysis.  
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This chapter then provides an overview of the two main areas of Royal Mail’s operation 
from which the samples were drawn before providing details of each workplace under 
investigation. This includes workplace biography and the contractual situation, trade 
union status, gender, and numbers of those interviewed in each workplace. This is 
followed by an evaluation of the validity and reliability of the study’s research methods 
within the context of the workplaces themselves. Included here is both a recognition and 
evaluation of the researcher’s time spent working within the industry and the threats and 
opportunities that this potentially posed to the research’s objectivity. The individual 
workplaces under investigation are subsequently examined in the following findings 
chapter. 
Chapter Seven: Modernisation and workplace industrial relations within the Royal Mail 
- findings from four case studies 
This final substantive chapter of the thesis analyses the main findings from the four 
workplaces under investigation which are set out in two main thematic sections. The first 
of these looks at the extent to which the workgroup in each workplace can be categorised 
as collective-militant. Here attention initially focuses on the degree that each respective 
workgroup has, in spite of accelerating marketization, been able to exercise the 
significant levels of collective job controls that have long been associated with postal 
workers (Gall, 2003: 29). This is followed by a consideration of the degree to which 
worker commitment to the Communication Workers Union (CWU) within each workplace 
remains resistant to the growing presence of a raft of managerially-driven initiatives that 
seek to incorporate postal workers into the modernisation of their industry (Beirne, 2013: 
123). Of particular concern here is the effect that new technology and non-standard 
forms of employment have had on the frontier of control in each of the four cases as 
compared to how this existed in the recent past.  
The second main category of findings involves an evaluation of the extent of non-union 
based forms of individual and collective job controls within each workplace. While these 
workers may well have long-established collective shopfloor control mechanisms, Gall 
(2003) identifies sectionalism and unevenness in the quality of collectivism on the part of 
postal workers. This needs to be considered alongside the host of Employee Involvement 
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initiatives that have emerged within Royal Mail in recent years which are, according to 
Beale and Mustchin (2013), aimed at increasing management control vis-à-vis that of local 
workplace unionism. The findings themselves provide a reliable and valid basis from 
which to draw a number of conclusions regarding the state of workplace organisation 
within a fully liberalised Royal Mail. While these are discussed at some length in the 
conclusion to the findings, they are briefly summarised below.    
The empirical research provides evidence that on-going marketization within the industry 
has not served to erase many of the long-standing mechanisms through which postal 
workers have both regulated their workplaces and created space from their labour 
process. Much of these continue to be collectively-based, union-centred and both 
informal and formal. Moreover, their longevity has in many cases rested upon the 
capacity of the workgroup in question to exercise action which is collective, unofficial and 
direct. Across the workplaces studied, such patterns of behaviour tended to be more 
prevalent in those  establishments where an institutionally central (Batstone et al., 1977: 
10) local union was able, through a network of experienced representatives, officials and 
influential workplace opinion formers to foster a particular set of workplace values, 
beliefs and procedures that operated in its favour (ibid, 10). In turn these particular views 
and patterns of workplace behaviour were to an extent reflective of past workplace 
actions which here can be characterised as combative and solidary-based. As Hyman 
(1975: 154) notes traditions of solidarity like this highlight the efficacy of collective action 
amongst workers and in doing so reinforce their collective strength. In the case of Royal 
Mail such a situation would help to provide a bulwark to stem the latest and most virulent 
of a succession of employer change programmes that have sought both structural and 
attitudinal change amongst its workforce (Beirne, 2013).  
On the other hand, the findings also highlighted that, in some cases, reaction to 
managerial-driven change amongst some workers within the Royal Mail has been non-
union centred and largely individual. The incidence of this was, in terms of the workplaces 
under investigation, more prevalent where the local union itself was less centralised, 
removed from its parent branch’s cohort of senior officials and subject to a range of 
structurally-specific influences which militated against effective solidary-based action. 
Ironically, in some instances, individual behaviour which contravened the objectives of 
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the workplace union was provided with scope to thrive by the collective ability of its local 
membership to veto managerial initiatives that sought tighter control over worker 
behaviour.  
At the same time, most workers who carried out such practices still held union 
membership and had appeared largely not to have ‘bought in’ to a set of employer-driven 
Employee Involvement initiatives which sought to strengthen the role of management 
vis-a-vis the CWU (Beale and Mustchin, 2013: 14). As was the case with many collectively 
based, union-centred practices, individually-based action often involved recourse to tacit 
intimate occupational knowledge (Marchington, 1992: 155) which management were 
both operationally reliant on and at the same time found difficult to monitor.      
New technology, in the form of host of sophisticated surveillance mechanisms and the 
latest mail processing methods, had impacted unevenly upon each workgroup’s capacity 
to retain existing levels of shopfloor control. Again, this was related to the nature of 
worker organisation within each workplace and the degree to which each group might 
potentially respond this through negative sanctions.  All workgroups had, to some extent, 
been affected by an increase in non-standard forms of employment. This had presented 
management in some instances with the opportunity to make in-roads in to some long 
standing areas of union control such as intra-workplace cooperation (Drago, 1996), job 
demarcation and the going rate for overtime. Here too there were variations from 
workplace to workplace, with some groups proving better able than others to defend 
against such initiatives.   
The above may raise questions as to the longevity of strong workplace jobs controls 
within a Royal Mail characterised by ever increasing levels of non-standard employment 
and market-driven forms of technology. However, some degree of cooperation with 
management extended to all workgroups within this study and will continue to be an 
inherent feature of work relations within the Royal Mail and for that matter the wider 
capitalist labour market. As Edwards (1988: 188) notes workers are reliant on firms for 
their livelihoods, while employers need to secure workers’ continued willingness to work. 
In the case of this study, although some of the means through which workers attempted 
to redefine their effort bargain may have infringed formally defined standards of 
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behaviour, they were often tolerated by management since they contributed to, and at 
times accelerated, the achievement of organisational goals. At times this took the form of 
an informally agreed set of arrangements through which local management and union at 
workplace level were able to mediate market-driven change that, in line with Beirne’s 
(2013: 123) findings, carried for both parties the threat of work intensification and 
increasing job insecurity.  
This thesis now focuses more closely on the subject of marketization within a wider 
evaluation of the role of the UK state as both employer and regulator in chief of a 
capitalist economy (Allen, 1960: 113). This forms the main theme of what is the opening 
substantive chapter of this thesis examining public service modernisation within a Marxist 
framework of analysis. From this viewpoint, on-going liberalisation of the public services 
is viewed as a means through which the state provides an infrastructure to facilitate the 
extraction of surplus value and profit. Such a perspective shapes this thesis and provides a 
conceptual basis from which to analyse modernisation.   
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Chapter Two:  The state, the public sector and modernisation 
This chapter adopts a Marxist approach to examine a crucial aspect of modernisation, 
namely the role of the state in supporting the capitalist class in securing an economic 
structure to meet business needs. In the case of the public services, this has involved the 
provision of an infrastructure to facilitate the extraction of surplus value and profit which 
has included the transferal of public services into private ownership. Attention focuses 
upon the British state both in its role as employer and provider of public services within 
the UK.  Central to this is an evaluation of the state, and its role in supporting the 
capitalist class in securing an economic structure to meet business needs. This calls for a 
consideration of the manner in which successive governments, as part of this institution, 
have recently attempted to fundamentally reform the way in which public services are 
delivered and the consequences of this for its workforce within what has traditionally 
been referred to as the public sector.  
Such a focus involves an examination of modernisation and restructuring within the 
public sector, and how organisational and economic change are setting the context for 
and defining the roles of management at the level of the shopfloor. This is crucial to an 
understanding of some of the pressures that currently shape managerial action within 
Royal Mail and how this, in turn, affects and is affected by worker behaviour. As Gall 
notes (2003) governmental policies toward modernisation have been critical in focussing 
the minds of Royal Mail executives in ways of improving financial health and greater 
commercialisation. These objectives have, more recently been brought more sharply into 
focus on the shopfloor where local management have been charged with achieving ever 
greater market-driven change. This is supported by a range of academic data which point 
to this location as a key area where Royal Mail has in recent times attempted to 
restructure its relationship with both its employees and their union representatives 
(Beale, 2003; Beale and Mustchin, 2013; Beirne, 2013).  
The contemporary context 
Public service reform has been a high priority amongst policy makers in most OECD 
countries over the last 25 years or so. Bach and Kessler (2012: 3) argue that his has been 
brought about by a combination of factors including demographic shifts, increasing user 
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expectations and economic constraints on governments in supplying these services. In the 
case of the UK, significant change in the nature of the management and organisation of 
the public services, has led to changes in the composition and structure of the public 
sector workforce along with shifts in the relations between public sector employers and 
their workforce (ibid., 5). Whilst more latterly successive (New Labour) governments have 
emphasised the importance of highly motivated front-line staff in bringing about 
reformed and improved public services (Cabinet Office, 2008) the experience of this has 
often been mixed. In addition to concerns about its effect upon staff morale (Bach and 
Kessler 2012: 5), the type of managerial approach that has been associated with the 
implementation of public service reform has, according to Worrall et al. (2009: 118), led 
to an intensification of work for some workers and a reduction in control over their 
labour process.   
For some this amounts to the continuation of a process which, from the 1980s onwards, 
has involved the collapse of a traditional pattern of public sector industrial relations 
based on fairness, involvement and equity of its workforce centred upon the model 
employer aspirations of the state (Bach and Winchester, 2003: 287). From this viewpoint, 
the government’s attitude from 1979 onwards changed radically becoming increasingly 
opposed to industry-wide collective bargaining and placing more emphasis upon market 
forces and individual performance as opposed to its previously long held principle of the 
criterion of pay comparability (Fredman and Morris, 1989: 142-3).   
Alternatively, commentators such as Coffey and Thornley (2009:109) caution against the 
risk of assuming a golden age of state employment practices that predate public sector 
reform. The argument here is that, a longer view of public sector industrial relations 
indicates governmental concessions relating to the terms and conditions of its workforce 
have, when enacted, been essentially driven by changes in trade union membership and 
militancy and associated changes in the economy and global environment rather than its 
aspirations of good employer (ibid.: 92). This suggests that the nature of public sector 
employment ensures that the relationship between employees and government is 
essentially predicated upon and shaped by the government’s role of regulator-in-chief 
(Allen, 1960: 113) of an essentially capitalist economy. Any thorough understanding of 
recent reform must therefore involve a longer view of public sector industrial relations 
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and an analysis of the role of government within the wider context of its position within 
the capitalist state.  
In seeking to define public sector employment, Corby and White (1993: 3) note that it 
comprises those organisations providing public goods to citizens and public corporations. 
The main UK public services that fall within the ambit of the public sector (the terms 
public services and public sector will be used interchangeably here) are central 
government, which is broadly referred to as the civil service, local government, health, 
education, the police, fire services and the armed forces. With regard to public 
corporations, the current privatisation of the Post Office signifies the end of one of the 
last of a number of what were broadly termed nationalised industries which, although 
exposed to commercial markets, had traditionally been subject to a large degree of 
governmental control over finances (Kessler and Bayliss, 1998: 132; Allen, 1960: 92-93). 
Despite fluctuations over time, the public sector has for much of the last 100 years 
employed a considerable proportion of workers within the UK labour market (Bach and 
Winchester, 2003: 305). Having declined during the 1980s, public sector employment 
increased to around 20% of the UK’s workforce by 2010 (Bach and Kessler, 2012: 3-4). For 
commentators such as Fredman and Morris (1989: 25) the significance of the state as an 
employer stems from these large numbers of workers that it employs and the distinctive 
set of employment practices which, they argue have set an example for the private 
sector. It is these employment practices within the wider context of the long-standing 
structure of the public sector and its traditional model of industrial relations to which this 
chapter now turns.  
Early industrial relations within the public sector 
Until 1918, public sector employment largely related to that of those employed in the civil 
service which at this time stood at around 221,000 (Fry, 1995). It consisted of industrial 
workers employed on munitions, in dockyards, in the Office of Works and the Stationary 
Office; and non-industrial workers in the Post Office and Government administrative 
departments (Allen, 1960: 71). From then on, the government first became a large 
employer of labour in peacetime, taking temporary control of the railways and coal 
industries. This took on a more meaningful vein when legislation passed between 1945 
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and 1951 placed the coal industry, transport industry, the gas electricity, iron and steel 
industries in the public sector of the economy. This meant that, the civil service 
notwithstanding, more than 2.5 million people came under the control of the government 
and were employed in industries that were national in scope and basic ones within the 
British economy (ibid:90). Additionally, public sector employment was further swelled by 
a rapid growth of employment in health, education and the social services as part of the 
development of the welfare state (Bach, 2010: 153). Trade unionism within the latter area 
of employment was encouraged echoing the climate within the newly nationalised 
industries which were already heavily unionised (Coffey and Thornley, 2009: 100) and 
covered by well-established negotiating procedures. Whilst these were altered when the 
employer changed to that of the government, the practice of free collective bargaining 
continued (Allen, 1960: 90).  For Bach and Winchester (2003: 308), this is indicative of the 
state’s position as an employer from after the First World War. From this perspective, sick 
benefits, job security, procedures aimed at dispute resolution and a willingness to 
recognise trade unions was a central feature of public sector employment.  
Early indications of an approach which, for some, centred upon the government’s 
recognition of the need to promote stable industrial relations (Bach and Winchester, 
2003: 308) are evident in the case of the civil service. Here, recommendations for joint 
councils (Whitley councils) at local and national level where trade unions negotiated over 
terms and conditions of employment were established in 1919 (Allen, 1960: 73; Bach and 
Winchester, 2003: 308; Clegg, 1979: 104).  Whilst wages and working conditions were 
negotiated at national level, the remit of the local level councils included the systematic 
resolution of minor grievances (with large issues again being settled at national council) 
thereby emphasising a commitment to reconciling differences without reverting to overt 
conflict (Allen, 1960: 76; Winchester, 1983). It has to be said that trade union pressure for 
such a system of worker representation was, for some time, met with resistance from 
government (Coffey and Thornley, 2009: 97) and, furthermore, failed to prevent the 
government from at times using the civil service as an easy way of cutting public 
expenditure (Allen, 1960: 73-83) Nevertheless, this Whitley model of collective bargaining 
later spread to local government and the NHS and helped to reinforce the 
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institutionalised position of trade unions within the public sector (Bach and Winchester, 
2003: 308). 
In a similar vein, the philosophy of joint regulation and an emphasis on conflict resolution 
flowed through to those industries which were nationalised. Each industry was put under 
the control of a public corporation which, unlike the civil service departments, had a wide 
area of freedom from government intervention. That said, their respective managements 
were broadly accountable to the relevant government ministers and through them to 
parliament and ultimately the public (Pendleton and Winterton, 1993:2). The 
corporation’s industrial boards were the bargaining counterparts to the trade unions and 
were responsible for applying governmental labour policies. This was assisted by 
statutory provision for joint consultation (Pendleton and Winterton, 1993: 3; Allen, 1960: 
93) with machinery varying between industries but uniformly covering health, safety and 
welfare. In all cases negotiations relating to conditions of employment and consultation 
were separate processes (Allen, 1960: 93). As with the civil service, the so called ‘good 
employer’ obligation, coupled with procedural formalisation and centralised bargaining, 
resulted in a centralised well-developed personnel and industrial relations functions 
within management (Pendleton and Winterton, 1993: 4). A key concern of these 
managers was the generation and enforcement of agreements as to how labour was 
utilised and control over the labour management activities of line managers (ibid.). A 
governmental policy of internal recruitment and promotion ensured the prevailing 
culture of a consensual and bureaucratic approach towards industrial relations was 
maintained amongst senior management within this area of public employment (ibid.).             
For Pendleton and Winterton (1993: 2), nationalisation served to ensure that strategic 
industries operated in the national interest and benefited the public at large whist 
diluting the long-standing demands of the trade union movement for workers’ control 
(Clegg 1979: 153). Ironside and Seifert (2000: 36-37) take this a step further by adopting a 
Marxist perspective regarding governmental approach towards the wider subject of 
public sector employment and argue that; as well as meeting the demands of its citizens 
for health and security, protection from crude exploitation and a democratic system of 
government, government action is firstly driven by the following imperative; for 
government to meet the demands of sections of British industry and commerce to 
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maintain conditions for them to operate within a secure infrastructure to support profit-
making. Unlike the private sector, therefore, public sector relations contain an essential 
interaction (Corby and White, 1999: 3) which is inescapably influenced and directed by 
overarching political values and objectives (Storey, 1992: 55).  
Public sector relationships then, are unique in the degree of political control to which 
they are subject (Corby and White, 1999: 4). Whilst it is clear that the private sector is still 
subject to the legislative, social and economic initiatives of government, private sector 
employers remain largely free to regulate the employment relationship as they choose 
(ibid.). In the final analysis however, public sector mangers are governed by the political 
objectives of their masters who, in a democracy, will normally change from time to time 
(ibid.). This being the case, it would appear reasonable to argue that, government, as a 
result of their objectives and mandate, will at various times be concerned with changing 
its structures and organisation to resemble a manner which reflects the way in which it 
seeks to administer goods and services in society. Massey and Pyper (2005: 3, 80) argue 
that this has in recent times been expressed by successive governmental initiatives aimed 
at modernising their structures and organisations which signifies a change in, and has had 
important implications for, the way in which public services are managed. They go on to 
argue that throughout this process there has been a redefinition of the state and its 
proper size and function, as well as the rights and duties of ordinary citizens (ibid.). When 
referring to the state Massey and Pyper are alluding to government itself within the wider 
context of an elaborate state apparatus composed of Parliament, the Monarchy, the 
Cabinet, the Civil Service, the Armed Forces, the Police and the Judiciary which together 
govern the citizens of the UK (Harvey and Hood, 1958: 11). It follows that any 
understanding of the role of government as an employer of public service workers must 
take place within a wider analysis of its position within the state and its relationship with 
the other parties and actors who make up this entity.   
The nature of the capitalist state 
The nature of the British state, how it works, who runs it and in whose interests (Harvey 
and Hood, 1958: 9) is subject to strong debate resulting in rival theories. In spite of this 
divergence of opinion, what would seem indisputable is that the British political system, 
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which forms a central part of (and moreover acts on behalf of) the state, exists on the 
basis of a capitalist economy in which the greater part of industry, trade, finance and land 
is the private property of a small minority (ibid.: 9). The ownership of what can be termed 
here as the means of production arguably gives the capitalist owning class a grip over the 
lives of millions of wage earners who have no choice but to work for them and constantly 
enrich them. Whilst often accepting the basic tenets of this argument, proponents of this 
system argue that in such societies citizens enjoy universal suffrage, free and regular 
elections, representative institutions and effective citizens’ rights, including the right to 
free speech and freedom of opposition which are taken advantage of under the 
protection of the law, an independent judiciary and a free political culture (Miliband, 
1969: 2). As a result, the argument goes; no government acting on behalf of the state can 
fail in the long run to respond to the wishes and demands of competing interest groups. 
This model is often referred to as democratic pluralism. This is a political system in which 
all of the active interest groups within a society can play part in the process of decision 
making (ibid.: 2-3). Power in this instance is seen to be competitive, diffused and 
fragmented with no single interest group viewed as being over influential in terms of 
state policy and action (ibid.). In doing so it thus rejects the notion that the state might be 
an institution whose main purpose is to defend the predominance in society of a 
particular class interest.   
While the above viewpoint does not necessarily preclude the idea of state reform, it 
believes that any such reform should involve the strengthening of system itself (Miliband, 
1969: 4). Similarly, supporters of what is termed as a social democratic model whilst 
sometimes critical of the unequal distribution of wealth and power inherent within 
capitalist society, view any necessary redistribution through existing political processes 
and institutions (Harvey and Hood, 1958: 10). This view of the state was to find favour-no 
doubt unconsciously - amongst the early trade union movement within the UK (ibid.: 12) 
and explains the historical legacy of reformism which fails to address the fundamental 
relations of production between capital and labour. This has, in itself, according to Hyman 
been a key source of ruling class power and dominance within contemporary British 
society where political leaders have seldom expressed disagreement on the validity of the 
capitalist system (Miliband, 1969: 68-70). This raises questions as to whether a seemingly 
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ideologically consistent pattern of executive power within the UK is the reflection of value 
consensus within liberal democratic societies or an expression of an instrument of the 
capitalist state which has evolved to preserve the interests of capitalism (Harvey and 
Hood, 1958: 14). 
If, as Harvey and Hood suggest, the state exists and functions primarily to serve the 
interest of capitalism, then it follows from a Marxist perspective that, a key requirement 
of the state is that of the domination of society on behalf of the class who own the forces 
of production (Miliband, 1969: 24). This should not detract from some of the important 
gains such as voting, freedom of speech, and freedom of association that have been 
achieved by the working class within what Marxists would term “bourgeois states” such 
as the UK. However it is argued that these are concessions by the ruling class which do 
not weaken both its political power and subsequent rights to accumulate wealth via the 
ownership of the means of production (ibid.). Moreover, the Marxist argument that the 
ruling class has been able to maintain control of the entire machinery of the state, in 
which they as a class have historically occupied and ideologically controlled in the form of 
an elitist strata of officialdom (Miliband, 1969: 23, 66-68), highlights an important point: 
that although the government does speak in the name of the state and is formally 
invested with state power, it does not necessarily effectively control that power (ibid.: 
50). In contrast, therefore, to those who view contemporary capitalist society in terms of 
pluralism, Marxists would question the levels of control governments actually hold within 
such societies.  
Whilst Marxist analysis questions the objectivity and efficacy of the state, such 
approaches, as Jessop (1990: 145) notes have generated a body of critical literature. Its 
critics argue that Marxist theory often overlooks the fact that capital is accountable to the 
rule of law and in doing so Marxists are presented with a major theoretical problem. This 
is that the form of the state in modern capitalist society ostensibly constitutes an 
increasingly impersonal public authority with definite formal channels of representation 
and accountability that are tied to more or less developed notions of popular rather than 
class sovereignty (Jessop, 1990: 145). By starting from the assumption of the classical 
polarisation between reformism and revolution, Marxists have at times faced charges of 
narrowly evaluating the role of the state. A preoccupation here with only the negative 
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(and of course non-revolutionary) roles that the state carries out, renders such theory, for 
some, as an inadequate means of carrying out a thorough political economy of state 
apparatus (Frankel, 1982: 258).     
The ‘complex relations between the rule of capital and the modern state’ (Jessop, 1990: 
144) evidently provide problematic ground for the application of a Marxist analysis of the 
state within contemporary capitalist society. However, a range of theories which seek to 
examine the influence of structural, political and economic pressures upon state policy 
and action have emerged over recent decades. These take their cue from Marx, and begin 
from the premise that state policy is shaped and constrained essentially by the interest of 
capital. This is due to the economic dependence of the state on capital investment and its 
potential withdrawal by the ruling class. As such, what are effectively ‘veto powers’ here 
serve to reinforce the dominance of the ruling class and its ability to direct state policy 
and action (Jessop, 1990: 146).  
Alternatively, it is argued that there is a particular instrumentalist relationship between 
the ruling class (capital as a whole) on the one side and state apparatus on the other (Offe 
and Ronge, 1982: 249). From this viewpoint, the capitalist class employ, through the 
affiliation of the state elite and through those involved privately in the formulation of 
government policy, the state as an instrument to promote their interests at the expense 
of other groups (see Miliband, 1969). This instrumentalist model of the relationship 
between capital and the state is according to its proponents equally accessible, in 
principle, to all political forces and can also be feasibly used for any governmental 
purpose (Jessop, 1990: 145). 
For commentators such as Offe and Ronge (1982: 250-5) the key concern of the capitalist 
state within modern society is the guarding of the general interests of all classes on the 
basis of capitalist exchange relationships. Since the state is excluded from the productive 
core of the economy (Jessop, 1990: 148), it is reliant on the revenue from taxes, which 
are indispensable for the use of state power, brought about by the process of 
accumulation (Offe and Ronge, 1982: 250). It follows that every occupant of state power 
is fundamentally concerned with promoting those conditions most conducive to 
accumulation (ibid). Frankel (1982: 262) adds weight to this argument by drawing 
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attention to the role of particular organs of state apparatus in helping intensify, and 
provide legitimation to new commodity exchange relations, and thus, the accumulation 
process (for example, in areas of art, food and capital intensive industries).  
Offe and Ronge’s account of the on-going requirement for the capitalist state to foster 
conditions which sustain and furthermore, maximise exchange relations and the 
commodification of value finds favour amongst those who argue that the over-extension 
of public services leads to the ‘crowding out’ of the wealth-creating private sector 
(Ferner, 1994: 52). Worse still, from this viewpoint, is the charge that an ‘overloaded’ 
state sector providing welfare services (such as health, education, and social security) has 
been historically responsible for fiscal crisis and worsening public sector deficits (ibid.). 
The sentiments of this logic have underpinned successive governmental attempts to 
restructure public services in recent decades which, whilst by no means a new 
phenomenon, have since the 1980s led to the penetration of the ‘market’ to the very core 
of the state (ibid.: 53).  
The introduction of ‘market discipline’ with its emphasis upon competition and budgetary 
constraints, its proponents have consistently argued is a key means of engendering 
efficient performance into what has been (and from some quarters continues to be) 
viewed as a largely inefficient bureaucratic public services within the UK (Fredman, 1999: 
54). Ironside and Seifert (2000: 6-7) identify the above discourse as part of a wider neo-
liberal approach towards the political economy of advanced capitalist nations which 
advocate the liberalisation of trade and finance in which the market sets the price and 
government ‘gets out of the way’.  In a broader context, the main features of neo-
liberalism and its core concern with removing all fetters on capital’s search for profits 
might be viewed as a set of policies and processes whereby a handful of private interests 
are permitted to control as much as possible of social life in order to maximise their 
personal profit (McChesney, 1999: 7-8).  
Ironside and Seifert (2000:7) go on to argue that the adoption of neo-liberal policies by 
government amounts to the argument that the state should act to support the interests 
of large companies at the expense of its citizens.  In doing so the state must promulgate 
the myth that there is no alternative and that profit seeking free competition is the only 
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guarantor of efficiency (ibid).  The continuing rhetoric of this approach therefore, has 
been that of a concern with shrinking the public sector which, and is reflective of the 
approaches adopted by both Conservative and Labour governments since the 1980s 
(Shaoul, 1999: 29). Attempts to introduce reform into the public services via the 
application of private sector free market ideas (Fredman and Morris, 1989: 142-143) have 
been accompanied by significant changes in employment relations (Bach and Winchester, 
2003: 285) in an area of employment where the political sensitivity of the quality of public 
services had arguably encouraged stable relations (Bach and Winchester, 2003: 310;  
Freedman and Morris, 1989) characterised by extensive union involvement (Corby and 
White, 1999: 18). Furthermore, government have sought to introduce these changes in a 
variety of ways (Fredman, 1999: 54) that have reflected a profound shift in wider labour 
market ideology and employment practice (Coffey and Thornley, 2009: 14). This has 
included initiatives such as privatisation, public sector cuts, public sector restructuring 
and anti-trade union legislation (Ironside and Seifert, 2000: 9).  
Modernisation and managerialism 
Privatisation can take a number of forms and shapes including: the total or partial 
conversion of a public corporation or nationalised industry into a limited company; 
government disposal of some or all of its shares it holds in specific bodies; or breaking the 
monopoly held by a state concern (Massey and Pyper, 2005: 46). This may further include 
the introduction of competitive tendering or market testing into public services (ibid.). 
Bach and Winchester (2003: 286) remind us that this was the most visible part of an on-
going public sector reform programme of successive post 1979 Conservative governments 
based upon the following logic: state control and public sector organisations were 
inefficient organisations, over dependent upon subsidy, and unaware of, and unable to 
meet, the demands of their customers. Privatisation, it is argued, would directly address 
this problem and alleviate the strain on public borrowing by transferring large numbers of 
the workers from the public to the private sector whilst providing revenue through the 
sale of assets to the Treasury (Massey and Piper, 2005: 83). The commitment to 
privatisation not only brought about the blurring of private and public sector boundaries 
(Cabinet Office, 1995: 127) but also appeared to cut across and arguably blur previous 
party political divisions as to the role of the state within contemporary society. Whilst the 
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privatisation of swathes of the public sector began tentatively, signifying as Coffey and 
Thornley (2009: 62) note a massive divestiture of state assets, it was to gather pace with 
an implementation process that proved to mature over time through (amongst other 
processes) the New Labour-inspired Private Finance Initiative (PFI) (Massey and Pyper: 
2005: 108). 
The Private Finance initiative (PFI) refers to the arrangement where the public sector 
contracts to purchase services on a long term basis ‘so as to take advantage of private 
sector skills incentivised by having private sector finance at risk. This includes concessions 
and franchises where a private sector partner takes on the responsibility for providing a 
public service, including maintaining, enhancing or constructing the necessary 
infrastructure’ (HM Treasury, 2000: 10). The public sector thereby engages the private 
sector to not only finance but also to design, construct or refurbish facilities as well as 
providing related support services under what is typically a long-term contract (Pollock 
and Price, 2004; Sawyer, 2003).  
Bach and Kessler (2012: 82) identify PFI as one of three externalisation streams favoured 
by New Labour which, whilst symbolising a shift from ideology to efficacy in terms of 
service provision, have continued and indeed extended the involvement of private and 
‘third sector’ contractors in the public services. PFI was introduced alongside a ‘softer’ 
form of outsourcing (Best Value process) which nevertheless intensified pressure to 
contract out ancillary or back office activities, along with (thirdly) the situating of publicly 
funded core services beyond the boundaries of the public sector to be delivered by 
private or independent sector organisations. Again, as with earlier privatisation 
programmes, there would appear to be a clear predisposition here which favours private 
sector over public sector organisation and a working assumption that private sector 
management is better management (Coffey and Thornley, 2009: 77).  
Programmes such as privatisation and market testing are recognised as part of a wider 
paradigm including globalisation, and the hollowing out of the state, in which the state 
itself has contracted out its traditional responsibilities to others. This represents a move 
away from the long-standing manner in which the state has sought to administer services 
based upon notions of sense of duty, hierarchical arrangement of tasks, functional 
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division of labour and recruitment on the basis of profession and qualification (Corby and 
White, 1999: 9). Such an approach is often generically referred to as a public 
administration approach towards public services and public service employment (ibid). By 
contrast, the great tranche of reforms and deep-seated changes that have taken place 
within the public sector over recent decades may be seen as essentially management-
centred and often management–led (ibid).  
This new managerialist approach has been dubbed ‘new public management’ (NPM) 
(Dunleavy and Hood, 1994) and contains a neo-liberal ideological belief in the primacy of 
market principles (Bach and Kessler, 2012: 25). Here private sector managerialism is seen 
as key in the transforming of what are perceived as bureaucratic, paternalistic and 
democratically passive public services into efficient, responsive and consumer-orientated 
ones (Ransom and Stewart, 1994). Corby and White (1999: 6) note the on-going 
preference for a managerial, as opposed to administrative type, approach within the 
contemporary public sector which not only finds favour amongst practitioners but also 
permeates party political boundaries. Thus, New Labour, whilst advocating in some ways 
a more interventionist role than its Conservative predecessors, largely accepted the 
values and assumptions of neo-liberal reform and the principle that public service 
provision and policy are not the exclusive concern of government (Bach and Kessler: 
2012: 29).   
New Public Management then is operationally central to the on-going attempts to bring 
about public service reform over recent decades and is founded on a critique of the 
classic model of public administration discussed earlier. However, whilst it is clear that its 
approach originates from three theoretically linked schools of thought (as in the Virginia, 
Chicago and Austria schools) all of which advocate a more privatised civil dominated 
society (ibid), there would appear to be disagreement as to just how novel and innovative 
NPM actually is. Commentators such as Pollitt (1990: 1) condemn NPM and its associated 
practices of performance measurement as Neo-Taylorist. They evoke a culture which, as 
Corby and White (1999: 38) note, rather than developing a responsive customer-focussed 
organisation, establishes a stultified climate of auditing and monitoring.  
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The effects of what has been viewed as a variant of scientific management have, 
according to critics, resulted in some public servants believing that they were being 
subjected to work intensification, with employees in some services reporting that they 
were working harder and longer hours (Edwards and Whitston, 1991; Lloyd and Seifert, 
1995; Sinclair et al., 1995). It is important to recognise that this evidence stems from the 
latter years of a Conservative administration which consistently proved to be preoccupied 
with cost minimisation in contrast to a succeeding New Labour Government which was 
ostensibly committed to (albeit individual) workforce involvement and partnership (Bach 
and Winchester, 2003: 292). However, the following point should be considered; for its 
critics New Labour’s programme of public sector reform, or rather its preferred term of 
‘modernising government’ (Cabinet Office, 1999) represented a continuation and indeed 
intensification of previous Conservative governments’ embrace of new public 
management (Bach and Winchester, 2003). 
The arguments so far presented point, in some respects, to a party political convergence 
in approach over recent decades towards the restructuring or (to use more recent 
parlance) ‘modernisation’ of public services. The assumption that ideological differences 
between left and right had lost their potency and that government was judged on the 
basis of results rather than sentiment was to prove an important tenet for the prominent 
role afforded to performance management in New Labour’s modernisation agenda (Bach 
and Kessler, 2012: 48-9). During its period in office New Labour relied on a series of target 
indicators, reward systems and performance appraisal to strengthen individual and 
organisational performance (ibid.). This was accompanied by an increased interest in 
flexible working reflected in the increased preference for varying employees’ working 
hours, the rapid and contingent change in worker numbers employed by public service 
organisations, and outsourced activities by contractors (ibid.: 75).  
Whilst the above was integral to a wider HR agenda and discourse in which government 
committed to valuing rather than denigrating public service public service reform under 
New Labour would appear to have continued to impact negatively upon the terms and 
conditions of public sector workers. As Coffey and Thornley (2009: 106) note, New Labour 
governments, despite introducing legislation around public sector equalities, during their 
time in office, presided over, amongst other things, a very sizable and badly 
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underestimated gender pay gap in its role as employer (ibid.). It is this latter point, in 
particular, which provides an example of the significant employment of state rhetoric in 
the creation of a narrative in which public sector employment has long been associated 
with providing superior terms and condition when compared to those in the private 
sector. 
In a similar way that it has used the model employer narrative to neutralise worker 
action, the capitalist state, Miliband argues, through a variety of means and institutions 
has played a notable and ever growing part in the fostering of a view of national 
allegiance eminently functional to the existing social order which rejects ‘alien’ and 
‘extreme’ doctrines which may pose a challenge to it (1969: 209). The capitalist state 
itself through the process of ‘political socialisation’ plays the essential role of persuading 
subordinate classes to accept the whole structure of political and economic domination 
and to confine their aspirations and demands within its limits (ibid.: 178). This situation is 
reinforced by the ability of capitalist big business, by virtue of its economic power, to 
wield vast ideological, political and, in its broadest sense, cultural influence on society at 
large (ibid.: 211). The capitalist class, it would appear, is thus able to effectively promote 
free enterprise, and business needs in the face of potential reformist governments by 
shifting the ideological and political parameters in which debate over issues such as state 
ownership of resources takes place (ibid.: 212-213)   
With Miliband’s argument in mind, it would seem evident that the pressures that have 
given rise to the privatisation of public services in advanced capitalist economies emanate 
in no small part from the desire of a relative handful of private interests to be permitted 
to control as much as possible of social life in order to maximise their personal profit 
(McChesney, 1999: 7-8). That such a free market approach towards public service delivery 
has been allowed to thrive despite often being at odds with public opinion (Hall, 2010: 
115), further emphasises the economic power of the capitalist class to use the state and 
its government as its instrument for the domination of society (Miliband, 1969: 23). 
Privatisation and liberalisation have generated easy sales, windfall gains for the buyers of 
shares and quick profit and large rewards for those organisations involved in arranging 
the privatisations and management of public services (Coffey and Thornley, 63: 79). In 
light of this, it is unsurprising to note that the capitalist class has often articulated through 
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its influence over governmental policy, and ownership of the mass mediums of 
communication, the case for public service reform and the free-market logic which 
accompanies this. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has adopted a Marxist perspective to analyse the nature of the British state 
as both employer and regulator of a capitalist economy. In doing so, it has argued that a 
key requirement of state is that of fostering conditions which sustain capitalist exchange 
relations (Offe and Ronge, 1982: 250-255) in a manner that is favourable to the interests 
of the capital class.  Public service reform over the last 30 years can therefore be viewed 
as an attempt by the state to provide an infrastructure to facilitate the extraction of 
surplus value and profit. This has involved the transferal of public services into private 
ownership in the context of enhanced competitive and performance pressures and 
changing organisational structures.   
This is part of a wider paradigm including globalisation, and the hollowing out of the 
state, in which the state itself has contracted out its traditional responsibilities to others. 
According to some commentators, this has been ushered in through a managerial 
approach that is representative of a shift in traditional models of public sector 
management. This is predicated on the neo-liberal ideological belief in the primacy of free 
market principles and has altered employment relations in the public services between 
the workforce and their employers (Bach and Kessler, 2012: 5, 25; Bach, 2010: 169).  A 
key feature here has been that of a more financially accountable management invested 
with greater local autonomy to pursue, through comprehensive systems of performance 
management, ever greater workforce efficiency and increased performance. While this 
may have been the case, Worrall et al. (2009: 120) have noted that it has not necessarily 
meant a straightforward shift in control from workforce to management. On the contrary, 
change has been the mediated outcome of the dialectic interplay between management 
action and worker reaction (ibid.).  
Such a context is essential to any analysis of contemporary shopfloor relations within the 
Royal Mail and the pressures which have influenced the actions of both management and 
workers here. In line with this chapter’s argument, government policies have been critical 
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in focussing the minds of the organisations senior executives in a context of accelerating 
competition (Gall, 2003). Like the wider public services, top-driven change has been 
applied almost continuously to the UK postal services since the late 1980s. Again, 
concerns to rationalise have stimulated and underpinned new management techniques 
for overseeing and communicating with staff (Martinez Lucio et al., 2000). More recently, 
a series of restructuring agreements between the Royal Mail and the Communication 
Workers Union have, like other areas of the public sector, devolved responsibility for 
realising ever greater market-driven change to actors at locus of the individual workplace 
(Beirne, 2013). Attempts to affect change here too have been far from straightforward 
and have often run up against robust and combative unionism (Gall, 2003).      
The complexities of shopfloor worker management relations form the basis of a detailed 
discussion in the following chapter. Much of this initially takes place through the lens of 
labour process theory (Braverman, 1974) and involves a consideration of how managerial 
strategies are both perceived and met by workers at the point of production itself. This 
provides the basis for an in-depth investigation into the nature of shopfloor struggle and 
the factors which affect the efficacy and form of worker agency that individual 
workgroups might exhibit.  
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Chapter Three: The management of labour, unions and workplace industrial relations  
The majority of this chapter adopts a workplace focus to investigate worker management 
relations at the point of production. In doing so it provides an important contribution to 
this study’s later analysis of shopfloor relations within the Royal Mail. In recent years the 
shopfloor has become a key area where an increasingly market-sensitive Royal Mail 
management have attempted to restructure working practices and increase the output of 
UK postal workers (Beale and Mustchin 2013; Beirne, 2013). This has evoked a range of 
responses in an industry where one relatively uniform group of workers are employed by 
one single employer (Gall, 2003). Insight into the factors which shape both this variety of 
responses by postal workers and, more generally, the actions of their managers in the 
workplace is gleaned here through an investigation of the following. Firstly, an analysis of 
management’s profit driven imperative within a capitalist economy and its subsequent 
pre-occupation with countering, what is perceived as, low productivity in labour intensive 
public services (Worrall et al., 2009: 118). This is followed by an evaluation of the factors 
which influence both the form and efficacy of shopfloor worker agency. Central to this is a 
consideration of the means through which management might try to maximise output 
and the variety of ways in which workers resist this.  
Attention then turns to an investigation of the impact of political and economic factors 
upon collective forms of worker regulation within both the private and public sector in 
recent decades. This involves an evaluation of the relevance of strike action as means of 
defending terms and conditions within a contemporary setting of restrictive trade union 
legislation and union decline. From here, this chapter moves on to examine the impact of 
non-standard forms of employment on trade union organisation.  Again, such context 
serves to enhance the subsequent discussion of the extent to which UK postal workers 
have tempered the impact of both market-driven technological change and a growth in 
insecure workers on established job controls. 
Labour management and public sector reform 
The previous chapter highlighted the on-going attempts by successive UK governments to 
reform public services. These have gathered pace dramatically in recent years 
accentuating a pattern of persistent organisational change within the public sector since 
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the 1980s (Ironside and Seifert, 2004: 58). A key feature of this shift has been an attempt 
by government to introduce into public sector organisations a regime of assertive 
managerialism with a view to running public services along the lines of sound business 
principles (Mather et al., 2005).  This has encouraged widespread experimentation with 
Human Resource Management-based practices that are ultimately concerned with 
reducing labour costs through a general process of skill mix changes, intensification of 
effort, and the tightening of work controls (Worrall et al., 2009).    
For its critics, the increasing reliance on HRM-based practice by public sector 
management has been viewed as being detrimental to public sector employees in all 
sectors (Worrall et al., 2009: 128-9). From this viewpoint, HRM involves a whole range of 
techniques designed to strengthen managerial control over staff performance and costs 
including: job evaluation, tighter workforce supervision and labour flexibility and 
employee participation schemes designed to weaken trade union influence (Ironside and 
Seifert, 2000: 11). These methods are often associated with Taylor’s principles of scientific 
management in which managerial sovereignty in all areas of the labour process serves to 
ensure that work done at the point of production meets the needs of the employer 
(ibid.). Such an approach has brought about a shift in the locus of control of work for 
many public sector workers. This involves control over pace, quality and volume of task 
shifting from well organised-often professionally qualified- employees to managers, and 
the unilateral transferral of aspects of work to less qualified, less unionised and cheaper 
workers (Corby and Symon, 2011; Worrall et al., 2009: 131; Mather et al.,2005).  
Some commentators have viewed the above as an on-going process of the degradation of 
labour within the public sector (Mooney and Law, 2007; Whitfield, 2006). Such arguments 
mirror those of Miliband (1969) who notes that the government, as part of the state, is 
essentially concerned with maintaining the capitalist economy at the expense of wage 
earners.  It follows that a clearer understanding of the market-driven logic of public sector 
labour management is best achieved through an analysis of the relationship between 
capital and labour within the framework of Braverman’s approach to the labour process 
theory. This, as Edwards (2010: 35) notes, fundamentally concerns recognition of the 
labour process itself, not as work in general but as a form of human activity which takes a 
particular character under capitalism.  
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The labour process, management, workers and shopfloor struggle 
Braverman (1974), drawing on Marx, argues that the labour process within a capitalist 
society has transformed from one of a general process of creating useful values to one of 
creating surplus capital and profit. From this perspective, workers, within the context of a 
capitalist free market system, are both perceived and legally adjudged to freely enter into 
a contract of employment with employers; in doing so they agree to do work in exchange 
for wages from their employer. However, a combination of powerful economic and social 
forces (Ironside and Seifert, 2000: 9) effectively compels workers to enter work in order 
to gain a livelihood (Braverman, 1974: 51-53). The extent to which the contract of 
employment in which they enter into is fulfilled is largely indeterminate. This means that 
workers in most employment situations bring to the workplace their capacity to work; the 
actual amount of work and the actual quality of work are not specified (Ironside and 
Seifert, 2000: 9). When purchasing the services of the worker what the capitalist 
employer buys is not an agreed amount of labour but the power of the worker to work 
over an agreed period of time (Braverman, 1974: 54). Ironside and Seifert (2000: 13) note 
that under a capitalist mode of production it is the capitalist who owns the means of 
production and that production itself rests on one fundamental purpose, to enrich the 
owners. This is achieved by paying workers less than the value of the work that they 
produce.  
For Ironside and Seifert (ibid.) the extraction of surplus value from workers by employers 
amounts to exploitation. Workers, however, are not only exploited by this process they 
are alienated from the product of their work because they produce services and goods for 
the employer rather than themselves. That they do not own the means and organisation 
of production, and are, by virtue of their contract of employment, easily dispensable, 
means that they surrender their interest in the labour process itself (Hyman, 1975: 76) 
with the labour process itself becoming the responsibility of the capitalist. In this setting 
of antagonistic relations of production, the capitalists’ essential requirement to realise 
the full usefulness of the labour that they have acquired is hampered by the opposing 
interests of those whose purposes the labour process is carried on, and those who, on the 
other side, carry it on.   It follows that the central task of those in control of the means of 
production, namely employers and their managerial agents, must be that of seeking 
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tighter control over the labour process in order to realize maximum output and profit 
(Braverman, 1974: 56). While Braverman locates this argument within the very nature of 
industrial capitalism, it is, as this chapter has already suggested, equally applicable to the 
requirements that face management within contemporary marketized public services; 
that of how to counter low productivity within what are labour-intensive services (Worrall 
et al., 2009: 118).  
Judged from a labour process theory perspective, public sector modernisation with its 
emphasis upon managerial sovereignty, progressive job fragmentation and deskilling, is 
underpinned with the requirement that has been historically inherent within the capitalist 
mode of production; that of ensuring that control over the labour process pass from 
worker to owner (Braverman 1974: 58). Central to the inherent necessity for capital to 
increase the yield of surplus value from workers is the requirement that its production 
techniques are constantly revolutionised (Nichols 1979: 29) Integral to this is the sub-
division and fragmentation of tasks, through which skilled work is destroyed and labour 
power cheapened to a commodity status (Braverman, 1974: 82). 
While it can now be argued that technology itself is part of the labour process, it in itself 
is decisively shaped by particular actors, forces and social factors. Workplace technologies 
are appropriated, deployed designed, implemented and even invented by management in 
the interests of capital accumulation and the organisation of work (Hall, 2010: 164). 
Similarly, managerial strategies such as Taylorism are essentially concerned with securing 
total control over alienated labour (Braverman, 1974: 89-90). Central to this is the 
assumption that management should exclusively dictate the precise manner in which 
work is organised. The scope of this ranges from the simplest to the most complex of 
tasks (ibid.: 90), essentially through the medium of work measurement and job 
fragmentation (Rose, 1988: 26). These principles form the bedrock of all modern work 
designs and effectively strip workers of knowledge thereby reducing them to 
undifferentiated labour (Braverman, 1974)       
The essence of the above argument is that there is a long-running tendency through 
fragmentation, rationalisation and mechanisation, for workers and their jobs to become 
deskilled. As a consequence, workers, regardless of their personal abilities, are more 
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easily and cheaply substituted in the production process (Zimbalist, 1979). However, 
labour process researchers have, in recent times, become more sensitive to a broad range 
of outcomes when it comes to the question of the impact of technology on skills. From 
this viewpoint, the shift from a relatively simple story of technology as de-skilling to a 
more complicated story of diverse skill implications mirrors the increasing complexity of 
technologies at work and particularly the rise of information and communication 
technologies. However, though this may emphasise the unsustainability of the deskilling 
thesis in its original form, the control imperative aspect of labour process theory has 
according to Hall (2010: 166) proved more durable. Enhanced systems of technological 
resourcing planning have, for example, been seen to extend management control by 
imposing standardised business processes on workers and the labour process. The 
development of such IT-based methods of company-wide business processes are critical 
to the control regimes of organisations that seek to coordinate activities across teams, 
business units, divisions, sites and indeed countries (ibid.: 176).      
Again, though Hall may be referring to companies within the private sector, some 
commentators would regard this process as being particularly relevant to the on-going 
reform and modernisation of the public sector (Mather et al., 2005: 5). State employees 
too, since they must sell their labour power are subsumed under the authority of their 
employer. Such a focus on what is essentially the long-term degradation of work must not 
however detract from the ways in which workers might resist or modify capitalist systems 
of control (Edwards, 1988: 187). In particular, the public sector is essentially labour 
intensive and still associated with comparatively high levels of worker organisation (Gold 
and Veersma, 2011). Here the inherently conflictual attempts by management to redefine 
effort bargain (Edwards and Scullion, 1982) and thereby threaten long-standing working 
practices, have often been a contested area of workplace relations (Worrall et al., 2009). 
The notion of the workplace as a terrain upon which workers and managers compete for 
control is analysed most effectively by Goodrich (1920). He places emphasis upon the 
dynamic way in which regulation over effort levels and work organisation is played out 
between management and groups of workers (ibid.). The shifting point where workers 
and managers struggle to influence the way in which work is organised and rewarded is 
referred to by Goodrich as the frontier of control and often involves accepted custom and 
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practice rather than stated principle. Edwards (1990) terms this the negotiation of order, 
where struggles between workers and employers create understandings as to how work 
is performed, the result of the structured antagonism between capital and labour. The 
capacity of groups of workers to shape their own situation and, thus, shift the frontier of 
control, can not only vary but also involve the deployment of numerous strategies. Apart 
from the withdrawal of labour, these may include output restriction, rigid task 
demarcation, and withdrawal of cooperation (Goodrich, 1920; Edwards, 1990).    
There are, however, a variety of other ways that, while constituting a response to the 
nature of capitalist work relations, do not necessarily suggest a collective attempt to 
shape the way in which work is organised and rewarded. Absenteeism, labour turnover, 
sabotage, or quitting for example have all often been regarded as expressions of conflict 
within the workplace (Kerr, 1964: 232; Knowles, 1952: 10). Such responses at times 
represent the only available means through which some workers can influence their work 
situation in the absence of more collectively centred control mechanisms (Lupton 1963; 
Edwards and Scullion, 1982). The propensity of workers to act in the ways that they do is 
related to two main and interrelated sets of factors. Firstly, the micro political nature in 
which the frontier of control has developed. And secondly, the way in which product 
market forces and other external factors have affected this (Edwards, 1988). 
In order for workgroups to both challenge and collectively influence the actions of 
management they must first be aware of their ability to, and the legitimacy of their right 
to, question managerial decision making. A prerequisite for collective worker action is an 
awareness of what Brown (1973: 144) refers to as their potential bargaining power which 
is sustained through a network of workplace contacts espousing particular sets of values 
(Batstone et al., 1977: 100). Whilst this awareness is essential in strengthening the 
effectiveness of worker action, the bargaining power of a workgroup depends upon 
external factors over which the group often has little control such as the product market 
and production process (Brown, 1973: 144). Added to this, Lupton (1963) argues, is the 
influence of wider union policy towards workplace organisation, workplace size and 
particular mode of payment system. However, while such factors influence relations 
between workers and managers, they are as Edwards (1988: 201) argues not 
determinate, since they have to be interpreted at workplace level.   
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Edwards and Scullion (1982) identify a range of factors inherent within the structure of 
controls within workplaces. These include historical, occupational, and managerial 
characteristics that can militate to prevent workers from being aware of their bargaining 
power and thus nullify collective expressions of conflict and control. Similarly, systems of 
production including the layout of machinery and equipment, can be viewed as setting 
limits to the social solidarity, collective consciousness and effectiveness of workgroups 
(Lupton, 1963: 16; Batstone et al., 1977). That said labour as a factor of production, is 
problematic (Batstone et al., 1977). Workers themselves often possess tacit on the job 
skills that may be used as a means of making work more tolerable. These skills contain 
both physical and attitudinal elements and can be deployed to either thwart or support 
managerial objectives (Marchington, 1992). This means that its inherent necessity to 
constantly renew the production process (Nichols, 1979: 29) forces capital to seek some 
level of creative cooperation from labour (Hall, 2010: 162).   
It follows that management must identify conditions under which workers are most likely 
to cooperate in order to increase or maintain marginal wage disparity short of manifest 
conflicts (Baldamus, 1961: 126; Braverman, 1974: 110). From a more contemporary 
perspective, Belanger and Thuderoz, (2010: 141) identify the increasing prevalence of a 
range of ‘softer strategies’ which for example, in calling upon employees to become 
actors within a team, project or so on, seek to strengthen worker association with the 
requirements of production. Sturdy et al., (2010: 116) term these as normative models of 
control which help exploit workers through the indoctrination of corporate values rather 
than traditional methods of direct coercion.  
The issue of worker consent is central to Burawoy’s (1979) study of factory piecework 
systems.  From this viewpoint, worker consent is elicited at the point of production where 
workers, often with tacit supervisory support, manipulate and subvert formal rules and 
relationships.  In doing so they attempt to both limit the deprivations of the labour 
process whilst at the same time striving to achieve levels of output that earn incentive 
pay (ibid.: 51) Burawoy (1979: 82) goes on to argue that such actions nevertheless at 
times might be key in facilitating managerial objectives. By participating in the above 
process workers are both distracted from exploitative nature of their own labour process 
and helping to reproduce the general control of capital over labour (ibid.). Moreover, the 
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degree of autonomy that workers might enjoy with regard to pursuing earnings can bring 
about a level of individuality amongst them. This leads to the conflict between capital and 
labour being translated from that of hierarchical domination into lateral antagonism on 
the shopfloor (ibid.: 65-7).     
Shopfloor organisation: workers and their stewards 
This chapter has so far examined a range of structural factors which influence worker 
agency. Such a focus does not answer the question as to why some groups of workers 
might be more effective than others in similar sets of industrial circumstances. As 
Edwards (1988: 209) notes, the influence of structural conditions is important but these 
have effect only because of the ways in which they are mediated by experience. Worker 
action does not merely fill in the gaps left by structural forces, it interprets and gives 
meaning to them (ibid.: 205-6). From this viewpoint, an appreciation of some of the key 
characteristics of workgroups which might facilitate their ability (and, importantly, their 
representatives’ ability) as active agents to build up job controls (Terry and Edwards, 
1988) can only be gained by revisiting what Edwards (1988) identifies as the dynamic and 
dialectic theme of shopfloor relations.  
The ability of workers and their unions to advance their interests is critically dependent 
on the power resources that they have at their disposal (Simms and Charlwood, 2010: 
128). Unions (and employers) can be thought of as being able to draw on two types of 
power resource The first, legitimacy power, refers to power that unions have because 
employers (sometimes through legislation) accept the legitimacy of a union’s 
representation and bargaining roles. The second is coercive power, the expression of 
which may take the form of job control by workgroups and refers to the power to force 
someone to do something because they fear the consequences of not doing it (ibid.). Job 
control might be defined as all the means used by workers and their unions to influence 
the pace and the timing of work, the balance between effort and reward and the 
conditions impinging on the immediate effort bargain (Scullion and Edwards, 1988: 125). 
This may find expression in worker influence over workplace issues such as the division of 
tasks, allocation of overtime and the application of discipline (Edwards: 1988). Such 
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controls are dependent upon the establishment and maintenance of strong shopfloor 
organisation (Edwards, 1988; Edwards and Scullion, 1982). 
Collective worker activism is a social process and is directed by values and systems of 
belief (Beynon, 1973) that must be developed and, due to the ever present threat of 
adverse forces from inside and outside of the workplace, sustained. Rather than being 
determined by technological factors, the expansion of workers’ margin of discretion is 
realised through their own consciousness, social activity and organisation (Belanger and 
Evans, 1988). Workgroup organisation is developed, in part, through processes of 
socialization which are, according to Batstone et al. (1977: 225), created and maintained 
within domestic organisations by those with the ability to identify, shape and direct issues 
in the manner required. From this viewpoint, the collective aims of workers are 
dependent upon and inextricably linked to workgroup leaders or spokespersons without 
whom they would find difficulty in effectively using their power (Brown, 1973: 132; 
Batstone et al., 1977: 225).     
When discussing leadership in terms of workplace trade unionism, Brown (1972: 132) 
notes that the power of shop stewards stems from the workgroup that they represent 
and, in particular, the willingness and ability of that group to act collectively in pursuance 
of its interests. This means that stewards’ power is limited by, and concomitant upon, the 
support of its members (Batstone et al., 1977). While this might be the case, steward 
leadership involves an ability to undertake certain courses of action without direct resort 
to the membership and crucially the capacity to influence membership attitudes (ibid.: 
99). The legitimacy of such types of strong leadership can often be located within its role 
in past shopfloor struggles and achievements (Beynon 1973: 29; Batstone et al.: 1977) 
and is essential in forming an ideological base upon which effective workplace trade 
unionism can be built (Batstone et al., 1977: 122). 
If shop stewards are able to influence the perspectives which their members adopt 
(Batstone et al.; 1977), it must be borne in mind that their leadership is not permanent. 
The members who elect them have specific expectations of their stewards. This dictates 
that the latter must acquire adequate resources which allow them to negotiate with the 
same members upon whose support their power, and indeed existence they are 
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dependent (ibid: 105, 129).  A key means by which shop stewards achieve this is through 
their relationship with other workers whom Batstone et al. (ibid.: 100) term as ‘opinion-
leaders’. From this viewpoint, it is argued that stewards are able to gain support for 
particular courses of action through the maintenance of a supportive network of social 
relationships (Hyman 1975: 161) with fellow workers who are influential in terms of 
shaping opinion within the wider workgroup (ibid.: 102). The essence of shop steward 
leadership in this context is the development of such networks of opinion leaders, and 
moreover, co-stewards. Such contacts can help espouse particular sets of values which 
justify decision making and reaffirm a level of collective awareness that is deemed to be 
essential for effective workplace action (Brown, 1972; Hyman, 1975).    
In his study of shopfloor workers in a car plant, Beynon (1973: 102) highlights the crucial 
role that shop stewards can sometimes play in shaping and maintaining collective worker 
consciousness. Stewards in this instance, through an ongoing structural and moral 
critique of management, were able to engender amongst their membership, a highly 
developed awareness of the class structure within the factory. They were crucially 
assisted here by an established and highly developed workplace committee whose history 
of involvement in workplace struggle provided a legitimate basis from which to argue 
(ibid, 102-103). This notion of workers understanding class relations in terms of the direct 
manifestation of conflict between themselves and management is sometimes referred to 
as factory consciousness (Lane, 1974; Hyman, 1975; Belanger and Evans, 1988) Whilst this 
at times might be considered somewhat parochial (Belanger and Evans, 1988: 184), it 
encapsulates the inherently oppositional nature of the exercise of job control within 
capitalism (Hyman, 1975: 159). 
The above suggests that the collective consciousness of workers and stewards in the past 
can facilitate the maintenance of such consciousness in the present (Batstone et al., 
1977). Furthermore, it provides support for the argument that, the perceived efficacy of 
collective control by workers is not only learned through experience, but is essentially 
rooted within shopfloor tradition (Hyman, 1975: 154). In this sense, previous action, can 
act as a wellspring that provides workers with credible examples of collective remedies 
through which to pursue the sense of collective grievance that is central to the success of 
strong shopfloor control (ibid.: 154). When operating against such a historical backdrop 
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therefore, stewards are able to draw on past images to create a range of vocabularies 
which can be employed in relation to collective action (Batstone et al., 1978). 
The effects of countervailing pressures on worker outlook and action 
So far, it would appear that there are number of key factors that are central to the 
maintenance and success of shopfloor organisation and action. These include the 
presence of workforce leaders, a developed worker consciousness and a tradition of 
shopfloor action. However, as this chapter has earlier highlighted, workers are subject to 
countervailing pressures both outside and within the workplace which serve to legitimize 
managerial authority within the workplace (Beynon, 1973). Attention now turns some of 
these pressures and how they might militate against collective worker action and the 
sense of grievance that gives rise to this (Kelly, 1998). This provides the basis for a debate 
about the process through which workers move towards collective shopfloor action.  As 
Hyman and Brough (1975) note, what is at issue here is the ideology and social imagery 
held by workers which is generated not only within work itself but in social life generally.     
For Marx and Engels, consciousness from the very beginning is a social product (Hyman 
and Brough, 1975). Knowledge here is regarded as socially produced on the basis of 
particular structures of economic relationships and a given ideology that reflects and 
supports the interests of specific section of society (ibid.: 187). From this viewpoint, 
dominant values originate among and reflect the interests of, those with power and 
advantage. They are embodied in the institutional order (i.e. the state and education) 
and, in the case of a capitalist economy, serve to legitimise inequality and its institutional 
expression. It is this dominant ideology of capital, which Hyman (1975) identifies as 
shaping worker perceptions of themselves and their world). Workers then bring to the 
workplace a learned set of norms which accept the authority of management and its right 
to manage. 
This chapter has, nevertheless, highlighted that there is a conflict of interest that lies at 
the heart of the employment relationship (Kelly, 1998) meaning that the hegemony of 
capitalist ideology is never absolute (Hyman, 1975). Workers’ ideologies, according to 
Hyman and Brough (1975), are inconsistent. They predominantly fail to question the 
dominant and generalised philosophies of society yet are cynical of those in positions of 
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power. In such indeterminate and ambiguous circumstances, the presence of individuals 
with a more developed and oppositional ideology can increase the likelihood of 
challenges to managerial authority (ibid., 174-7). This aligns with Hyman’s (2001) 
argument that unions cannot escape their role as agencies of class, and highlights the role 
that workplace leaders might play in translating residual and latent worker impulses into 
collective activity and a trade union consciousness (Moore, 2010).  
Worker mobilisation and strike action 
Kelly (1998) adopts a Marxist perspective when exploring the factors which give rise to 
collective mobilisation in the form of oppositional action by workers at workplace level. 
Central to this process are interrelated themes of perceived injustice, worker identity and, 
as this chapter has highlighted, the crucial role played by workplace leaders. Again, the 
capacity to act collectively is seen to require a degree of class consciousness or worker 
solidarity (Klandermans, 1997). In order that such consciousness might translate into 
action (what we might term the mobilisation process), workers firstly must acquire a 
sense of grievance and injustice (Kelly, 1998). They must also feel entitled to their 
demands and believe that there is a chance that their situation can be changed by 
collective agency (Gamson, 1992; Klandermans, 1997). Although in the first instance 
mobilisation is based upon a sense of injustice, emergent shopfloor organisation requires 
conflict sponsorship (Beynon, 1973). This takes place essentially through the medium of 
workplace leaders who, through their use of ideology and discourse, might engender 
group identity. In such circumstances, workers coalesce from a set of individuals into a 
social group with a collective interest (Kelly, 1998).  
Kelly focuses the issue of worker grievance to highlight the ways in which ideologies 
might be used by workplace leaders to identify the most salient features of the 
employment relationship. Crucial to this is the cultivation of a set of emotionally loaded 
categories for thinking about this exchange in terms of the interests of one’s own group.  
Such categories are central to the notion of social identity, whereby a group’s collective 
identity and interests are reinforced by comparisons with members of other groups, 
sometimes referred to as out groups (Kelly, 1998). In addition to promoting group 
cohesion and identity by drawing on particular terminology, workgroup leaders must also 
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frame issues which engender a sense of injustice amongst workers. What is also 
particularly important here is that workers attribute their perceived sense of injustice to 
their employer. These attributions of blame both derive from, and reinforce, a sense of 
distinct group identity, which Kelly notes is an essential element in the process in which 
workers become collectivised. This most blatant form that this can take is that of strike 
action 
Hyman (1972: 53) defines strikes as a temporary stoppage that serve as a means of 
organised conflict and part of a conscious strategy to change a situation which is 
identified as the source of discontent. Strikes are not homogenous and can range from a 
massive protracted confrontation to a half hour protest by half a dozen workers (ibid.). 
However, whilst strike action involves processes of influence and power, the 
circumstances in which it might prevail as opposed to alternative expressions of worker 
unrest must contain a minimum of worker solidarity and organisation (ibid.: 54). Strike 
action is a collective act and implies a certain amount of understanding and belief in the 
efficaciousness of mass action. It follows that those workers with no feeling of solidarity 
or common interest would be unlikely to undertake a strike (Griffin, 1939: 98).  
To continue along Marxian lines, strikes occur as a result of the contradictory interests of 
the two main actors within the employment relationship (Grint, 2005: 169). Not only does 
conflict centre on the wage effort bargain and the price of labour, it stems from the 
commodification of labour, its subordination to managerial control (Blackburn, 1967: 38-
9), and the resultant powerlessness and job insecurity that workers experience (Hyman, 
1984: 91). The greater the degree that managerial objectives fall outside the more 
narrowly defined interests of workers, the more probable they will be perceived as being 
illegitimate and thus resisted by those workers (ibid.: 93). This means that strike action, 
can only be understood through a wider analysis of all persons and groups significantly 
involved in the relationship between labour and management (Kornhauser, 1954: 75)   
The evidence so far suggests that rather than being explained away in terms of an 
irrational act, strikes may well be viewed as one of a number of reactions to situations 
that conflict with the expectations and aspirations of individuals (Hyman, 1984: 135). 
Indeed, by comparing this chapter’s earlier focus on the variety of forms of alternative 
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response to conflict and the deprivations of work (Baldamus, 1961) such as absenteeism, 
sabotage, and output restriction (Kerr, 1964: 171), it is possible to differentiate between 
the varying degrees of rationality that underpin worker action. For example, purely 
individual forms of what may be perceived as conflict activity like absenteeism and 
turnover bring only temporary relief from an uncongenial job and therefore, along with 
other individual worker responses, reflect a low level of rationality (Hyman, 1984: 136). 
Since the ability of employees individually to evade managerial rules is in most contexts 
rigidly circumscribed, it would appear wholly rational that they act collectively in order to 
marshal sufficient power to affect their work situation (ibid.). Therefore, while collective 
action in forms such as mock aggression and horseplay (Roy, 1960: 167) may be in some 
instances regarded as adaptations to workplace drudgery, it can be evidence of a higher 
level of rationality particularly when explicitly attempting to exert some control over the 
employment relationship (Hyman, 1984: 136).       
Touraine (1965: 22) takes up the issue of workers deploying strike action as a means of 
restructuring power relations within the workplace. He contrasts this with an alternative 
strike orientation whereby workers take action to uphold the interests of a group or 
category within an organisation. The former of these orientations in particular, especially 
when it involves unofficial strike action, has been seen by some writers as a means of 
generating heightened consciousness (Cameron and Eldridge, 1968: 90) during which 
workers become more than usually aware of the oppressiveness of their industrial lot. 
Others have argued that strike action may in fact raise the focus of worker consciousness 
to the point where it questions the very nature and structure of capitalist society (Lenin, 
1964). However, the idea of strikes as functioning as an explicit challenge to the structure 
of control within industry and society would seem questionable when considering the 
historical form that working class response to capitalism within the UK has traditionally 
taken. (Grint, 2005: 157). 
The last point supports the argument that that trade unions as organisations do not 
challenge the existence of a society based on class division but, since they reflect the 
difference between capital and labour, merely express it (Anderson, 1967). As such they 
can never be viable vehicles for the advancement of socialism itself since they are tied to 
capitalism, which is a framework that they can bargain within but never change (ibid.). 
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Hyman (1975: 158-159) seeks to explain the factors that have shaped union expression in 
this sense by locating it within an account of the development of the early formal 
institutional relationship between trade unions and employers. From this viewpoint, the 
legitimacy and security of trade unions was historically very much dependent upon their 
role in helping to achieve the managerially driven goals of regularity and predictability in 
industrial relations. This often involved raising the levels at which collective bargaining 
took place, setting definitions of the subject of negotiation and the adherence to 
protracted procedures for the avoidance of disputes. Again, this has taken place largely 
within a framework in which existing forms of material inequality and of capitalist control 
have been taken for granted (ibid.). The role of trade unions within this process of the 
institutionalisation of conflict with UK industrial relations, is sometimes regarded a means 
of emasculating worker action (Anderson, 1967: 276). Alternatively, it may be viewed as 
an essential part of the mechanism of social control (Fox and Flanders, 1969: 159) which 
serves to resolve conflict through negotiation (Ironside and Seifert, 2000: 16).  
Writing at a time when it was vogue to view industrial unrest as best mediated through 
the pluralist maxim of joint institutional regulation, some commentators posited the 
notion of a continuing decrease in strikes (Ross and Hartman, 1960). From this viewpoint, 
dwindling in strike action at the time was indicative of a decline in industrial conflict 
(ibid.). This proved to be somewhat premature, in that it preceded a period during which 
strikes appeared to flourish (Cameron and Eldridge, 1968). That said in recent decades, 
the number of strikes fell to the extent that of they were, by 2000, close to a minimum 
level (Edwards, 2001). Quite apart from those that predicted this as a result of the 
institutionalisation of conflict, (Grint, 2005: 176), levels of contemporary strike action 
would appear to have been influenced by a range of other factors.  This chapter now 
examines these factors before returning to the issue of strike action and an evaluation of 
its appropriateness as a trade union tactic in the contemporary industrial relations 
environment.     
Contemporary trade unions: decline and revival; moderation versus militancy    
As the previous chapter suggested, the conditions and circumstances, under which trade 
unions operate, changed decisively during the 1980s (Fairbrother, 1996: 115). Change 
44 
  
here included: the contraction of manufacturing employment, the privatisation of public 
services, the growth of non-manual workers, a doubling in part time work (to over seven 
million), a growth in small, less bureaucratised firms and high levels of cyclical 
unemployment (Ackers et al., 1996: 7). This took place against, and was moreover 
facilitated by, the backdrop of a free market governmental economic policy that was 
dominated by a concern to reduce inflation through tight control of money supply and 
the abandonment of the objective of full employment. Smith and Morton (1993: 100) 
identify this as part of a wider state-initiated programme aimed at restructuring work and 
employment relations which served to deny workers in both the public and private 
sectors access to resources of collective power. Central to this was the continuation of a 
trend towards the increasing juridification of employment relations but with an emphasis 
suggestive of a marked shift towards the repression of union activity by the state 
(Williams and Adam-Smith, 2010: 84-85).      
Ackers et al. (1996: 17-20) argue that such legislation has reduced trade unions freedom 
to take industrial action, and paved the way for both management and government to 
bring about structural change in the form of new working practices and resultant high 
unemployment. Nowhere have these initiatives been more bitterly contested than in 
areas of employment which have traditionally been associated with high levels of strike 
proneness such as manufacturing, coal, and transport which, as Lyddon (2009) notes, 
resulted in a number of crushing defeats for unions. Along with the subsequent decline in 
‘unionised jobs’, the ‘demonstration effect’ (ibid) of this upon other workers provides 
important additional insight into the decline in reduction in the strike weapon in recent 
times.  
More recently, in the public sector itself, there has been series of strikes which for Kimber 
(2012) serve as evidence of resurgence in workplace power in areas including education, 
local government and the civil service. However, while Bach (2010: 169-170) argues that 
trade unions have had remained important national institutional actors able to articulate 
membership concerns around politically sensitive issues such as privatisation, he is more 
circumspect about their potency at workplace level. Here their capacity to organise, to 
regulate terms and conditions of employment and to influence managerial decision-
making has diminished significantly against a backdrop of overall decline in trade union 
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density in the public sector from 84% in 1980 to 56% in 2012 (ibid.: 169-170). This was 
brought about, in no small part, by the ongoing fragmentation of services and the 
dispersal of members into outsourced private sector workplaces. Bach and Stroleny 
(2013: 350-351) argue that weakness here has been exacerbated by a number of other 
factors. These include; membership fear of taking action within the wider climate of 
austerity; a degree of acceptance by members of the legitimacy of austerity and 
subsequent doubts about the ability of their unions to alter governmental policy; and 
finally, difficulties amongst public sector unions in securing sufficient workplace 
representatives to build workplace organisation and develop a collective sense of 
grievance against employers.   
Local trade unionism in both local government and the civil service has more recently 
been further threatened by unprecedented job losses (job losses were in excess of 14% in 
local government and the civil service between 2008-213) and an aggressive cadre of 
management that have sought to implement austerity measures by cutting allowances, 
reviewing starting salaries and challenging incremental pay progression (Bach and 
Stroleny, 2013: 354). The inability to stave off, what have sometimes been regionally-
driven, initiatives have led some unions within the public sector to make concessions at a 
national level.  As a consequence, in areas such as the NHS for example, some earlier 
gains that the unions achieved in the 2004 Agenda for Change agreement have recently 
been reversed (ibid.: 346). In contrast, some unions have managed to retain significant 
influence and established job controls at the level of the workplace itself (Beale and 
Mustchin, 2013). 
For Kelly, any such decline is temporary and must be viewed as a cyclical process (1998: 
100-105). From this viewpoint, the power of trade unions and their members has 
repeatedly been affected by use of counter–mobilisation strategies by the state and 
employers. This has particularly been the case during times of economic restructuring and 
has been carried out in a manner that would appear to be a recurrent theme throughout 
the history of capitalism (ibid.: 122). However, the presence at certain times of particular 
structural factors such as employer and state concerns with profitability, labour market 
conditions and general changes in worker attitude, have helped to nurture, develop and 
maximise the efficacy of more combative forms of worker action. Any such action again, 
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however, is crucially dependent upon the emergence of worker consciousness which is 
stimulated by employer violation of workplace conventions and social values (ibid.: 108). 
Viewed from Kelly’s perspective therefore, severe membership decline, restrictive 
legislation, low levels of strike action and the potential dilution of a “traditional” class 
identity are problems from which unions have managed to historically recover. Rather 
than being hostage to an irreversible trend of de-collectivisation, what would once more 
appear to be crucial to the effectiveness of trade unions is the ideological messages and 
mobilizing tactics of their leaders (Touraine et al., 1987: 286-290). This contrasts with the 
post-modernist assertions that class politics and organised labour are components of a 
decaying labour movement which is both reflected in, and has given rise to, less 
adversarial industrial relations and the terminal decline of trade unionism (Kelly, 1996). 
To continue with the theme of the efficacy of trade unions and the value of more 
combative forms of action, it will be recalled that this chapter earlier discussed the effects 
of a string of high profile defeats on the part of trade unions (Lyddon, 2009) and the 
period of coercive pacification (Hyman, 1984: 225), that this has ushered in. However, 
evidence suggests that within certain areas of the UK labour market, strikes have 
remained important both as bargaining levers in pay negotiations, and as a means of 
signalling discontent over new working arrangements (Edwards, 2001). Lyddon (2009: 
317-339) points to the on-going use of the strike weapon within the public sector, 
transport, communication and distribution which, because it involves protracted planning 
and the tactical use of ballots, can both prolong disputes and widen the group of 
employees who are prepared to take action (Edwards, 2001). Such circumstances mean 
that unions can be on a conflict footing for long periods meaning that current historically 
low levels of strike action may well mask a high level of industrial unrest (ibid.).  
Not only are strike levels at times unrepresentative of underlying industrial conflict they 
can also provide a misleading view of the potential power of some groups of workers. 
Thus, Lyddon (2009: 317, 339) notes that there remain various groups of reasonably 
secure strategically well placed, but dissatisfied, groups of workers, facing employers 
whose ‘just in time’ supply systems render them quite vulnerable to worker action. Such a 
situation again raises questions as to the attractiveness of partnership based approach 
that has been associated with non-negotiable change that is deleterious to the interests 
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of workers (Martinez Lucio and Stuart, 2005; Danford et al., 2004, 2005) among those 
more well positioned unions. Thus, commentating some twelve years after Kelly (1996), 
Buttigieg et al., (2008: 263) maintain the argument that, in contrast to notions of 
partnership and social cooperation, worker mobilisation and collectivist orientation 
enhance the opportunity of a union to achieve its bargaining objectives.  What is more, 
successful worker mobilisation in pursuit of this is still based upon the attribution of 
problems to agency and a ‘them and us’ concept of the employment relationship (ibid.). 
Again, such a viewpoint suggests that notions of partnership may do little other than to 
mask the antagonistic interest of workers and employers (Kelly, 1996: 102), and 
moreover, that prognostications of the “death of the strike”, the dissolution of the 
working class and the demise of trade unionism appear somewhat unfounded (Lyddon, 
2009: 339).   
It would so far seem that arguments relating to worker consciousness, and the role that 
workplace leaders might play in bringing this about, might go some way towards off-
setting more deterministic approaches which seek to explain worker behaviour. However, 
stress on the actors’ subjective definition of a situation should not allow us to play down 
or ignore objective properties of the situation in which action occurs (Rose, 1988: 271). 
Evidence points to a clear tension between the external pressures shaping worker 
behaviour and the factors affecting the way that these are mediated in the workplace 
Thus, whilst objective features do not rigidly determine the subject’s action they can 
provide a framework that more readily facilitates some forms of action while excluding 
others, and encourage some forms whilst discouraging others (ibid.). This raises a number 
of questions including the potential effects of external factors such as the political and 
economic climate upon worker action, the way that workers approach managerial 
attempts to introduce change, and, perhaps more fundamentally, the willingness of 
workers to identify with the aims of trade unions. Greater understanding of such issues is 
gained by refocussing upon the shopfloor and in particular the effects of governmental 
and by extension, managerial quests for increasing forms of worker flexibility on 
workplace organisation.  
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The growth of flexible working and its effects upon shopfloor organisation    
This chapter began with a brief account of the economic and political doctrine of Neo-
Liberalism. It will be recalled that this attributes almost mystical powers to the free 
market (Moody, 1997: 120) and contains, at its core, the principles of free trade and a 
thorough intolerance towards trade unions.  A key component of this approach has 
involved the pursuit of the central labour market aim of restoring employer initiative by 
reducing, as much as possible, all restrictions on the deployment of labour. In recent 
decades, governments who have been wedded to such an approach have created a 
legislative, ideological and discursive framework that has encouraged the flexible 
alignment of workers to match employer requirements (Crouch, 2003: 119).   
Flexibility in this sense takes on two distinct but interrelated streams. The first is 
functional flexibility, which refers to a type of work organisation which its proponents 
argue is based upon mechanisms that provide organisationally committed employees 
with multi skills. These can be redeployed relatively quickly from one task to another 
resulting in gains for both firm and worker (Kalleburg, 2001: 481-482). The second is 
numerical flexibility where employers attempt to reduce costs by using workers who are 
not their regular employees (ibid). In Britain, a number of types of work groups have been 
seen as constituting the growing (numerically) flexible workforce including part-time 
workers, agency workers and short term contract holders (Kalleburg, 2001: 483; Gallie, 
1998: 152).  
Most recently, the on-going quest for ever-greater forms of worker flexibility on the part 
of employers has found expression in the proliferation of what has come to be termed as 
the ‘zero-hour’ contracts. Under such an arrangement an individual is not guaranteed 
work and is paid only for the actual hours of work offered by the employer and carried 
out. According to Brinkley (2013: 7), employers may often favour these types of contract 
where work is erratic and highly unpredictable, varying from day to day and week to 
week. They offer an effective and cost efficient way of matching labour demand and 
supply. The Office for National Statistics estimates that there were approximately 1.8 
million zero-hours contract that provided work in August 2014 (Pyper and Dar, 2015: 3).   
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The increased usage of non-standard types of employment (Edgell, 2006: 126) such as 
zero-hours contracts, temporary and part time contracts as well as agency workers by 
employers has led some commentators (Atkinson, 1984; Mangum et al., 1985: 599-561; 
Osterman, 1994) to identify the simultaneous presence of two distinct groups of workers 
within many organisations. The first of these are sometimes referred to as core workers, 
who tend to be full time, often skilled employees who enjoy fringe benefits and who are 
(arguably) committed to their employment (Kalleburg, 2001: 484). The second group are 
often termed peripheral, or contingent workers (Heery and Abbott; 2000; Kalleburg, 
2001), who occupy insecure non-standard types of employment. Whilst non-standard 
work often falls into a number of categories it seems to be commonly underpinned by a 
number of certain features which clearly indicate that it is inferior to standard forms of 
work (Edgell, 2006: 141; Robinson, 2000: 32). These include high levels of job insecurity 
(Gallie, 1998: 185), a greater likelihood of low pay, no sick pay, and no pension or access 
to career progression (McGovern et al., 2004). Those workers ‘employed’ on a zero-hour 
basis are entitled to no protection against unfair dismissal, maternity rights, redundancy 
rights and rights under TUPE (Brinkley, 2013: 7). Despite the sometimes stark differences 
between them, core and peripheral workers often work side by side (Smith, 1994) with 
the increasing utilisation of peripheral workers via organisational networks leading in 
some circumstances to dual internal labour markets (Harrison, 1994: 196).     
The juxtaposition of core and non-standard staff might act, in line with Burawoy’s (1979) 
account of the internal labour market, as a means of laterally dispersing the conflict that 
is inherent within the capitalist employment relationship. In particular, management’s 
recruitment of peripheral workers can give rise to conflict and tension between 
temporary and permanent employees due to some of the conflicting and divergent 
interests that these groups hold in the workplace (Heery and Abbot, 2000: 158). Barnett 
and Miner (1992: 272-274) provide an example of how this might play out in the 
workplace by highlighting how the insecure nature of peripheral workers can at times 
actually enhance the internal job mobility opportunities of regular workers by reducing 
the number of such permanent employees who are competing for promotion. Research 
also emphasises the chasm and concomitant interests that can exist between a mobile 
‘first class’ core group of workers and an expendable ‘second class’ of peripheral workers 
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(Heckscher, 2000 cited in Blyton and Turnbull, 2008). It also raises questions that are 
underpinned by a social dimension related to the labour market rights and opportunities 
associated with low-skilled disadvantaged contingent work (Godard and Delaney, 2000: 
492; Kalleburg, 2001: 492-5).  
Evidence so far suggests that, though it may be a staple feature of modern employment 
practice, the growing utilisation of a disadvantaged, disenfranchised stratum of 
contingent workers is at odds with principles of fashionable HRM-based models of labour 
management. Both Sisson and Purcell (2010: 88-89) and Nolan and O’Donnell (2003: 493) 
note that such models champion high commitment and high involvement style 
management systems which place emphasis upon team working, workplace wellbeing 
and employee development. More accurately, the popularity of casualisation lies in the 
obvious cost benefits that a low paid disposable group of workers might bring to an 
organisation and its value as a means by which employers can dilute worker control. Its 
effectiveness in this sense is particularly evident in the case of functional flexibility. Here 
rapid deployment of workers between tasks (Kalleburg, 2001: 481) can be more easily 
achieved in the context of what Drago (1996) refers to as ‘management by fear’ in the 
low-job-security environment characteristic of the disposable workforce. Unsurprisingly, 
this changing structure of workforce composition has in recent times been perceived by 
trade unions as posing a threat to their power and the security of their existing members 
(Heery and Abbot, 2000: 158).  
Growing insecurity might stimulate workers’ demands for union protection and there are 
examples of a number of historically successful union campaigns that have sought to 
regulate unpredictable employment. These have been undertaken in industries including 
mining and docks and the car industry (Durcan et al., 1983). However, surveys indicate 
that insecure workers themselves are less likely to join unions than their full-time, 
substantively employed counterparts (Heery and Abbott, 2000: 155). In addition to their 
susceptibility to managerial and organisational whim, the insecure nature of their work 
means that peripheral employees are also difficult to organise (ibid.).  
Demand for union membership is often attenuated by three considerations: fear, 
reflecting individual employee vulnerability that is associated with non-standard work 
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(Poynter, 2000; Edgell, 2006: 141); ignorance, with migrants and young workers (who are 
statistically over-represented in this area of employment) often having never 
encountered a trade union (Haynes et al., 2005); and calculations of cost relative to 
anticipated benefits (Galenson, 1994). Furthermore, the decentralised direction of 
industrial relations in recent decades has arguably done little to encourage trade 
unionism amongst insecure workers with the resultant workplace level bargaining and 
organisation proving implausible for workers who are in some cases not tied to a 
particular workplace or a particular employer (Heery and Abbott, 2000: 168). 
The growth in contingent forms of employees and their coexistence among more secure 
core groups of worker suggests that strategies based around, supporting a standardised 
group of workers pursuing the same aims has become increasingly difficult for unions to 
sustain (Bacon and Storey, 2000: 43). As Heery and Abbott (2000: 170) note, peripheral 
workers’ interests conflict, at least in part, with those of full-time permanent employees 
which present unions with difficulties in maintaining membership level and workplace 
organisation. The difficulties that unions face have been compounded in recent times by 
the upsurge in managerial approaches that emphasise the individual employee and in 
doing so threaten to shatter the collectivist past and traditional methods of trade 
unionism (ibid.). The notion that group identity, commonality of interest (Kelly, 1998) and 
an ideology based on workplace collectivism (Beynon, 1973) are prerequisites for group 
action (and thus shopfloor control) would, as such, appear to be potentially compromised 
or diluted by the presence of disparate groups of workers within the workplace.  
Perhaps conversely, due to the disproportionately high make-up of minority groups, there 
is a greater likelihood for contingent workers to experience discrimination. Race, 
ethnicity, gender, disability and sexuality are all integral dimensions of a fundamentally 
unequal employment relationship located in the workplace (Moore, 2010: 118). Trade 
unionism may, through both structural and discursive channels, be able to serve as a 
context in which multiple and contingent identities are collectivised and subordinated to 
union or (implicit) class interests (ibid.). The important point here is that for work group 
organisation to thrive within the reshaped context in which activists operate, trade 
unions must be able to assert and frame the common interests that emerge from the 
experience of wage labour under the capitalist mode of production. At the same time, 
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they must reflect, mediate, and shape the social identities (Moore, 2010: 119) of 
contingent groups within the workplace.    
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the management of labour and the ways that workers respond 
to the labour process within context of a capitalist economy. Much of this has focussed 
on the loci of the shopfloor itself and the actions of workers at the point of production 
This has involved a consideration of the employment relationship through the medium of 
labour process theory which Braverman (1974: 54) argues is dominated and shaped by 
the accumulation of wealth. From this viewpoint, modernisation of the public services has 
been driven by the primary aim of increasing productivity for the purpose of increasing 
private wealth. The vehicle for change here has been a set of managerial practices which 
advocate managerial sovereignty which are underpinned by the Taylorist principles of 
scientific management. For Worrall et al. (2009: 118) this has resulted in work 
intensification, job alienation and loss of control over the labour process for public sector 
workers in general.  
An investigation into shopfloor relations and the pressures which shape both 
management and worker action in a capitalist economy is a vital component of this thesis’ 
overall concern with worker-management relations within the Royal Mail. Here, 
management have become increasingly charged with introducing market driven change 
at the locale of the shopfloor itself. This chapter has shed light on the methods through 
which management seek to achieve this and the free market profit imperative that 
underpin these. An appreciation of the effects of such initiatives on the autonomy of 
public sector workers helps bring insight to the factors which continue to shape the on-
going levels of resistance by UK postal workers to workplace reform (Beale and Mustchin, 
2013; Beirne, 2013).   
In concentrating on events at the point of production this chapter has also focused on the 
processes through which workers collectively mobilise (Kelly, 1998) to defend their terms 
and conditions. As such, it provides insight into what has been a key feature of workplace 
Post Office industrial relations in recent decades as well as the roles that the local union 
and workers play in this process. Since this is contextualised in an analysis of the current 
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historically low levels of industrial action in the wider labour market, it helps to 
accentuate what is the special case of the Royal Mail, where high levels of industrial 
action have in recent decades bucked this trend. This provides an effective lead-in to this 
thesis’ next chapter. This is a detailed discussion of worker management relations within 
the Post Office and the historical, political and economic factors which have shaped 
these.   
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Chapter Four: Examining industrial relations in the Post Office 
This chapter examines the long-standing relationship between the Post Office, its 
workforce and their representatives. In doing so it concentrates on that aspect of the 
organisation that is concerned with the processing, collection and delivery of mails (Gall, 
2003: 24) which is currently known as the Royal Mail. This, for much of its existence, has 
fallen within the generic parameters of the wider Post Office before eventually becoming 
a separate autonomous business unit in 1986 (ibid.: 40). The earlier part of this chapter 
will, therefore, refer to this entity in terms of the wider Post Office before moving to 
concentrate more specifically on its term as a stand-alone business unit. From here on it 
will be referred to as Royal Mail. While the Post Office has throughout its long history 
employed a number of categories of worker, the focus here is upon those that have been 
historically referred to as postmen and postwomen.      
For much of its existence the Post Office has, as part of the public sector, fallen under the 
ambit of central government. As such, the influence of state policy upon relations within 
the Post Office features throughout this chapter which adopts an historical analysis, 
taking as it starting point an investigation of initial trade union recognition and emergent 
organisation within the industry. From here, attention moves on to focus upon the main 
political, social and economic factors that have shaped both early and post-war 
developments within the Post Office before finally assessing the current effects of full 
liberalisation.   
A key area for analysis here are the forces which have influenced labour relations 
strategies by Post Office management, and how these have affected and been affected by 
union structure, strategy (Batstone et al., 1984: 1) and organic worker agency. Such a 
focus provides important insight into the factors which have both shaped, and helped 
sustain the significant levels of shopfloor job controls which continue to be exhibited by 
many groups of postal workers (Gall, 2003). The attention here to management strategy 
and logic is particularly important in compensating for this study’s absence of first-hand 
accounts from Royal Mail management as to what pressures might drive their behaviour 
on the shopfloor. For these reasons it brings essential context to the later empirical 
account of management and worker action in a range of Royal Mail workplaces.   
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The ongoing liberalisation of the UK postal services 
The postal service within the UK has in recent times experienced broadly similar 
processes of deregulation and marketization to those throughout many western 
economies (Gall, 2003: 277). This has, in line with many other public services and utilities, 
involved exposure to market forces in the form of private capital and competition and the 
consequent relentless pressure to commercialise (ibid.). At first glance this initiative 
might appear to have come a little late in the day when compared to the manner in which 
other long-standing public utilities within the UK have been subject to such reform (for a 
discussion on this see Kessler and Bayliss 1998: 147-159). However, as this study has 
earlier suggested, modernisation of the postal services has been just one aspect of a 
sustained New Labour pro-market, liberalisation programme which appears to have 
retrospectively endorsed the swathes of privatisation which took place in the 1980s 
(Coffey and Thornley, 2009: 58). A major theme of this was the (albeit fiercely resisted) 
de-centralization of public sector pay and the degradation of relatively well paid 
unionised jobs (Coffey and Thornley, 2009: 16).  
Given what is known of the contemporary industrial make-up of Royal Mail and its 
employees (which will be looked at more closely later on in this chapter), it would appear 
logical to conclude that the increasing prevalence of such initiatives have served as a 
catalyst for unusually high levels of industrial unrest within the Post Office in recent 
times. Here, a relatively well organised and militant group of workers (Beale, 2003; Gall, 
2003) have sought to repel market-driven change which poses both an ideological and 
material threat to their terms and conditions (Beale, 2003). Kelly (1996) argues that 
militancy is based on widespread membership mobilisation with the intention of 
confronting the employers as a collective body to impose costs on them. However, such a 
perspective has a tendency to overlook a consideration of what Gall (2003: 12) refers to 
as labour militancy. This is used to denote behaviour that is sub-national and is concerned 
largely, but not exclusively with workplace-based action. Obvious examples are walkouts 
and strikes over immediate concerns such as sackings victimisation (ibid.) and changes to 
long-standing ways of working. When examining militant behaviour on the part of postal 
workers, this chapter will largely be focussing on these principally economic forms of 
militancy. That they differ from forms of behaviour which may encompass a political 
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dimension, should not, detract from the union’s long-established tradition of pursuing its 
aims through political processes          
Again, as with debates relating to the wider public services, there is a suggestion here 
that in its quest to usher in the principles of marketization, Royal Mail has moved from a 
consensual form of industrial relations, to a more unitary private sector-style model. 
However, by adopting a similar approach to that advocated by Coffey and Thornley 
(2009), a longer term perspective on the relationship between the Post Office and its 
workers provides a somewhat different picture. From this standpoint, the Post Office has 
historically behaved in a manner which has followed the contours of that of the state in 
its wider role as an employer. In this sense, as Allen notes (1960: 71) the approach of the 
state towards its workforce have not been a consistently comfortable one. Like the 
relationship between trade unions and private employers it has been subject to variations 
(ibid.).  
The Post Office and the origins of trade union organisation  
Harvey and Hood (1958: 186) employ a Marxist perspective to identify the origins of 
modern state employment which they suggest developed in response to the bourgeoning 
requirements of an economy based upon monopoly capitalism. Central to this was the 
growth of an enormous administrative apparatus whose chiefs, in conjunction with 
cabinet, exercised for much of the late nineteenth and twentieth Century considerable 
jurisdiction over the Treasury, Foreign Office, Home Office and all other governmental 
offices (ibid.). This apparatus overseeing the different functions of state employment has 
been historically termed as the Civil Service which, according to Harvey and Hood (1958: 
186-7) has been widely (but in their view falsely) regarded as class-neutral and politically 
impartial. One of the largest of these numerous governmental departments that helped 
form the early Civil Service was the Post Office (Coffey and Thornley, 2009: 93) which 
was, prior to industrialisation, controlled by the crown. By 1902 this organisation 
employed 77,035 persons out of total of 105,888 established in the civil service and 
working for central government (Allen, 1960: 72). Its transformation into a state owned 
and controlled service from this period on in many ways supports the image of the civil 
service as that of key in helping to service the requirements of capitalism. Thus, the 
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growth of national markets and, particularly, the demands of business, were seen to 
require cheap, efficient and reliable means of communication (Batstone et al., 1984: 22-
3). This must, however, be viewed in relation to concurrent humanitarian demands at the 
time for expansion as a means of compensating geographical dispersion and raising 
literacy levels (ibid.). This last point perhaps helps to highlight some of the complex and 
often contradictory pressures faced by the state in its role as employer, service provider, 
and arbiter within a capitalist economy.  
These dual pressures for the provision of a low-cost universally available postal service 
were to help define the early parameters within which the Post Office, historically, had to 
conduct its operational role. This has traditionally taken the form of a universal pricing 
structure and, until recently, the monopoly of letter carriage, which have been important 
features of the service irrespective of levels of business activity (Batstone et al., 1984:78). 
Such features have determined both basic levels of staffing and frequency of collection 
and delivery with the former being affected at least by change in the number of delivery 
points (new houses etc.) as levels of business (ibid.). Within these fixed parameters 
however, the Post Office has sought on-going changes to delivery patterns in response to 
the introduction and wide spread availability of more rapid forms of communication (for 
example the telegraph and telephone) (ibid.). This suggests that the current pressures 
facing the contemporary postal service and its employees may represent less of a 
departure from its long-standing situation as a service provider than it would at face value 
appear. It would, therefore, seem reasonable to assume that the prevalence and 
frequency of such pressures, and the consequent need to restructure its workforce’s 
labour process, have over time shaped both the manner in which the Post Office as an 
employer has approached its employees and how they have responded. From this 
viewpoint, the more assertive model of managerialism associated with the restructuring 
of the postal service and moreover, wider public sector reform (see Mather et al., 2005) 
may be nothing new.   
Early evidence indeed suggests that far from being perceived as a more recent symptom 
of modernisation, managerial hostility towards trade unionism was a key feature of early 
industrial relations within the Post Office. Following the elimination of patronage and the 
advent of open recruitment, the government opposed early trade unionism within the 
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Post Office until 1906 whereupon recognition of a raft of associations and federations of 
postal servants and consent to negotiate with their full time officials was granted (Allen, 
1960: 72). This change in approach with regard to recognition by the Post Office is 
representative of a wider shift in labour relations strategy by the state. This was shaped in 
no small part by the growing political and industrial influence of trade unions and the rise 
of the Labour Party during this period (Batstone et al., 1984: 109). In the interests of 
political contingency therefore, the state accommodated growing demands by Post Office 
staff for union recognition to ensure worker and union commitment to organisational 
aims. Operating in conjunction with this was a selection and socialization process in which 
Post Office workers were increasingly recruited from young males fresh into the labour 
market and secondly ex-military personnel. In these ways management achieved a labour 
force which was disciplined, committed to public service and, since additionally isolated 
from market pressure, less likely to cause political embarrassment (ibid.).       
This shift in approach by the Post Office as an employer perhaps represented for some 
the first steps towards the idealised image of model employer which it appeared to enjoy 
for much of the twentieth century. It also followed a number of initiatives deemed to 
facilitate the goal of a cheap and reliable postal (and subsequently telegraph and 
telephone) system (Batstone et al., 1984: 108). These included the subdivision of postal 
work into less skilled tasks (Swift, 1929); the on-going attempts to employ cheaper types 
of labour (as in temporary staff and the employment of ’boy labour’ and women) 
(Shepherd, 1923: 113); the intensification of work and the nullifying of collective 
organisation through the use of victimization and (among other agencies) the use of 
blacklegs (Swift, 1929: 134-135; Bealey, 1976: 18). It is clear that a number of these 
measures bear a resemblance to some of the more contemporary flexible-based 
managerial practices which have arisen out of the pressures of preparing for privatisation 
within the Post Office and moreover modern day wider public services (see for example 
Martinez Lucio et al., 2000; Fairbrother, 1994; O’Connell Davidson, 1993). In doing so 
therefore, they help to expose the key aims of modernisation as that of a concern with 
cost cutting, de-skilling and the weakening of terms and conditions. Since they were 
ushered in by the state’s desire to achieve a cheap postal service without drawing 
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resources away from the private sector (Batstone et al., 1984: 108), they also highlight 
the long-standing sacrosanct position of private capital within capitalist society. 
Another factor which led to the relatively early recognition of trade unions within the 
Post Office, when compared to the wider civil service, was the occupational nature of its 
workforce. The manual nature of postal work was conducive to trade unionism (Batstone 
et al., 1984: 109) with workers being amongst the first to organise (by 1902 there were 
nine Post Office unions, see Allen, 1960: 72) and impose political pressures upon the state 
(Clegg et al., 1964: 215-22; Shepherd, 1923: 198). The state in this instance was, 
therefore, spurred into attempts to incorporate postal worker representatives into a 
structure which encouraged ‘moderation’ and responsibility, in an attempt to limit the 
extent to which they associated with the wider labour movement. Allied to this was an 
early attempt to cultivate a “model employer” approach towards industrial relations, in 
which strong responsible trade unionism, the then Post Master General argued, would be 
more likely to facilitate satisfactory outcomes between workers and employer (Clinton, 
1984: 86). That this approach by the state in its role of employer was borne out of 
necessity is apparent when looking at the much slower development and establishment 
of trade unionism in other areas of the civil service (Allen, 1960: 72). For example, 
although by the outbreak of the war in 1914 trade unionism within the wider civil service 
was widespread it was largely ineffective with no officers, offices and staff (Allen, 1960: 
73) and with their spokesmen enjoying no real negotiating rights. Again, recognition here 
may have been largely to do with governmental attempts to shield its employees from 
the period’s growing mood of industrial militancy brought about by the failure of either 
parliamentarianism or orthodox trade unionism to secure any improvement in the 
working class standard of life (Cole cited in Pelling, 1988: 195). This further suggests that 
governmental acceptance of trade unionism was based more upon pragmatism than 
representing an irrevocable change for the good (Coffey and Thornley, 2009: 95).    
The war, as Allen (1960, 73) notes, altered the whole character of the Civil Service. 
Normal practices were abandoned, women replaced male labour, and the Civil Service 
recruited a huge raft of temporary workers who knew nothing of, and cared little for, its 
traditions (ibid.). Imbued with a growing insistence upon pay comparability, impulses to 
combine during a period of low unemployment were strengthened amongst these 
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workers (Phelps Brown, 1959: 360-361), with trade union membership within 5 years 
doubling (Coffey and Thornley, 2009: 95). The propensity of the state to attempt to nullify 
trade unionism through incorporation in times of economic and political crises was in 
these circumstances apparent. This took the form of increasing industry wide bargaining 
and the use of arbitration which provided the foundations for the Whitley Committee 
system (Coffey and Thornley, 2009: 95). Within the Whitley system codified national 
agreements are supplemented at regional, employer and local level. Both formal and 
informal bargaining takes place over a wide range of procedural and substantive issues 
including holiday, pay, hours of attendance grievance and discipline. Trade union officials, 
workplace bargainers and lay activists are all mobilised around collective bargaining and 
individual representation (Ironside and Seifert, 2000: 16). Although not initially intended 
for the Civil Service (Allen, 1960: 73) Whitleyism, after pressure from its unions and more 
than a small amount of opposition from the government in its capacity of employer, was 
introduced into the Civil Service becoming operational from July 1919.  
The complex and hierarchical nature of the Whitley system forced civil servants to 
reorganise their own organisations which were too numerous and divided in opinion 
(amounting by 1919 to around 200 hundred different associations) to undertake effective 
negotiations with the official side (Allen, 1960: 75). The formation of the Union of Post 
Office Workers (UPW) brought together most of the significant unions (ibid) and 
organised all indoor and outdoor manipulative, non-engineering grades of postal workers 
(Clinton, 1984: 322). These included postmen, postmen higher grade (PHG) telephonists, 
sorters, and postal officers.  Its structure was inherited almost directly from what was the 
Postman’s Federation (ibid.) with its officers being elected by its members for life; they 
were the general secretary, and his assistant (or deputy from 1948), assistant secretaries, 
together with treasurer, organising secretary and editor (ibid.). Members, whose density 
levels in posts and telecommunications stood, by 1921, at 64.2%, almost twice the 
national average and above the figure for national government (Bain and Price, 1980), 
were represented by an executive. Within this structure, which was to remain largely 
unchanged for many years (Clinton, 1984: 321), delegates and members historically 
expressed their views at annual conference, special conferences and district committees 
(ibid.).  
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While commentators such as Clinton (1984: 321) extol the democratic traditions of the 
UPW, it has historically been regarded as operating with a high degree of centralization 
(Batstone et al., 1984: 191). Again, as with much of the public sector, this was shaped by 
the nature of pay determination, Whitleyism, and public accountability (Boraston et al., 
1975: 156). Despite the provision of Whitley committees at lower level, major issues 
tended to be handled exclusively at the national level (Gladden, 1943: 27) with, for 
example, wage negotiations always being directed by the general secretary (Moran, 1974: 
26). These modes of negotiation not only reflected the structure and power of the 
employer, they helped to foster and lay down a tradition of strong bargaining 
relationships between general secretaries, senior Post Office management and politicians 
(Taylor, 1980: 428; Parris, 1973; Bealey, 1976). The importance placed by the UPW on 
political influence as a means of satisfactorily maintaining the institutions of industrial 
relations as well as defending and promoting both union rights and the civil rights of 
members (Humphreys, 1958; Gladden, 1943; Parris, 1973) has been reflected in its long-
standing association with the TUC and close relationship with the Labour party (Moran, 
1974:32). This highlights the means by which the UPW was, when circumstances were 
favourable, able to gain wider support for its aims and to exploit for itself the concessions 
which the state has at times been forced to make to the union movement (Batstone et al. 
1984: 189).  
From its early days then the UPW, with its close relationship with the Labour party, 
differed from other trade unions within the civil service. Humphreys (1958: 227) identifies 
the latter as being characterised by ‘a special sort of trade unionism, strong and active, 
yet in harmony with the traditional political neutrality of the civil service in a democratic 
state’. However, in a similar vein to other unions within the civil service, a reliance on 
political action and the need to maintain a public service identity as a means of justifying 
relatively reasonable wage levels undermined (at least up until the 1950s) any serious 
resort to strike action for the UPW and its members (Batstone et al., 1984: 189-90). 
Nevertheless, important differences did remain particularly with regard to what Moran 
(1974: 23) refers to as the organisational goals of the union. From this viewpoint, in 
addition to pursuing economic goals involving the provision of remunerative benefits for 
its members, trade unions may pursue what Moran (1974 :6) refers to as cultural goals. 
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Cultural goals are pursued if a union commits itself to the support of some form of social 
philosophy, and most British unions when they have pursued cultural goals have 
committed themselves to some left wing political philosophy (ibid). In this sense the UPW 
inherited from preceding postal unions support amongst its ranks for (and thus pursued, 
initially through the vehicle of guild socialism) some form of workers control in the 
industry. The notion of workers control in this instance was predicated on a long-standing 
interest in joint control of the Post Office between its authorities and its employees. As 
Moran notes (ibid.: 27) this implies an interest in non-economic issues and may posit a 
challenge to the conventional structure of authority relations between management and 
worker within the workplace. Whilst it was to lose steam after the general strike in 1926 
(ibid.: 28), the issue of worker control within the Post Office has periodically been a much 
contested area of workplace relations. Nowhere has this been more acutely evident than 
within the recent and on-going restructuring of the postal service (see Beale, 2003).  
Moran (1974: 33) notes that despite the best efforts of the UPW, the Post Office 
remained unwilling throughout the twentieth (and it might be added here the early years 
of the twenty first) century to consider sharing authority with grades of workers 
organised by the UPW - apart from a brief experiment with industrial democracy in 1978 
(see Batstone et al., 1984). That said, labour relations within the industry were dominated 
for long periods by strategies designed to engender cooperation through the fostering of 
job security, individual welfare and joint consultation on virtually all operational matters 
(ibid.: 183). A strong internal labour market, Whitleyism and the notion of ‘fair 
comparison’ in terms of pay (an issue which was however to prove the subject of long-
standing contestation within the wider Civil Service) provided a material underpinning to 
what appeared to be a high degree of consensus between management and unions 
(ibid.). However, the state’s concern with maintaining low-cost public services which do 
not contradict the principles of the private sector has periodically created pressures for 
organisational reform within the Post Office. Put another way, the state’s ultimate 
dependence upon private sector revenue for its very survival within a capitalist economy 
(Offe and Ronge, 1982: 250; Lindblom, 1979) has operated (and indeed continues to act) 
as a fundamental influence upon the nature of industrial relations within the Post Office. 
Rather than being seen as a symptom of current marketization then, strong 
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recommendations that the Post Office should be seen to pursue the principles of private 
sector rationalisation were advocated from some managerial quarters from as early as 
the inter-war years (Pitt, 1980; Hannah, 1976). Consequently, from 1932 the Post Office, 
under the recommendations of the Bridgeman Committee, was tasked with introducing 
changes which included a degree of decentralisation and clear distinctions between its 
postal and telecoms functions whilst retaining a proportion of its ‘profits’ (Batstone et al., 
1984: 25).  
Historically, employers have not been the only parties within the sphere of public sector 
industrial relations to look to examples from private industry as a means of attempting to 
achieve their objectives. Civil Service unions consistently claimed from the late 1920s 
onwards that the wages of their members lagged behind those in outside industry and, in 
the main, their claims were justified (Allen, 1960: 86). This situation became all the more 
acute in times of high unemployment as the government, in its role of employer, began to 
extend the criteria of fair wage comparisons by including non-monetary advantages of 
government employment (ibid.). Non-monetary advantages in terms of employment 
within the Post Office referred to internal benefits such as, prospects for promotion, 
access to pensions and high levels of job security (Batstone et al., 1984: 112). The latter of 
these was particularly important during the interwar years when working conditions 
became better regulated, more benevolent and therefore relatively attractive within the 
Post Office (ibid.). While commentators such as Allen (1960: 86) point to the relative 
deterioration of pay within the Civil Service from the years 1932-1953, the provisions of 
such benefits resulted in the same period in significantly and steadily increasing labour 
costs for the Post Office (Batstone et al., 1984: 112-3). This must be viewed in relation to 
what Moran (1974: 28) refers to as the general radicalising process of the UPW within this 
period (specifically around the early years of the Second World War) in which the union’s 
interest in worker control was revived. Again it would appear that the state was prepared, 
and at a time of sectoral growth able, to move away from an earlier emphasis on 
efficiency in order to achieve a committed labour force which posed no threat to 
parliamentary authority and the notion of public service (ibid.).    
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The early post war years and the advent of commercialisation  
As this chapter has earlier suggested, industrial relations within the Post Office, must be 
viewed within the wider context of how the state attempts to its manage a range of 
contradictory pressures brought to bear upon it within capitalist society. What may be 
viewed as a decline of the traditional labour relations strategy of the Post Office, 
particularly from the late 1950s onwards (Batstone et al., 1984: 114) can be seen as part 
of a wider shift by the government through which it sought to address the solution of 
national economic problems created by inflation and the adverse balance of foreign trade 
(Allen, 1960: 64). Central to this was the pursuit by government of a policy of wage 
restraint which, as the nation’s largest employer at the time, it attempted to enforce on 
its own employees (ibid). This was reflected in increasing governmental breaches of the 
norms of fair wage comparisons an example of this being the Post-Master General’s 
refusal to implement an arbitration award in the late 1950s (Batstone et al., 1984: 114). 
For their proponents the introduction of such measures were an attempt to curb labour 
costs which, despite technological innovation, as with the public sector as a whole 
(Gough, 1975), were increasing within the Post Office. This was to provide the backdrop 
for the drive to economy and efficiency within the Post Office from the period 1957 to 
1964 (Clinton, 1984: 299) and highlights how the government is, when it deems 
necessary, prepared to allow its relationship with the representatives of its employees to 
deteriorate. As Allen (1960: 67) notes in relation to this period during which there was 
pressure from the business sector and elsewhere for the refinement of the means of 
economic planning; ‘the government was involved in the relationship in three ways: as a 
conciliator and arbitrator, as the nation’s largest employer, and as the overseer of the 
community’s interest’. When it came down to it, priority was given to the last (Allen, 
1960: 57).  
The move away from its traditional labour relations strategy was regarded by the Post 
Office as an essential component of its journey towards operating within a commercial 
paradigm.  As Batstone et al. (1984: 116) note, existing within such a context would 
increasingly require major changes in managerial approach. The implication here was that 
market criteria should become more central with pay being more closely determined by 
performance and profitability rather than fair comparison. This carried important 
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implications for the way in which work was organised and was underpinned by the 
argument that joint regulation should not obstruct adjustments to the dictates of the 
market. In that it initially found early expression in the area of wage restraint, this shift in 
approach served as a catalyst which provoked the first official industrial action by the 
UPW and the Post Office Engineers (POEU) in the history of the Post Office (Bealey, 1976: 
342-43). This was followed by a growing readiness amongst the rank and file to challenge 
managerial authority and to engage in industrial action at the local level (Batstone et al., 
1984: 115). Whilst the mood among postal unions was symptomatic of both wider unrest 
within the civil service (ibid.) and a reflection of a militant industrial relations policy that 
was adopted by the TUC during this period (Allen, 1960: 67), the following point should 
also be considered. A number of years earlier, but certainly within what would 
conceivably be the working life span of a significant number of its members, the UPW had 
suffered considerable membership loss (from 120,000 down to 52,000 in a few short 
months) when proposing its intention to adopt the strike weapon (Moran, 1974: 103). On 
the one hand, it may be argued that this upsurge in the willingness of members to engage 
in strike action stemmed from the move to a less conciliatory approach on the behalf of 
Post Office management. However, Hyman (1975: 154) reminds us that recourse to strike 
action (and a concern with workplace control in the above sense), tends to be dependent 
upon a tradition of collective workplace consciousness, and an awareness that grievances 
can be remedied by collective action; a tradition that had been historically absent within 
Post Office industrial relations. This, of course, raises the question as to what other 
factors helped bring about these cultural and operational changes within the UPW and its 
membership with regard to how they sought to both defend and further their interests 
from this period onwards.  
As Clinton (1984: 302) notes, a new problem for the postal system from the late 1950s, 
particularly in the larger cities, was an acute labour shortage. This was influenced in no 
small part by the relative decline in earnings of Post Office workers compared to outside 
industry and a corresponding increase in other benefits such as job security and pensions 
in the latter (Batstone et al., 1984: 115). Labour turnover was thus increasing, and 
moreover, with a reduction in the telegram system (and subsequent decline in messenger 
boys) and the reduced volume and availability of ex-military entrants the nature of the 
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workforce began to change (ibid.). This had the effect of eroding the traditional spirit of 
the Post Office and reduced the efficacy of the process of socialization into the traditions 
of Whitleyism (ibid.). Conversely, it was argued that this influx of new labour brought with 
it attitudes towards management and work from other industries that had developed 
throughout a period in which there had been an upsurge in rank and file militancy (Lane, 
1974: 164). This arguably helped to bring about what might be regarded as reversal of the 
traditional socialization process, as long–serving staff appeared to feel growing 
dissatisfaction with their terms and conditions and the quasi-military system of discipline 
within the Post Office. Moreover, they became increasingly prepared to challenge 
managerial decision-making (Batstone et al., 1984: 115) 
It would appear that a change in the composition of the workforce and general erosion of 
the material underpinnings of consensus were largely responsible for the worsening in 
shopfloor relations within the Post Office from the late 1950s. What was a growing trend 
towards more economically-based forms of militancy was not restricted to workers, 
activists and their representatives on the shopfloor. Union leaders also became 
increasingly prepared to use the Whitley system to obstruct management and defend 
members’ interests (Batstone et al., 1984: 114). This served to constrain the freedom of 
management as greater levels of consultation (presumably at times resulting in union 
veto) over technical and staffing arrangements (ibid.) emerged. From this viewpoint, a 
traditional reliance on political favour and consensual bargaining on the part of the UPW 
may have been borne more out of the pragmatic awareness of long-standing membership 
timidity (Moran, 1974) than its ideological leanings as an organisation. As Ironside and 
Seifert (2000: 17) note, trade union bargaining strength is, in part, dependent upon its 
ability to mobilize its membership to potentially harm, disrupt and distort the employer’s 
business. Without such means the leadership of the UPW up until the late 1950s may, it 
might be argued, have had to look to more moderate ways of achieving its objectives. 
These had been reasonably successful up until this period. However, worsening terms and 
conditions and the importation of more militant attitudes into its changing constituency 
fused to provide a channel through which the UPW leadership’s long-held, commitment 
to a more combative style of unionism began to find expression.       
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The consensus under strain 
This period of growing industrial unrest within the Post Office towards the end of the 
1950s is recognised by Clinton (1984: 301) as a General Election boom period of ‘go’ that 
was to be quickly followed by one of ‘stop’. A growing balance of payments deficit during 
1961 was thus followed by a period of recession which ushered in governmental 
initiatives that included wage pauses amongst its workforce and a concomitant reduction 
in public spending (ibid.). It was against this backdrop that a new Post Office Act was 
passed in 1961, which increased its financial independence and was intended to bring 
about greater efficiency. Here, perhaps, was the first clear example of the Post Office’s 
move towards operating in a more commercial paradigm as it was from 1961 onwards 
required to conform to the rules for nationalised industries (Gall, 2003: 25). This involved 
the introduction of conventional commercial accounting, cover costs, and amongst other 
measures, the achievement of specified financial targets under the day-to-day auspices of 
a more autonomous Post Office management (Clinton, 1984: 302; Gall, 2003: 25). The 
roots of this more commercial approach were to be found within the Conservative 
government’s attempt to infuse greater commercial spirit into the Post Office (Batstone 
et al., 1984: 200) an important strand of which involved the ‘overcoming of the dictatorial 
attitudes of the unions’ (Bevins, 1965: 72-8). This greater emphasis upon market-related 
considerations contrasted sharply with traditional notions of ‘just’ and ‘fair’ employee 
rewards. Furthermore, it served to heighten the bargaining awareness of the Post Office 
trade unions who increasingly engaged in their own quid pro quid form of bargaining 
(Batstone et al., 1984: 201).  
This chapter has earlier outlined how the government in Britain, from the Post War 
period in particular, occupied an anomalous position of that of large scale employer, 
conciliator and regulator in chief of the economy (Allen, 1960: 113). As such, it has 
periodically attempted to limit pay increases in order to deal with economic crisis and has 
often taken the easiest option of applying this to its own employees (ibid). For Postal 
workers therefore, discussions relating to wage rises were from the early 1960s to 
become more clearly and predominantly shaped by government policy (Clinton, 1984: 
533). This affected the nature and contours of bargaining within the Post office leading to 
direct bargaining and industrial confrontation that was without precedent (ibid.). While 
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their leaders may have been constrained within the parameters of government wage 
restraint, postal workers at shopfloor level were exploiting the period’s climate of full 
employment. They were beginning to engage in the practice of local bargaining that was 
by the 1960s spreading out beyond its original stronghold in engineering (Lane, 1974: 
160). A shortage of labour within the Post Office was supplemented by high levels of 
overtime which boosted earning levels and affected bargaining patterns (Clinton, 1984: 
302). This growing reliance on overtime as a means of coping with increasing mail 
volumes and fluctuations in traffic flow was to become a staple operational feature within 
the Post Office that would serve to reinforce local and often unofficial bargaining for a 
number of decades that followed (Gall, 2003: 29).    
As they moved into the 1960s a more industrially confident UPW membership continued 
to express their growing dissatisfaction towards the governments wage restraint 
measures and its impact upon their falling wage relativities through increasing incidences 
of industrial action. Unlike other public utility workers whose similar experiences 
increasingly forced shows of wage militancy at national level (Lane, 1974: 160), postal 
workers demonstrated that they were prepared to take the type of immediate localised 
and unofficial action that was to later set them apart from other groups of workers in the 
1990s and 2000s (see Gall, 2003). Clinton (1984: 540-2) provides numerous example of 
widespread wage-related unofficial unrest (some of which involved the important tactic 
of the ban on overtime) throughout the early 1960s in a host of Post Office depots 
including many parts of London, Crewe, St Helens, Leicester, Nottingham and Ipswich. 
Although the union at a national level had generally tended to support the economic 
planning efforts of government during this period, it did not support the restriction on 
members’ incomes. In 1964, therefore, the union’s executive for the first time in the 
history of the union announced its intention to strike nationally (ibid.). This failed to stem 
further outbreaks of localised industrial unrest but (after a one-day national stoppage) 
resulted in a rise in pay which was regarded as a victory for postal workers and their 
union (ibid.).  
Strike action within the Post Office during the 1960s was in part then a symptom of the 
UPW being as Clinton (1984: 545) so eloquently states, ‘pushed from the carpeted 
corridors of the civil service into a more rumbustious bargaining market place’. In addition 
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to changing economic pressures such action, particularly when local, was influenced by 
the changing nature of the workforce and the attitudinal values that new workers 
brought with them (ibid). Therefore, it represented the nascent development of a 
cohesive and confident shop steward movement within the Post Office that, due to 
labour shortages, was able to begin to apply pressure at the crucial point of production 
(Darlington, 1994: 34). However, whilst such arguments may go some way to providing an 
explanation of the increasing recourse to strike activity amongst the membership of the 
UPW, they would not appear to be so directly applicable to industrial relations within the 
wider Civil Service. In particular, although other areas of the civil service were at the time 
experiencing similar problems in terms of labour turnover and one would assume 
subsequent cultural change, the postal strike of 1964 was regarded as something of a 
novelty amongst this category of workers (Clinton, 1984: 545). This raises questions as to 
what other factors may have influenced postal workers to periodically take industrial 
action which at the time appeared to have been in contrast with other workgroups in 
apparently similar circumstances. 
Manual grades of postal worker have traditionally carried out work that whilst being 
largely routine has tended to facilitate a significant level of workgroup communication. 
These workgroups have also often been housed in occupationally specific work areas, 
wearing standard uniforms and all working under a common authority (Moran, 1974: 18-
20). For Moran, these are factors that potentially foster relatively high union involvement 
and a militant approach towards trade unionism (ibid). As Kelly notes, the strong social 
workgroup identity that such circumstances foster, are crucial to the realisation of 
effective mobilisation (Kelly, 1998). Judged from this viewpoint certain staple features of 
postal work provided an effective framework upon which to import and then build a more 
militant method of trade unionism by a more belligerent UPW and its membership. 
Ironically, whilst this was a response to the waning consensual style of industrial relations 
within the Post Office, its protagonists were often able to reconstitute the bilateral 
vestiges of this system to effectively build an oppositional workplace culture to 
managerially driven change.     
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The loss of civil service status and increasing pressure for reform 
It was partly in response to the ways in which the Whitley system was being allowed to 
operate in ways that hampered effective management (Fulton Committee, 1968: 88-89) 
that the Post Office in 1969 moved to Corporation status. This built upon earlier 
commercial edicts introduced in 1967 and involved the further adoption of market 
principles and the removal of the Post Office from the Civil service (Gall, 2003: 25). The 
Post Master General, a position which dated back to 1660 (see Robinson, 1948: 48), was 
replaced by a Minister of Posts and Telecommunications with fewer powers and fewer 
day to day responsibilities for the running of the service (Clinton, 1984: 308). These 
changes made it possible for some Conservative politicians to argue for the separation of 
the postal and telecommunication side of the service. This might now be viewed as a 
precursor to a weakening of the monopoly and the handing over of sections of the service 
to private enterprise (ibid.). Moreover, they were a harbinger of the present and 
dominant free market narrative of present day which views the market as the most 
efficient way of allocating goods and services. As this study has earlier highlighted, such a 
viewpoint advocates the subjecting of public services to market disciplines with 
government services carried out by the private sector should this be the most cost 
effective means of their delivery (Corby and White, 1999: 8).  
The postal business - for this is what it now increasingly took the form of - came into the 
1970s against the backdrop of further governmental policies aimed at wage restraint 
(Corby and White, 1999: 7) and increasing pressure to implement new strategies that 
were in line with the commercial paradigm of the period (Batstone et al., 1984: 174). As 
with other areas of the public sector, the effect of this on wage negotiations further 
eroded the old consensus and increased industrial action (Elliot and Fallick, 1981). This 
found expression in the 1971 postal strike which began in January of that year, was to last 
for seven weeks and involved all grades of the membership (Moran, 1974: 82). The 
dispute’s final settlement was widely regarded as a traumatic defeat for the UPW and a 
watershed which transformed those who worked for the Post Office and its successors 
into the type of trade unionist recognisable within the movement as a whole (Corby, 
1979: 115; Moran, 1974: 82; Clinton, 1984: 507). Nevertheless, the dispute did provide an 
indication of the union’s apparent ability to secure membership compliance to its 
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objectives (Moran, 1974: 83). Here Moran (1974: 149-53) again looks to the union’s 
structure, in terms of the high ratio of members to full time officers. From this viewpoint, 
the manner in which they were elected as opposed to appointed helped maintain and 
give credence to a radical kernel of local activists who were able to convey the pursuit of 
more radical cultural goals.  
Despite the outcome of the 1971 dispute, managerial approaches remained unsure and 
cautious displaying a willingness or inability to convert victory into managerial 
sovereignty in the workplace. For commentators such as Corby (1979: 123) this related to 
management having no real experience of a major dispute before. However, there 
remained on-going recruitment and retention difficulties within the Post Office. 
Additionally, technical developments in the way in which postal work was processed had 
begun to erode what had traditionally been the stabilizing effect of job security for staff. 
This may help partly explain why management in the early 1970s at least, continued to 
seek union approval (often resulting in veto) in the implementation of labour relations 
policies (Batstone et al., 1984: 170).  Examples of this approach could be found in the 
slowing down by management, in the face of union opposition, of the introduction of 
productivity deals and new efficiency enhancing machinery which the postal business was 
under considerable political pressure to introduce (ibid.). As the decade unfolded 
management within the Post Office was coming under growing pressure to satisfy two 
frequently contradictory objectives. On the one hand there was pressure to maintain the 
stability of the service upon which the relationship between business and the State 
largely depended. On the other hand, it was increasingly required to reduce labour costs 
without the option of financial inducements to the workforce (ibid.).    
The 1970s and a growth in shopfloor power  
As Marchington (1992: 153) reminds us, at all times management remain dependent 
upon the actions of employees to ensure that production or service is maintained at a 
satisfactory level. While this is most apparent when skilled work is being undertaken, it 
principles are equally applicable to the managerial challenges within the Post Office 
throughout the 1970s where the recruitment and retention of labour continued to be a 
problem (Batstone et al., 1984: 169). As a consequence, Post Office management faced 
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with an insufficient supply of labour, turned to more covert ways of securing worker 
compliance in its search for greater operational efficiency (ibid.: 179). In particular, 
workers in some areas were allowed to develop localised practices which enhanced levels 
of overtime, reduced workload and protected jobs. Custom and practice along with 
unofficial bargaining became a staple feature of Post Office workplaces which, as well as 
securing better terms and conditions, provided branches with a strong basis from which 
to exercise considerable power over management (Gall, 2003: 29). Reinforcing this source 
of union power was the long-standing system of ‘seniority’ whereby job allocation (as in 
hard or easy, good or bad, worse or better paid work.) was determined on the length of 
worker service and organised through the local union. This, along with worker and union 
determination over the allocation of holidays and overtime allocation, served to enhance 
the workplace control enjoyed by postal workers since it prevented managerial 
victimisation and the targeting of activists (ibid). Despite the implications, management 
regarded, or were at least prepared to tolerate, these arrangements. As Batstone et al. 
(1984: 170) note, this served a means of developing loyalty through indulgency patterns 
within the traditional framework of an internal labour market (Burawoy, 1979) rather 
than via the less available incentive of direct wage rise. 
Ironically, the growth in local power which this situation brought about not only led to an 
increase in local industrial action, it also provided a position from which left-wing factions 
found some influence (Batstone et al., 1984: 209). These groups sought to increase their 
influence by obtaining changes in union constitution and practice. Perhaps an indication 
of the growing presence of such groups was to be found in the long standing opposition 
of the UPW both locally and nationally to the Post Offices Mechanisation plan. Under the 
plan mechanical sorting equipment was scheduled to be installed into 120 offices by 1976 
thereby reducing the number of dispatching offices (as in those that sorted and sent mail 
into the Post Office network which transferred mail around the country into depots for 
delivery) from 1,600 to 120 then further down to 80 (Corby, 1979: 196). From its 
viewpoint, the Post Office believed that this would lead to a considerable reduction in 
manpower requirement whilst producing a unified system of mails circulation (ibid.). 
However, by 1975 only 12 offices had been equipped for these changes largely due to the 
opposition of the UPW and its subsequent embargo on the initiative (ibid.). While this 
73 
  
opposition was bought out in the form of a £1.15 a week pay rise for the workforce, 
savings from the project were not great, with the final agreement precluding the use of 
part time labour and largely blocking the use of female labour in mechanised tasks (ibid.).    
Not only did the mechanisation programme of the 1970s fail to bring about the level of 
efficiency savings which it had hoped to yield, it also served to strengthen the power of 
the UPW particularly in those areas in which it was introduced. In particular, the 
concentration of mail sorting and dispatch into larger Mechanised Letter Offices served to 
increase and widen the vulnerability of mail services to industrial disruption, not just from 
postal operatives but furthermore, from other groups of workers such as the equally well-
organised Post Office Engineers (Corby, 1979: 208). According to Gall (2003: 131-2) the 
above is one of a range of features of the mail system and the way in which the Post 
Office operates which combine to add to the potency of strike action by its workforce. 
These include the personalised (and therefore non-substitutable) nature of the product, 
the time-sensitive manner in which the system works, and the necessarily continuous 
interdependent manner of a network of operational components (as in its delivery, 
sorting and distribution operations). Such factors make the organisation susceptible to 
disproportionate levels of disruption by workers from any of its functions. Adding further 
strength to the industrial confidence of the UPW at the time was the monopoly which the 
Post Office had historically held over letter delivery. This effectively served to prevent any 
credible alternatives to mail delivery that might be used to undermine the union’s 
position.  
 It would seem that for much of the 1970s the postal business was characterised by a 
political status quo which was reflected in its labour relations strategy. This involved a 
commitment to provide stable employment and working flexibility in exchange for union 
and worker commitment to maintaining service to the public (Batstone et al., 1984: 250). 
That this took place within an increasingly commercial paradigm called for an increasing 
degree of devolved autonomy for local management which served to enhance the local 
power of some workgroups. However, such was the mood of the time, from the late 
1970s the autonomy of the Post Office and in particular the monopolies which it held 
were continually threatened (Batstone et al., 1984; Clinton, 1984: 595). In response to 
this, and particularly the implications for the industry and thus its membership, the UPW 
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again looked to political action through its traditional political networks and involvement 
on government bodies as a means of influencing the opinion of the state. At other times 
this political activity took the form of a coalition with management and a more 
meaningful commitment to the introduction of local productivity deals. This reflected a 
change in strategy by UPW to meet the challenges posed by the incoming Conservative 
government of 1979 (Batstone et al., 1984: 199). 
As well as harking back to its traditional method of political action, the UPW in the late 
1970s after many years of campaigning achieved (albeit briefly and in diluted form) its 
early objective of industrial democracy (Corby, 1979: 126; Clinton, 1984: 388). This took 
the form of an experiment between the union and the Post Office which would 
automatically lapse after a two-year period unless the legislation which helped bring it 
about was renewed (Batstone et al., 1984: 13). Again, its achievement in 1978 was due in 
no small part to, and highlights the adept political manoeuvring of, the UPW which was 
able to further its case to the then Labour government (who had electorally committed to 
the pursuit of such arrangements). Central to this was the latter’s appeal for and 
reference to state prescriptions for ‘good industrial relations’ enshrined in The Post Office 
Act 1969 (Batstone et al., 1983). Under the scheme members of the UPW along with 
representatives of other unions from the postal industry sat on the Post Office board and 
were involved both formally and fully in its collective decisions and collective 
responsibility (Batstone et al., 1984: 13; Corby, 1979: 127). This was mirrored at regional 
and local level by consultative committees comprised of management and union 
representatives. However, although management had hoped that it would act as a means 
of reducing worker opposition to change, they argued that the experiment was being 
used by the union to obstruct business initiatives and changes to working practices 
(Batstone et al., 1984: 144). In light of this Post Office management successfully 
demanded its cessation at the end of the trial (ibid.). This, according to Clinton (1984: 
595) coincided with the onset of a period which from the 1979 General Election onwards 
saw changes in attitudes towards industrial relations perhaps greater than ever before. 
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Ongoing commercialisation and the threat of the free market 
Although the Post Office had long been successful in resisting the substance if not the 
form of commercial practices, the changes pressed by the Thatcher administration proved 
less resistible (Ferner and Terry, 1985: 4). The government from 1979 onwards were able 
to shift the debate on the economy in terms of the argument that that the private sector 
was on the whole as good as, if not better, than the public sector at providing public 
services (Corby and White, 1999: 8; Ferner and Terry, 1985: 4). Changes in line with this 
strand of the government’s ideological approach were brought about by a major 
programme of the privatisation of national assets including British Aerospace, British 
Airways and British Gas, and the weakening of public service monopolies (Ferner and 
Terry, 1985: 4). Whilst the Post Office did not form part of the governments immediate 
privatisation programme it was not immune from the pressures which it gave rise to. For 
example, the Post Office’s monopoly over air courier and electronic mail services was 
removed in 1980. Additionally, its telecommunications arm became formally separated 
and exposed to competition from 1981 (Batstone et al., 1984: 55; Ferner and Terry, 1985: 
4) before eventually being privatised in 1984. Potentially more important were the 
assumed powers by the Secretary of State to remove the Post Office’s monopoly if it 
failed to respond adequately to new market demands and to provide adequate service as 
a result of industrial action.     
These developments brought about significant reactions from both the Post Office’s 
management and its unions. In June 1980 the UPW became the UCW (Union of 
Communication Workers) with new regional structures and greater powers for separate 
executives covering posts and telecoms (Clinton, 1984: 596). The membership also 
(narrowly) accepted a national productivity scheme, which the union had recommended 
arguing that it would lessen the pressure for regionalised pay and a subsequent reduction 
in union power (Gall, 2003: 37). For its part, Post Office management throughout the 
early to mid1980s sought greater cost savings through plans to introduce greater part 
time working, increased labour flexibility and the further implementation of new 
technology (ibid.). While the UCW recognised and accepted the requirement for 
restructuring as a means of obviating the need for further government intervention, it 
could not agree to a package of measures in 1984 which sought to link these initiatives to 
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that year’s annual round of pay bargaining (ibid.). As a result, in a clear example of its 
preparedness to abandon the consensual approach, Post Office management in early 
1985 unilaterally extended the use of technology in its largest depot in Mount Pleasant, 
London (Ferner and Terry, 1985: 10). Additionally, notice was served on the cessation of 
established procedures and custom and practice arrangements in Northampton’s main 
depot (Gall, 2003: 40). Although both disputes led to unofficial industrial action, the UCW 
shied away from a national strike, reluctantly agreeing to an efficiency scheme which 
involved greater use of part time workers and increased mechanisation (Ferner and Terry, 
1985: 10-11; Martinez Lucio, 1993: 31; Gall, 2003: 42).   
The localised nature of strike action in the disputes of early 1985 was indicative of a 
growing trend of worker reaction to managerial attempts to introduce unilateral change 
within the Post Office (Ferner and Terry, 1985: 7). Days lost due to industrial action 
increased from 3, 900 in 1981-2 to 10, 200 in 1983-4 and 90 000 in 1984-5 as local 
management came under increasing pressure from above to cut back on overtime levels 
and to alter the allocation of staff to duties (Ferner and Terry, 1985: 7). What the disputes 
also signified was a growing willingness amongst Post Office management to take on the 
UCW via local set piece showdowns. Consequently, this shifted power to the base of the 
union rendering the UCW’s method of political exchange within this new political 
environment even more difficult to maintain (Gall, 2003: 45). In truth, what might be 
termed here as a bifurcation of power within the union had actually began some years 
earlier with the onset of commercialism in the 1960s and 1970s. This had given rise to 
some devolved bargaining and the adoption of industrial tactics amongst some workplace 
activists (Batstone et al., 1984: 208-209). Nevertheless, the nature of the action was 
almost entirely unofficial which contained the added element of solidarity walkouts 
(Ferner and Terry, 1985: 15) and often ended in favourable outcomes for the union. In a 
period of declining and often unsuccessful national strike activity this cumulatively served 
to increase the industrial confidence of postal workers (Gall, 2003: 84). 
At this point, it is worth pointing out that the Post Office underwent significant 
restructuring during 1986. Under government instruction to commercialise the Post 
Office created a number of so called autonomous business units creating separate 
counter service (Post Office Counters with 12,000 workers), parcel (Parcel Force with 
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12,000 workers), and letters (Royal Mail with 170,000 workers) division (Gall, 2003, 45). 
This aimed to allow more rapid and effective corporate response to market pressure 
whilst establishing the necessary structures for privatisation (ibid.: 45). Given that this 
study is primarily concerned with industrial relations within the Royal Mail division of the 
organisation attention will largely focus upon this division of the wider Post Office. The 
term Royal Mail will now. Therefore, refer to that specific aspect of the postal industry.      
Evidence of both the increasingly commercialised nature of the Post Office and the 
confidence and willingness of postal workers to resort to industrial action was to be found 
in the first national postal dispute in 17 years in 1988. This centred on the unilateral 
implementation of Difficult Recruitment Area Supplements (known as DRAS). Under this 
scheme new recruits in areas of the South East which were experiencing high labour 
turnover were to be paid an extra premium during their first year of recruitment. Such a 
scheme, from their perspective, posed a threat to the integrity of the UCW and the future 
of national collective bargaining. Whilst this action took the initial form of a one-day 
national strike, it escalated into a series of unofficial walkouts in response to the 
introduction by the Royal Mail of casual workers to clear up resultant mail backlogs (Gall, 
2003: 82). The reaction of workers to this latter issue emphasised its potential threat to 
existing notions of job security and earning levels which had long been central to the 
fabric of industrial relations within the Post Office. The fact that localised action carried 
on in contravention of talks aimed at settling the dispute indicated that industrial 
relations within the Royal Mail were becoming more decentralised (Martinez Lucio, 1993: 
37). As far as Royal Mail management were concerned, it highlighted that the industrial 
relations system within the service had not been sufficiently reformed to facilitate the 
kinds of development desired in the long term. Moreover, it served to prove that there 
existed deep enough levels of workforce uncertainty and discontent as to pose a 
significant threat of future protracted industrial action (ibid.). In light of this the Royal 
Mail looked toward the use of alternative personnel approaches within existing formal, if 
decentralised, industrial relations mechanisms. 
From the late 1980s onwards Royal Mail attempted to implement a wide range of new 
HRM based management initiatives (Darlington, 1993; Martinez Lucio, 1993; Martinez 
Lucio et al., 1997; Martinez Lucio at al., 2000). These included employee involvement 
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schemes, employee opinion surveys, quality improvement projects, the widespread 
distribution of printed business briefings to the workforce and a ‘customer first’ initiative 
which focused on the primacy of internal customer relations (Beale, 2003; Martinez Lucio, 
1993: 39). It was hoped that this would help engender clearer workforce commitment to 
managerial goals and significant change in organisational culture. This would pave the 
way for Royal Mail’s pursuit of more flexible working practices which could be aligned to 
the increased use of automation (Gall, 2003: 50; Martinez Lucio, 1993: 40). In an attempt 
to increase labour flexibility, Royal Mail during the early 1990s sought (often without 
success) to substantially increase its use of part time temporary and casual employment- 
an area which had tended to be strongly contested by many workgroups and the local 
and national UCW. This was accompanied in 1992 by a major restructuring exercise in 
which Royal Mail decentralized its operation into nine geographical divisions, each with 
its own managerial structure and each operating as separate business units. This 
separation of function flowed down to workplace level with the processing, distribution 
and delivery of mails all independent from one another with their own workforce and 
cohort of local management (ibid.). It was hoped, that these changes would curb the 
multi-functional and temporal flexibility that had been traditionally controlled by postal 
workers (and displaced onto the newer peripheral recruits). This in theory would make 
close supervisory scrutiny, team working and eventual franchise more easily achievable 
(Beale, 2003: Martinez Lucio, 1993: 39).  
These developments within Royal Mail necessitated a reform in its industrial relations 
system at local level which had remained resilient to change (Martinez Lucio, 1993: 40).  A 
new system of worker representation based along the lines of functional splits within a 
regional structure was subsequently agreed between the UCW and Royal Mail in 1992. 
The New Industrial Relations Framework Agreement (NIRFA) as it was termed sought, in 
the spirit of decentralisation, to involve a newly recognised stratum of workplace (unit) 
stewards. These were part of a wider representational framework of area and divisional 
representatives that mirrored Royal Mail’s new managerial structure. Whilst it offered, 
the somewhat cautious, UCW the scope to negotiate with management at the new 
appropriate levels, NIRFA was underpinned by the principle of shifting local negotiating 
power away from local branches, whose officials Royal Mail saw as instigators of disputes 
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and strikes (Gall, 2003: 49).  In doing so, the new system sought to isolate local 
representatives in order to create an enterprise type of union based on cooperation and 
the avoidance of conflict. Should issues prove difficult to resolve they were to be 
progressed to area then if necessary divisional levels thus excluding local ‘less reasonable’ 
branch officials (ibid.).  
The inadequacy of such measures as a means of curbing local worker action were soon 
demonstrated; in 1993 the UCW through local strike action and non-cooperation (see 
Beale, 2003) staved off managerial attempts to substitute traditional rotational methods 
of job resourcing (whereby workers autonomously alternated between shifts and jobs) 
with a system of fixed managerial determined duties. Not only did this initiative threaten 
an arrangement that had allowed workers to temper the monotony and unsociability of 
some aspects of postal work, its underlying logic (with its implications for the seniority 
principle) was to reduce worker control over how work was allocated within Royal Mail 
workplaces (ibid.). The ability of the UCW to defend the terms and conditions of members 
in the face of a new managerialism, which sought to create an industrial relations climate 
that was compatible with marketization (Gall, 2003: 51) was further demonstrated in 
1996. Here the union, which was by now the Communication Workers Union (CWU) 
engaged in what was the largest strike in Britain in terms of days lost in the 1990s (ibid.). 
This was in response to Royal Mail’s attempts to introduce an initiative that came under 
the heading of the Employee Agenda and sought to resolve issues such as flexibility, 
grading and participation within one framework (Martinez Lucio et al., 2000). Central to 
this was the introduction of team working with its staple features of team leaders, self-
assessment and team responsibility for holidays and sickness cover. As Beale notes, such 
measures threatened worker control over local terms and conditions. In evaluating the 
1996 dispute and the 8 national days of action which ensued, Gall (2003: 100-30) argues 
that it was on balance successful (for the CWU) and served to maintain the industrial 
confidence of postal workers to continue using industrial action as the modus operandi.   
The UCW/CWU’s relative success in both the national 1996 Employee Agenda dispute and 
the 1993 localised (although on Royal Mail’s part, nationally coordinated) disputes over 
fixed duties again highlighted that power within the union was still located 
simultaneously at national and workplace level (Batstone et al., 1984: 254-262). During a 
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period of general worker acquiescence, a wide range of factors including, increased 
volumes of work, monopoly status, public support and changing political contingency, 
served throughout the 1990s to bolster this power (Beale, 2003). Additionally, in a similar 
vein to their predecessors from the 1960s, union leaders, particularly at a local level, were 
able to successfully reconstitute and then exploit a number of internal organisational 
features as a means of rebuffing managerial driven change. The New Industrial Relations 
Framework 1992 became a medium through which workplace representatives were able 
to gain status, industrial know-how and strengthen shopfloor organisation while the new 
stratum of area representatives assumed the de-facto role of works convenors (ibid.). 
Other examples of the subversion of internal control mechanisms were to be found in the 
hijacking of team briefing sessions by the local union to address members (ibid.) and 
functionalised work becoming the focus for demarcation arguments. 
Perhaps though the most important factor which helped sustain strong workplace control 
at this time, was the on-going reduction of the union’s branches (from around 800-900 in 
the late 1980s to 90-100 branches by the early 1990s) which was accelerated by the need 
to meet the requirements of the NIRFA (Gall, 2003: 144). As a result, more moderate 
quiescent groups of worker were incorporated into larger branches that were better 
organised and more active in defending members’ interests. This meant that previously 
isolated workers were now integrated to some degree with other workgroups who were 
more strategically well placed within the mail system and held more oppositional 
workplace attitudes. In effect the potential for striking was much more extensive than 
before, since action did not have to cross branch borders to spread (ibid.). Ironically 
therefore, the NIRFA, a mechanism which had been introduced to engender a more 
cooperative type of unionism, was the centrepiece of a complex array of interlocking 
factors that allowed postal workers to strike more easily and more effectively than many 
other workers (ibid.).    
In providing an overview of the period, Gall (2003: 61) argues that compared to other 
workers, postal workers throughout the 1990s took relatively high levels of both unofficial 
and official strike action. He goes on to argue that they were probably from the period 
1995-2001 the most strike-prone group of workers in Britain. This culminated in 330 
instances of unofficial action and 25 of official action in the year to March 2001 including 
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‘knock-on-disputes’ in which CWU members refused to do work resulting from industrial 
action elsewhere (Sawyer et al., 2001: 11-2). These statistics clearly point to the capacity 
of the CWU leadership, both locally and nationally, to mobilise its membership during a 
period of historically low levels of strike action (ibid.). Moreover, they point to an upsurge 
in action that was symptomatic of an industrial relations climate within the Royal Mail 
which had, with its increase in court injunctions and unofficial action, become increasingly 
conflictual (Martinez Lucio et al., 2000: 272). A further feature of this decline in relations 
was Royal Mail’s increased readiness to suspend union representatives during local 
conflicts (a strategy which had begun in the late 1980s) throughout the 1990s (ibid.) and 
2000s (Lyddon, 2009: 325). Since this was often met with strike action (Gall, 2003: 174, 
185), it would appear that Royal Mail were at times seeking to provoke and spread 
immediate workplace action which detracted wider attention from the fundamental 
provenance of conflict within the postal industry. This was an underlying discontent 
amongst the workforce caused by commercialisation pressures and workplace 
restructuring (Williams and Adam Smith, 2010: 276). 
As this chapter has earlier argued, a number of factors combined to strengthen the 
industrial confidence of postal workers to confront both employer and indirectly 
government throughout the 1990s. Central to this was the postponement of plans to 
privatise Royal Mail due to opposition from within and outside the Conservative 
government (Martinez Lucio, 2000: 270). The avoidance of job losses and protection from 
competition thus provided fertile terrain for the CWU to limit and control the 
introduction of a variety of market-driven initiatives the workplace. However, as the 
postal industry moved into the 2000s, pressures for the introduction of more efficient 
ways of working remained. Evidence that the New Labour government of 1997 had 
explicitly adopted much of the neo-liberal inheritance bequeathed by the outgoing 
Conservatives (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2000; Crouch, 2001; Leys, 2001) manifested itself in 
the deregulatory thrust of The Postal Service Act 2000 (Gall, 2003: 299). This ushered in a 
staggered timetable of liberalisation of the postal industry, in which Royal Mail’s 
monopoly was to be progressively eroded until full marketization from 2009 (ibid.: 299-
300). Accompanying this was the establishment of the regulatory body Postcomm 
charged with enforcing the provisions of the Act. These provisions concerned 
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maintenance of the long-standing USP (Universal Service Price) and setting of service 
quality levels through the provision of licences to collect process and deliver mail (ibid.). 
In a similar vein to privatisation then, this effectively meant licensing competition to 
either bypass Royal Mail or force it to ‘sharpen up’ in pursuit of these goals.  
The race towards liberalisation 
The significant threat that this variant of marketization posed to the interests of postal 
workers found expression in the high number of localised strikes that took place between 
2000 and the summer of 2001 (Gall, 2003: 54). From then on strike activity for a period, 
fell markedly as the CWU and Royal Mail in keeping with the New Labour espoused 
theme of (conditional) partnership (Smith and Morton, 2006: 403) entered into a ‘peace-
keeping’ moratorium. Under this arrangement managerially-imposed changes to working 
practices and resultant strike ballots were suspended (Gall, 2003: 70). However, a raft of 
initiatives (which were to be later rescinded or diluted) announced by Royal Mail from 
2001 onwards including 40,000 jobs losses (in violation of a job security agreement), the 
reduction of sick pay and contracting out of a number of services resulted in the CWU 
issuing 21 national strike threats between July 2001 and March 2003 (ibid.: 306). In 
addition to these developments, the elevation of conflict to the national realms of the 
CWU was given further impetus by what many considered to be the ascendency of the 
‘left’ within the union. In 2001, the incoming General Secretary had stood on a platform 
of fighting privatisation and job cuts, increased government funding for the Post Office, 
greater independence from the employer and the decentralisation of power within the 
union (Gall, 2003 and Charlwood, 2004). While these events may have suggested that 
power within the union (albeit with the promise of it being decentralised) and with it the 
determination of action, had relocated to national level, events in the autumn of 2003 
were to suggest otherwise.  
Charlwood (2004: 388) identifies a number of high profile disputes during 2003 which 
centred on workers attempting to defend themselves against management restructuring 
plans. This involved nationally coordinated official action with regard to disputes between 
the FBU and the Fire Service and GMB and Amicus with BA (British Airways). A dispute 
between the CWU and Royal Mail in the October of that year brought about wide-scale 
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unofficial action which resulted in postal workers halting managerially imposed change 
and obtaining a favourable outcome on pay and the reorganisation of working practices 
(ibid). Importantly, this had superseded a ballot in which a call for national industrial 
action in relation to these changes had been (narrowly) defeated (Lyddon, 2009: 325). 
This upsurge of grass roots action in response to localised initiatives from a resurgent 
Royal Mail management again highlights the important role of local activists within the 
CWU, and the general nature of unofficial action within the postal industry. Rather than 
being spontaneous, most unofficial strikes are organised and premeditated with the 
initiative largely coming from lay leadership, or unit representatives, and are seen to 
provide numerous strategic benefits. Firstly, they cater for redress over ‘perishable 
disputes’ where if action is not immediate management would win by default (see 
Cameron and Eldridge, 1968: 70). Secondly, they serve as a means by which local officials 
can retain local union control over the issues and outcomes at stake, and thirdly they act 
as a method of side-stepping the national CWU’s inability or unwillingness to support 
such strikes (Gall, 2003: 166-8).  
Royal Mail’s on-going restructuring programme saw the introduction of dramatic changes 
to its delivery system-from two down to one delivery per day from 2003 onwards (Gall, 
2003: 304). Since this involved widespread change to local working practices, potential 
loss of earnings and increased job insecurity, it served to ensure that sporadic official and 
unofficial action continued (Lyddon, 2009: 325). In 2004 therefore, there were 95 
recorded incidents of industrial action (89 of which were unofficial) whilst in 2005 23 
incidents were recorded (17 of which were unofficial). Further action in areas including 
Stoke on Trent, Belfast, South Wales and South Yorkshire were to follow in 2006.  This 
action perhaps highlighted the continuing belief, and capacity to engage, in localised 
autonomous action amongst the rank and file since it took place against the backdrop of 
CWU’s strategy during this period of engagement in political exchange. The return by the 
union to its historical means of influencing the political decision making process did 
achieve some success. This included the putting back the deregulation time table, the 
revision of the pricing policy and the removal of the regulator (Gall, 2003: 305). However, 
by the early summer of 2007, in a reflection of the industrial relations climate within the 
wider public services, what Lyddon (2009: 325) refers to as an ‘eventual showdown’ took 
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place between Royal Mail and the CWU over workforce pensions, pay and modernization. 
Central to this was the historically contested area of worker control within Royal Mail. 
Here the employer sought the removal of 92 ‘Spanish practices’ on the part of the union 
and its members (ibid.: 389).   
After a number of national stoppages, the CWU was able to recommend an eventual 
settlement to its members. However, the 2007 dispute had been protracted involving 
both the targeting of local representatives (in areas which included Stoke on Trent, 
Bristol, Oxford, and South London) and the use of a court injunction by Royal Mail 
(Lyddon, 2009: 324). The latter’s increasingly unitary approach towards industrial 
relations goes some way to explaining the short-lived tenure of the 2007 Pay and 
Modernisation agreement. From the CWU’s perspective, Royal Mail management were 
increasingly breaching the agreement’s central tenet of union involvement in the 
introduction of new machinery and workforce rationalisation (Pay and Modernisation 
Agreement, 2007). As a result, a clutch of regional and localised strikes took place from 
June 2009 (The Daily Telegraph, 2009) which again emphasised the union membership’s 
traditional capacity for localised action. This was followed by rolling national action 
before a settlement was reached in November 2009 (The Guardian, 2009). This took the 
form of The Business Transformation Agreement 2010 (BT Agreement 2010) which 
provided an overarching framework within which Royal Mail and the CWU were to bring 
about modernisation of the industry. The agreement was underpinned by the spirit of 
joint negotiation and committed both parties to a new more cooperative relationship as a 
means of managing change within an industry which Parliament in 2010 passed 
legislation (Postal Services Act 2011) to privatise.   
Partnership and cooperation  
Commenting around the time of the BT Agreement 2010, Bacon and Samuel (2009: 246) 
argue that in a period of few alternatives, unions have continued to sign partnership 
agreements in preference over threats to their long-term role in the workplace. In light of 
a declining market and growing political pressure for efficiency gains, this more 
cooperative model of industrial relations constituted an attempt by its leadership to make 
pragmatic use of available opportunities to influence employer policies (ibid.). Whilst this 
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helps explain the rationale underpinning the strategy of a union whose members have in 
recent decades, met managerial change with resistance rather than reluctance or positive 
acceptance (Gall, 2003: xi), such an approach is not without its critics. For example, 
partnership is regarded from some quarters as serving to incorporate workers and their 
representatives into participating in their own work intensification (Bain and Taylor, 2007; 
Stevenson and Carter, 2009). Moreover, the vulnerability to market forces of promised 
reciprocal concessions on the part of the employer, may itself threaten union legitimacy 
and effective worker representation (Jenkins, 2007: 649). The dichotomy of opinions 
surrounding the effectiveness of partnership as a means through which trade unions 
might regulate the terms and conditions of their members is better understood by a 
consideration of its practical implementation (through the BT Agreement 2010) within the 
Royal Mail.  
A study carried out by Beale and Mustchin (2013: 13-16) during the early stages of the 
2010 agreements tenure would appear to question the domestic application of its stated 
aims of bringing about ‘more rewarding employment for a more valued and genuinely 
involved workforce’ (BT Agreement 2010: 4). The authors point to Royal Mail’s use of 
employee involvement schemes throughout the period 2009-2010 as a means of bullying 
staff, promoting privatisation and extending managerial control vis-à-vis the CWU. They 
also note the use of documentation generated from employee involvement initiatives as 
being used in the support of disciplinary procedures which were aimed at reducing 
workforce numbers more cheaply than the statutory redundancy process. This highlights 
the contrast between the conciliatory rhetoric and confrontational practice (ibid.: 15) of 
partnership-based initiatives such as employee involvement. In this instance these were 
being used in an attempt to marginalise the CWU, one of the two central partners of the 
agreement itself. That said, this chapter has highlighted the strong and entrenched 
tradition of workplace organisation within the postal industry which acted here as an 
effective means of resisting such managerial practices (ibid.: 16-7). In particular, the CWU 
at workplace level were often able to shape the nature of such initiatives and often 
reconstitute them into trade union forums (ibid.). This more positive account of the 
advantages that partnership might provide for unions within the workplace itself is built 
upon by Beirne (2013: 122). From this viewpoint, the agreement provided a mechanism 
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through which the union could intervene and change management’s attempts to alter 
processes at workplace level.  Local action was often assisted by downward pressure from 
the union at executive level particularly in terms of moderating the decisions of 
unresponsive local managers (ibid.: 122). This suggests that Batstone et al.’s (1977) 
characterisation of the union as highly centralised but with considerable autonomy at 
branch level is still relevant and that this model has proved more effective in responding 
to new management practices in the general context of decentralised industrial relations 
(Martinez Lucio and Weston, 1992: 85).      
The CWU’s ability to positively affect workplace change through the medium of 
partnership helps to explain why the union has in the face of current on-going 
rationalisation continued to keep faith in such an approach (Agenda for Growth, Stability 
and Long Term Success 2014). The CWU’s structure and tradition of strong workplace 
trade unionism (Beale and Mustchin, 2013: 17) would appear to provide a bulwark 
against management’s use of partnership as a rhetorical vehicle to implement change 
which is coterminous with the interests of workers. However, Jenkins’ (2007) study of 
partnership amongst a number of workplaces in south Wales offers a further cautionary 
note with regard to the CWU’s continued faith in partnership (see Agenda for Growth, 
Stability and Long Term Success 2014). For Jenkins, the communication and information 
sharing aspect of partnership may, within the context of a competitive environment, be 
used as a means of highlighting workplace vulnerability and encouraging union focus on 
the singular interests of the unit (2007: 638). Such a situation may undermine any 
possibility of wider collective solidarity in the face of broader threats (Lillie and Martinez 
Lucio, 2004: 175) as workplaces vie with one another for work which the employer uses 
as leverage to change terms and conditions (Jenkins, 2007: 638). This is particularly 
salient to the latest settlement between Royal Mail and the CWU which has committed 
both parties to consensual change (and concomitant job losses) and alternative methods 
of dispute resolution. The proven effectiveness of the CWU both locally and nationally 
notwithstanding, the overwhelming difficulties for union negotiators in such 
circumstances (ibid.) would appear to present potential challenges to membership 
solidarity. Under the auspices of an agreement in which the existence of some Royal Mail 
workplaces vis-à-vis that of others is dependent upon factors such as financial cost and 
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quality of service, the sense of common interests and identity which is central to the 
process through which workers move towards collective action (Kelly, 1998: 44) may 
potentially be eroded.     
Conclusion 
This chapter has located an investigation of industrial relations in the UK postal service in 
a wider analysis of the range political economic and social factors that have, throughout 
its history, influenced the behaviours of its main actors. It identified that worker-
management relations have traditionally been conducted within a comprehensive 
framework of bargaining machinery and joint methods of conflict resolution (Batstone et 
al., 1984). As a more commercially-based paradigm emerged the Post Office’s labour 
relations strategy changed to that of a more market-sensitive approach. More recently, 
the acceleration of this process has involved the experimentation by management within 
the Royal Mail with a host of HRM-based initiatives (Jenkins et al., 2003: 88) at ‘ground 
level’ and more generally, the adoption of a unitary approach to invoking workplace 
change that has resulted in significant levels of industrial action. 
Such a focus is vital to an understanding both the rational for, and traditions that, 
underpin many of the working practices still carried out by postal workers, as well as the 
forces which currently shape both their actions and those of their managers. Its 
exposition of the organisational and occupational characteristics which have long aided 
workplace organisation helps to explain the continued presence within the postal service 
of a labour management model that is still based on the traditional negotiation of order. 
The emphasis throughout on the growing impact of competition is particularly salient to 
an understanding of the current state of industrial relations in a fully liberalised postal 
service. In addressing this, this chapter serves as an effective base from which to which to 
better understand the findings of the four Royal Mail sites which are the subject of this 
research.  
Finally, it has been the contention of this section that there have been long-standing 
important intra-workplace differences with regard to the levels of a trade union 
organisation and job control with the postal service (see Gall, 2003). At present all 
workers within the industry are employed by a single employer under uniformly agreed 
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terms and conditions. This means that the case of postal workers highlights two 
particularly important points with regard to contemporary industrial relations. Firstly, 
that worker agency is a crucial factor that can mediate market-driven change within the 
workplace itself. And secondly, that there exists potential for workers within the wider 
public services to resist a modernisation programme that threatens the means through 
which they and their representatives seek to regulate their labour process. The issue of 
worker agency and the ways that workers mediate structural forces by their actions at 
workplace level forms the focus of this thesis next chapter.  
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Chapter Five: Analysing workplace industrial relations 
There are a wealth of studies which have examined the impact of modernisation and new 
public management on the labour process of public sector workers in recent years. This 
study has, up to this point, drawn on both a number of these and a range of literature 
which focuses on the minutiae of worker action at the point of production. This has 
formed part of an investigation into the factors which shape the actions of both workers 
and managers at the level of the shopfloor. Any investigation into current events within 
the Royal Mail must pay careful attention to the locale of the shopfloor where the 
implementation of market change is being increasingly devolved to local management 
(Beirne, 2013). Again, this brings valuable context to this study’s empirical findings of 
worker managerial relations in four Royal Mail workplaces.     
However, despite their valuable contribution, these studies are inappropriate in providing 
a conceptual framework from which to analyse workplace relations in an industry that is 
quite different from others. For example, authors such as Bach and Kessler (2012) and 
Massey and Pyper (2005) provide insight into the economic and political driving forces 
behind modernisation and, the impact that market-sensitive management have had upon 
the terms and conditions of public sector workers. However, neither study really 
concentrates on how such factors might be mediated at the level of the shopfloor 
through robust and organised forms of worker resistance. This, in contrast to most other 
sectors of the labour market, continues to be a constant feature of contemporary 
industrial relations within the Royal Mail (Gall, 2003; Beale and Mustchin, 2013) and must 
necessarily be considered. Fairbrother (1994), on the other hand, does examine 
modernisation through the medium of local union officials. However, he again does not 
penetrate the depths of the shopfloor to the extent which would unearth the nature and 
presence of the type of informal responses to modernisation that are also of interest to 
this thesis.     
The challenge facing the author was to construct a framework that was suitable for a 
close-up analysis of worker manger relations in an industry that is quite different from 
most others. The unique levels of worker control still held by many workgroups within the 
Royal Mail where industrial relations are still based on the traditional negotiation of order 
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rendered it a special case. To understand such a situation in the absence appropriate 
contemporary literature called for an approach that was sensitive to a case which first 
sight seems to be an example of outdated industrial relations. This was remedied through 
Batstone et al.’s (1977) classic study of shopfloor relations which formed one part of this 
study’s conceptual framework. A key focus here is the effect that domestic trade union 
organisation has upon worker agency at the locale of the shopfloor.  
This thesis is concerned with how this agency is affected by, and in turn affects, 
managerial attempts to introduce market-driven reform at workplace level.  Here the 
author turned to what is the second component of the overall framework which is 
Edwards’ study Conflict and Accommodation (1988). This examines the manner in which 
patterns of workplace relations are shaped by a cluster of both external and internal 
influences and their interaction. The two approaches and the value that they bring to a 
study of worker-management relations in the Royal Mail are discussed at length in this 
chapter.  
Rationale for the study’s framework 
The Royal Mail forms part of the wider UK public service sector where ongoing 
widespread structural reform has taken place within a general neo-liberal economic 
framework (Worrall et al., 2009: 118). This has involved a range managerial initiatives 
which have aimed to intensify worker performance and behaviour (Worrall et al., 2009: 
118; Thomas and Davies, 2005: 685) The enactment of this has, however, been far from 
clear cut and cohesive and has been mediated by the context of different public services 
and individual agency (ibid.: 689). In the case of the Royal Mail, far reaching managerial-
driven reform- national strikes notwithstanding, has stimulated the uneven emergence of 
local workplace militancy that is in contrast to that of most other British trade unions of 
this period (Beale and Mustchin, 2013: 2; Gall, 2003).  
It follows that a key line of investigation throughout this chapter is how structural 
pressures emanating from external factors such as modernisation might be mediated by 
the subjective features of worker agency at workplace level. This will involve a 
consideration of how management and workers are involved in the dynamic and on-going 
process of negotiating order at the point of production. Accordingly, this chapter will 
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open with an evaluation of Edwards’ (1998) study of conflict and accommodation. This 
pays particular attention to the manner in which patterns of workplace relations are 
shaped by a cluster of both external and internal influences and their interaction (ibid.: 
201). Workplace relations here are viewed to be dialectic with patterns of behaviour 
being social products that arise out of the interaction between management and worker.  
Edwards (1988: 102) focusses on a variety of workgroups with differing skills in a range of 
workplace settings. Significant focus is placed on the effects a range of structural factors 
such as the nature of technology and the shape of the product market upon each group. 
While its scope is essential to an understanding of how differing external pressures 
interact with particular local workplace factors to influence types of worker behaviour, it 
may only partially answer the main concerns of this study. Workers within Royal Mail can 
be characterised as working within a relatively homogenous organisation, carrying out 
similar activities and covered by a uniform trade union recognition agreement. However, 
as Gall (2003) notes these workers have displayed varying patterns of workplace level 
behaviour in response to the pressures emanating from modernisation. This suggests that 
these various responses are better understood via an analysis of the subjective micro-
political processes by which similar structural pressures might be mediated at workplace 
level. Any such analysis within the context of such a densely unionised sector of 
employment as the Royal Mail must, therefore, essentially consider the nature of 
workplace trade unionism and its effect upon worker agency.  
The nature of shop steward organisation and in particular its effect upon workgroup 
action is central to Batstone et al.’s study of ‘Shop stewards in action’ (1977). By 
concentrating on shopfloor level union organisation, this study highlights the importance 
of relationships between stewards and their members and how this influences patterns of 
worker behaviour within domestic organisations. From this viewpoint, shop stewards in 
particular positions of influence and power are likely to play a greater role in the 
determination of behaviour than others (ibid.: 4). Bolstering steward power here is the 
nature of the work situation and the degree to which this promotes collective cohesive 
worker behaviour. According to Batstone et al. this is itself concomitantly shaped by the 
endeavours and actions of the union in the workplace, or, as it will be sometimes referred 
to here, the domestic organisation (ibid.: 134-135). 
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 It follows that, although external factors may interact with subjective factors to shape 
worker behaviour, the nature of domestic workplace organisation is an important factor 
itself in shaping patterns of worker behaviour. In the case of Royal Mail it can now be 
posited that different types of worker response to modernisation may, in part, be related 
to the nature of local branch and workplace leadership. The workplace-focused nature of 
Batstone et al.’s study renders it useful in strengthening the agency aspect of Edwards’ 
argument and as such would appear useful in contributing to the overall conceptual 
framework of this study. In order to provide a meaningful assessment of their value, 
these frameworks will be contextualised within a wider debate of the study’s main areas 
of concern and the line of arguments that have been so far put forward. Attention now 
turns to a consideration of Edwards’ study on patterns of conflict and accommodation 
within the workplace and how this relates to recent changes within both the public sector 
and more specifically the Royal Mail. 
Conflict, accommodation and consent 
Edwards’ (1988) argues that all workers are engaged in active efforts to make sense of, 
and to achieve control over, their work destinies and experiences. From this perspective, 
types of worker behaviour such as output restriction, ‘fiddles’, ‘pilfering’ and sabotage are 
seen as informal means of resisting or modifying managerial control in the workplace. 
Edwards (1988: 187-188) also recognises the importance of external structural forces in 
affecting worker action. Attention, in particular, focuses on how the basic structural 
antagonism between capital and labour within capitalist society places contradictory 
demands upon both management and workers and how, out of this process, the patterns 
of workplace order are generated (ibid: 188). This suggests that although structural forces 
including product market, technology and managerial systems of control do influence 
workplace action, they do not determine events since these have to be in practice 
mediated and, often in the interest of expediency, accommodated by the actors involved. 
In other words, given that workers are dependent upon the success of firms for their 
livelihoods, and that employers need to secure workers’ willingness to work, the 
relationship contains elements of cooperation (Cressey and MacInnes, 1980). In this sense 
workers may sometimes attempt to subvert their day to day working practices in order to 
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exert their control within the parameters, and indeed often pursuit, of organisational 
goals. 
The interplay between structure and action is better understood by briefly turning to an 
earlier study by Edwards and Scullion (1982) which examines worker behaviour in the 
form of industrial conflict within a variety of factory settings in the UK. A key concern here 
is how action that might be viewed from certain quarters as conflictual can gain a 
particular significance and form in a particular environment. According to the authors, 
conflictual types of worker behaviour such as absenteeism, sabotage and labour turnover 
must be understood within the context of wider workplace relations and are related to 
the patterns of control over the labour process (ibid.: 14); that process wherein a 
worker’s ability to work is translated into actual labour, a process involving conflicts of 
interest over the terms on which effort is extracted from workers (Edwards and Scullion, 
1984: 558) 
Having identified the broad conflict of interest that lies within the labour process, 
Edwards and Scullion (1984: 9) go on to argue that its manifestations are far from given 
and are instead related to their social setting. From this viewpoint, a consideration of 
subjective influences including the nature of workplace controls, the application of rules, 
and understandings held by workers and managers provides insight into why certain 
forms of attitudes and behaviour may or may not be present in workplaces. For example, 
Edwards and Scullion highlight how factors such as managerial approach, labour flexibility 
and levels of workgroup control can affect the manner in which activities such as 
absenteeism might be viewed and indeed undertaken in different workplaces. Again, they 
note that structural factors such as technology and the basic capitalist organisation of 
work particularly effect levels of workplace action. However, these are insufficient by 
themselves in providing a fuller explanation since forms of social control over these 
structural constraints are crucial in helping to explain how these constraints work in 
practice (ibid.: 277). 
In a similar vein, although the inherently contradictory requirements of management 
within a capitalist society can help foster the development of informal working practices, 
these practices, by their very nature, are not uniformly applied across all workplaces. As 
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Edwards (1988: 188) notes, informal practices are not the same everywhere. The act of 
pilfering, for example, is not a standard phenomenon but has widely varying forms and 
meanings. Furthermore, output restriction (the practice of putting ceilings on the amount 
of work done per day) is by no means universal (see, for example, Lupton, 1963). For 
Edwards, informal practices like pilfering and ‘fiddles’ grow out of the traditions of 
specific occupations, in which workers learn informal understanding as well as formal 
instructions. Whilst these may find individual or collective expression, group fiddles can 
be more developed than individual ones and more easily sustained through custom and 
practice. Although fiddles themselves do not depend on workgroups their character will 
be powerfully shaped by the extent of group formation and moreover, the conditions, 
including readiness to discuss earnings and willingness to restrict effort under work study 
that helps sustain them (Armstrong et al., 1981; Edwards and Scullion, 1982). From this 
Edwards (1988: 226-36) moves on to identify the following four different types of work 
groups and the bargaining behaviour. 
Firstly, there are non-militant work groups (of which there are two sub-groups). The first 
of these are subject to tight managerial control and discretion with no developed sense of 
opposition and lack the resources to bargain with management. Where modes of 
accommodation exist here they tend to be individualised. The second type of non-militant 
approach occurs when workers are subject to less tight controls and enjoy reasonable 
autonomy and relatively high wages. Under this system of sophisticated control the 
cooperative aspects of work are emphasised and the space for fiddles reduced. Given that 
work relations (within capitalism) are an inevitable source of dispute (Hyman, 1975: 186), 
workforce resentment still exists here but with little scope through which to find 
expression (Edwards, 1988: 195). A case close to this model would be the processing 
plant studied by Edwards and Scullion (1982), in which management obtained worker 
compliance through consultation and participation (ibid.: 51).  
Edwards’ next category of bargaining behaviour is referred to as ‘militant individualism’, 
where workers with an awareness of the conflict of interest over the effort bargain 
actively pursue their own interests (Edwards, 1988: 196). This is followed by a more 
collective approach in which groups of workers tend to have group norms governing 
effort standards and engage in a wide range of fiddles.  Worker influence here does not, 
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however, extend to manning levels or allocation of work. Finally, Edwards (1988: 194) 
identifies an organisational type of behaviour in which worker influence extends to 
division of task, allocation of overtime and application of discipline. Whilst precise types 
of job controls may vary according to the exigencies of the work tasks, such work groups 
share the common feature of the ability to regulate work through the control of manning 
levels and mobility of workers between tasks.   
Again, it must be borne in mind that these categories of workgroup behaviour are not 
merely a product of their organisational environment, since each respective environment 
is the product of on-going relationships between its management and workers. It is the 
character of these relations that plays a key role in shaping worker behaviour. This point 
gains greater clarity from a consideration of Edwards and Scullion’s (1984) later analysis 
of their seven factory study. Here the authors once more turn to both absenteeism and 
labour turnover to argue that explanations of what are often ostensibly regarded as 
individual types of worker behaviour must be viewed within an analysis of the patterns 
and variations of workplace controls. Thus, Edwards and Scullion (ibid.: 562-563) are able 
to point to examples of workplaces in the engineering industry where absenteeism and 
turnover were low due to the level of workplace controls held by stewards and the 
favourable and generally tolerable conditions that this brought to the workforce. In 
contrast, two clothing factories where union organisation was weak were typified by high 
levels of both absenteeism and labour turnover. The authors go onto argue that this was 
directly related to the intensity of managerial control over work and a lack of collective 
means of challenging this on the shopfloor (ibid.: 560).  
Absenteeism and labour turnover here however, were not a response by individuals to 
the work environment or a reflection of protest against managerial control. They were 
the product of a control system whose success rested on the fact that grievances were 
not collectively articulated as protest. Indeed, absence and turnover were from 
management’s perspective acceptable for the following reasons. Firstly, the absence of 
workplace controls facilitated flexible use of labour which did not interrupt production. 
And secondly, given the propensity for potential shopfloor leaders to quit, the lack of 
collective challenge to this system was reinforced. From this viewpoint it is possible to 
capture the dialectic and interdependent nature of structure and agency in the following 
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statement; organisational rules are not independent variables but dependent for their 
creation and, crucially, for their level of enforcement, on the pattern of worker-
management relations (ibid.: 557).  
It can now be argued that there exists a wide range of informal workgroup behaviour 
through which workers attempt to gain control over the effort bargain and which are 
shaped by the character of workplace relations. In a similar sense to Edwards and 
Scullion’s (1984) observations on absenteeism, Edwards (1988: 192) notes that informal 
practices are at times not just tolerated by management but can be actively encouraged 
since they can bring a number of significant benefits to the production process. For 
example, tolerating ‘fiddles’ can provide management with a relatively cheap way of 
getting workers to work, thereby reducing other potentially costlier adaptations such as 
absenteeism (Lupton, 1963). The acceptance of workforce job regulation by management 
within the workplace, and the subsequent autonomy of worker organisation over task, 
may also reduce the required levels of workplace supervision (Edwards, 1988: 192). Other 
managerial benefits include, particularly in a ‘piece work’ setting, a speed up in 
production, as workers learn informal methods to do the job more quickly, whilst at the 
same time circumventing safe (and slower) systems of working. For Burawoy (1979) 
managerial acceptance of workers subverting rules within organisationally prescribed 
boundaries is a means by which worker consent and adherence to wider corporate rules 
are generated within the workplace. However, despite the benefits that the above might 
bring to management, the fundamentally conflicting aims of managers and workers 
means that relations between the two are in a constant state of tension and flux. In 
particular, the frontier of control, which Goodrich (1920: 66) terms as that shifting line in 
a great mass of regulation can, as with workers, be advanced by management with 
worker gains being eradicated when economic conditions dictate (Edwards, 1988: 194). 
The framework advanced by Edwards argues that conflict and consent are interwoven 
and that they are an essential aspect of the workplace relations between management 
and workers (ibid.: 192). Again, such an approach provides a useful framework for an 
analysis of this study’s concern with the ways in which postal workers react to market 
driven change. 
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As this study has earlier highlighted, the modernisation of Royal Mail can be viewed as 
one aspect of the recent and on-going marketization of the wider public services. This has 
involved an array of managerial initiatives aimed at improved productivity and the 
intensification of labour (Worrall et al., 2009; Mather et al., 2005). The introduction of 
these initiatives has been associated increased standardisation, more narrowly defined 
training and reduced worker discretion with control of the labour process becoming 
increasingly managerialised (Grugulis et al., 2003; Rainbird et al., 2004: 94; Mather et al., 
2005: 5). Though they have remained important in terms of articulating membership 
discontent, the capacity of trade unions here to influence managerial decision making has 
diminished significantly (Bach, 2010: 170). Furthermore, as has been examined in chapter 
2, there has been a significant reduction in trade union density levels in the public sector, 
from an overall 84% in 1980 down to 57% in 2010 (Bach and Kessler, 2012: 145), brought 
about by factors such as outsourcing and privatisation (ibid.: 146). This suggests 
increasing difficulties for public sector workers and the ways in which they attempt to 
exert control in the workplace.  
The arguments contained within Edwards’ study of conflict and accommodation provides 
an important insight into the implications of modernisation in terms of the ability of 
public sector workers to influence their labour process. According to Edwards, (1988: 191-
2) workers attempt to exert control through informal practices, with the form that these 
take being shaped by particular circumstances relating to the workplace and industry in 
question. These influences will be discussed in detail below. It is important at this stage to 
establish that the development and sustainability of workgroup control is, in part, 
dependent upon the presence of strong cohesive workgroups that are able to both 
defend custom and practice (Brown, 1972) and resist managerial punishment (Edwards, 
1988: 192). Given the traditionally high levels of union density within public sector 
workplaces it would be expected that, Whitley notwithstanding, its workforce would be 
well positioned to successfully realise such controls. It follows that a reduction in trade 
union density levels accompanied by the concomitant managerial imposition of 
technologies of control might combine to dilute the ability of public sector workers to 
exert control over work and how it is performed within the public services (Worrall et al., 
2009: 126) 
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The arguments put forward by Worrall et al. (2009: 126) suggest that there has been a 
shift in control over “the job” and how it is performed within the public services which 
contrasts sharply with its tradition of negotiation and consultation (Bach and Kessler, 
2012: 139). As a long standing occupant of the public services, the Post Office, or to be 
more specific the Royal Mail, has historically fitted squarely in to this tradition. This has 
found expression in deeply embedded systems of workforce consultation and a range of 
long-standing national and local bargaining arrangements (Gall, 2003: 26). Such a context 
has provided a basis for its densely unionised workforce to develop a plethora of 
workplace controls some of which resemble the wider reaching type of workgroup 
behaviour identified by Edwards (1988: 197). These include worker and union control 
over overtime and task allocation, the autonomy to rotate on jobs and rigid seniority 
(Gall, 2003: 29). The nature of such practices clearly serves to restrict managerial 
prerogative, and, as such, like other areas of the public sector, has within the context of 
modernisation become a major area of contestation within the Royal Mail. Advances 
made by management in the arrangement of work within the wider public sector point to 
the fact that informal arrangements are sometimes covert and their existence can be 
fragile (Edwards, 1988: 194). However, any power shift is not a straight forward process. 
Its outcomes are the result of a mediated process of the interplay of management action 
and worker reaction in different settings (Worrall et al., 2009).   
The notion of shopfloor relations as constituting a dynamic mediation process between 
management and workers is central to Edwards’ (1988) model which notes workplace 
relations as being in a constant state of tension and movement. From this viewpoint, 
workplace relations are influenced by structural factors such as labour and product 
markets as well as technology which put pressures on workers and managers (ibid.: 200-
1). In the case of Royal Mail, as with other areas of the public sector, these pressures have 
taken the form of liberalisation and the quest for greater workforce efficiency and 
productivity. However, according to Edwards (1988: 194-201) such external pressures are 
not deterministic and have to be interpreted at the workplace. The manner in which 
workers respond is influenced by factors such as payment systems, skills held by the 
workgroup and type of worker bargaining approach. Again, any such accommodation and 
arrangements arising from the above amount to a compromise in struggle over the labour 
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process which offers concrete benefits for both workers and management (ibid.: 193-4). 
This would appear to be particularly applicable to workplace relations within the Royal 
Mail. Here organisational attempts to eradicate worker influence within the workplace (as 
outlined in the previous chapter) have themselves, as a result of wide-scale worker 
resistance, been mediated resulting in a number of service-wide agreements (BT 
Agreement 2010, Pay and Modernisation Agreement 2007). These have provided scope 
for significant worker influence over the arrangement of production within a framework 
of agreed, managerially- sought, efficiency measures.   
Edwards (1988) would seem to provide a credible framework within which to understand 
some of the factors that have contributed to the nature and durability of strong 
autonomous workforce regulation within the Royal Mail. This is particularly the case 
when considering his focus on the sometimes contradictory nature of informal group 
practices such as fiddles, and the benefit which they can provide to management (ibid.: 
192). Thus, the origins of local informal bargaining arrangements within the highly 
centralised system of industrial relations within the Post Office can be traced back to a 
period of high labour turnover and recruitment difficulties (Clinton, 1984: 302). 
Managerial tolerance of this informality served as means of getting the job done- 
particularly with regard to the medium of localised overtime practices. This helped to 
sustain a form of secondary worker adjustment which assisted in stemming levels 
absenteeism and resignation (Edwards, 1988: 192). That these practices were intrinsic to 
the raft of so-called ‘Spanish practices’ contested by Royal Mail in their 2007 national 
dispute with the CWU (Lyddon, 2009) highlights their longevity and the fact that they had 
developed into part of a complex web of custom and practice  in many workplaces 
(Brown, 1972).  
It is perhaps tempting to regard worker activity around overtime as conforming to 
another category of workgroup bargaining behaviour which Edwards (1988: 196) 
identifies as militant individualism. This as the term suggests, refers to a context in which 
workers hold a degree of bargaining awareness but actively pursue their own individual 
interests. However, influence over overtime within the Royal Mail, is one of raft of control 
mechanisms through which postal workers and their union effectively equalise earning 
opportunities whilst preventing managerial favouritism and the victimisation of 
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workplace activists (Gall, 2003: 29). Though informal bargaining around overtime may 
have arisen from and been sustained by external labour market factors, these have been 
mediated at workplace level to become a source of unity and collectivism (ibid.: 29). 
Again workforce behaviour here would seem to akin to the category of worker action 
which Edwards (1988: 196) notes, involves the use of a more developed set of job 
controls which temper managerial prerogative. 
If the depth of collective controls exercised by many groups of Royal Mail workers are at 
odds with those of many other public service workers, then they are so in spite of what 
has amounted to the full-blown liberalisation of the postal service in recent times. Thus 
the outcome of a series of ‘efficiency’ centred disputes throughout the mid-to-late 2000s 
has left many groups of Royal Mail workers with a considerable level of workplace 
influence (see BT Agreement 2010). Again, Edwards’ (1988: 201) approach provides an 
understanding of the efficacy of worker action in this instance by identifying interrelated 
clusters of internal and external stimuli which are causally associated with patterns of 
workplace relations. From this viewpoint, postal work though not thought of as skilled, 
contains not inconsiderable job-specific localised knowledge relating to how work is 
organised and carried out.  
The general cohesiveness of the CWU membership at shopfloor level means that there 
would be considerable logistical difficulties in creating and deploying a substitute 
workforce in the face of industrial action like that mentioned above (Gall, 2003: 140). The 
potency this affords to such action is complimented by the perishable, non-substitutable 
nature of the product and vulnerability of the mail network to industrial action (ibid.: 132-
9). Furthermore, the legitimate and necessary mobility of postal workers between 
workplace and functions engenders solidarity and allows information, instructions and 
issues to be passed around (Lane, 1974: 190-1). These characteristics of postal work are 
on the whole external as is the occupationally homogenous structure of the CWU which 
assists in its interest formation and mobilisation of its membership (Gall, 2003: 138). That 
said, they are intrinsically related to, and serve to bolster, the industrial confidence of 
postal workers and the collective nature in which they look for solutions to their 
grievances in the workplace (ibid.: 134). It is this sense of awareness that grievances can 
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be remedied by collective action which Hyman (1975: 154) regards as an essential feature 
amongst workgroups who exercise effective workplace control. 
It follows from the argument put forward by Edwards (1988) that the interrelationship 
between the technical capacity of postal workers to disrupt production and the manner in 
which they approach workplace action, extends to and influences the strategies adopted 
by management within the industry. These strategies are not always deliberate and can 
arise out of managerial pragmatism with subsequent benefits emerging in an unplanned 
way (ibid.: 193). Thus, the relative workplace autonomy enjoyed by postal workers may 
represent a sophisticated control mechanism by which management attempt to 
accommodate a strategically well placed group of workers (ibid.). This would appear to be 
so when considering the practice of job selection through the medium of seniority within 
the Royal Mail. Whilst, as Gall (2003: 29) notes, this might serve to enhance worker 
control and protect from managerial whim, it also provides benefits for management 
since it contributes to a reliance by individuals on seniority rights that undermines 
collective challenges to management (Edwards, 1988: 94). Again, the benefits that such 
arrangements might bring to management have often only emerged after their being a 
source of major contestation, highlighting the complex and contradictory 
interrelationship between conflict and consent within the workplace.   
Workplace relations then, involve an on-going negotiation of order in which 
understandings and accommodations between workers and management are generated 
(Edwards, 1988: 202). They are influenced by, and in some respect influence, a cluster of 
characteristics including the nature of the product and product market, technology and 
managerial approach. In the case of postal workers, it would seem that these factors have 
cumulatively served to afford relatively high levels of workplace control and which has 
proved relatively resilient to economic change. This lends support to Edwards’ (ibid.: 201) 
observation that whilst an environment of increasing market competition may act as a 
legitimatory argument for managerial driven change, the acceptance of such change is 
not inevitable. Arguments have to be made and a system of order reproduced (ibid.).  
That many collective working practices within the Royal Mail have not been swept away 
in a legitimatory tide of liberalisation, points to the continued existence of strong 
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collective customs and norms which whilst being social products are just as ‘real’ as a 
technology (ibid.: 202).  
Postal workers and dockers: informality and adjustment 
Although postal workers have as an occupational group managed to retain reasonable 
levels of influence over their terms and conditions, they have not done so without 
recourse to significant levels of strike action (Gall, 2003; Lyddon, 2009). The BT 
Agreement 2010 may have served to consolidate the position of the CWU in the process 
of negotiated change within the postal industry but its existence arose out of 
considerable conflict within an industry that in recent times has been regarded as the 
most strike prone in Britain (Gall, 2003). It is precisely the issue of strike proneness which 
Edwards (1988) concentrates on in providing an insight into the nature of workplace 
conflict amongst dock workers particularly during a period of technological and structural 
change. Again, it is argued here that an understanding of workplace conflict is best 
gleaned through consideration of the ways in which employers and employees mediate 
structural conditions to generate distinct combinations of cooperation and resistance 
(ibid.: 202). Whilst Edwards concentrates on industrial conflict amongst dock workers, the 
analysis provides a useful lens through which to understand the dynamic of shopfloor 
relations and the nature of job controls within the Royal Mail in the context of on-going 
modernisation. It is to this that attention now turns.  
Central to Edwards’ (1988) study of job controls on the docks is the ways in which dockers 
respond to the threat posed by structural change to their significant levels of autonomy 
and long-standing working practices. Historically, dockers had worked in autonomous 
gangs in which the allocation of work was decided by them with little managerial 
presence. This gave rise to a complex set of controls which emerged out of customs of the 
job and the development of a series of working practices. In this environment a highly 
organised system of pilfering amongst workers (ibid.: 206-7) was allowed to thrive. Work 
on the docks was highly irregular due to seasonal fluctuations involving a casual 
intermittent system of employment (ibid.: 206). At first glance it would appear a system 
fraught with such high levels of job insecurity, and an absence of managerial control 
would provide significant problems for both parties. However, casualization provided 
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workers with an alternative to routinized, disciplined forms of employment such as 
factory work. For employers on the other hand, it served to maximise productivity and 
weaken trade unionism on the docks (ibid; 206). These respective benefits help explain 
the longevity of this system and again illustrate that the social relations of work often 
involve the simultaneous subversion and pursuit of organisational goals (ibid.: 188).  
Gall (2003: 138-9) identifies a range of features amongst postal workers which might be 
regarded as similar enough to those of dock workers as to make an interesting 
comparison. For example, like dock workers, postal workers lived work experience is 
sufficiently homogenous and arduous to help create a sense of commonality and 
community (Gall, 2003: 139). Additionally, the physical concentration of many postal 
workers in larger delivery offices means that whilst there is a clear hierarchy of power, 
relations between management and worker are often, like those in the docks, distant and 
typified by a ‘them’ and ‘us’ mentality (ibid.: 139). This chapter has already outlined the 
significant levels of job control traditionally held by many groups of postal workers. On 
this point, it is worth mentioning that, in a similar vein to the docks, many local work 
arrangements within the Royal Mail are determined at shopfloor level. Here those who 
negotiate on such matters are generally those that work alongside the colleagues who 
they negotiate on behalf of (ibid.: 140). As with the Docks, there are a number of features 
of the manner in which work within the Royal Mail is organised which appear perplexing 
from the outside. However, they too are underpinned by a particular set of logics that 
evolve out of the process by which external influences are mediated within the 
workplace.  
With regard to the last point, dock work may well have been traditionally viewed as an 
unstable occupation in which fluctuating earnings generated discontent. However, its 
largely informal nature provided workers with enough space to define their own tasks 
and to determine within limits how hard they should work (Edwards, 1988: 214). 
Employment within the Post Office with its relatively low basic pay and unsocial hours has 
for much of the post war period onwards been considered unattractive enough as to 
cause recruitment problems (Clinton, 1984: 302; Batstone et al., 1984: 169). To counter 
this Post Office management have allowed, and at times encouraged, the development of 
local working practices which have effectively reduced workloads, enhanced overtime 
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and protected jobs (Batstone et al., 1984: 179). Examples of this are ‘job and finish’ (Gall, 
2003: 208) (a major issue of contention in the 2007 dispute between RM and the CWU) 
and the informal means by which workers have rotated between duties. This has ensured 
that there has often been no permanent relation between worker, exact employment and 
even line manager (Martinez Lucio, 1993: 35). Again the relatively low levels of labour 
turnover within the Royal Mail (Gall, 2003: 139), suggests that these arrangements have 
provided significant enough ‘hidden benefits’ as to, like dock work, make the job more 
preferable than more routinized higher paid occupations. Indeed, when structural 
pressures have threatened the existence of these practices, both sets of workers have 
considered them so central to their way of working as to respond with significant levels of 
strike action (Gall, 2003; Edwards, 1988).  
For Edwards (1988: 209) strike action was the natural response to structural reform 
within the dock industry which sought to eradicate casualization and the distinctive set of 
expectations which this way of working held for its workforce. The logic of this argument, 
in light of the above discussion, would seem to be applicable to the on-going 
modernisation of Royal Mail, in which rapid structural change threatens long-standing 
informal practices. In both instances the workers involved were not the authors of the 
system but managed to adapt aspects of it to their advantage. Once established such 
ways of working can carry what Brown (1972: 55) refers to as a customary legitimacy 
which structural change can serve to violate. This is an important point and provides an 
insight into the continuing willingness of postal workers to oppose restructuring even if 
such change falls within the ambit of collective agreements that link efficiency to pay 
increases (The Way Froward Agreement 2001; Pay and Major Change Agreement 2003; 
Pay and Modernisation Agreement 2007). This suggests that in addition to being 
symptomatic of job insecurity, high levels of strike activity within Royal Mail in recent 
times may also be viewed as an expression of collective resentment at the loss of space 
provided by secondary adjustment (Edwards, 1988: 212).   
Whist it should be borne in mind that there are significant differences between the two 
groups, Edwards’ (1988) study of dock workers helps shed light on to the behaviour of 
postal workers during a period of major structural change. In doing so it serves to 
question those who might regard postal workers as inherently militant and instead 
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suggests that their recourse to strike action is a secondary consequence of the system of 
working within Royal Mail (ibid.: 207). Such systems of working, as the above has argued, 
develop out of the contradictory politics of shopfloor relations. They are underpinned by 
a distinct set of logics and assumptions that are as real and as ‘felt’ as the technological, 
and substantive factors alongside which they exist (ibid.).  
Edwards’ approach therefore goes some way to providing a framework within which to 
examine how modernisation within the postal industry might affect the collective control 
of workers and how they subsequently react to this. What it perhaps does not cater for 
however, is a fuller explanation of the significant differences in workplace control and 
levels of mobilisation (Gall, 2003) displayed by workers within the reasonably 
homogenous setting of the postal service. This chapter seeks greater understanding by 
turning to an approach that lies outside that of a mainly structural analysis of workplace 
relations. Hill (1974: 218) captures the need for such a focus by positing, what factors 
persuade particular workgroups to take advantage of encouraging or facilitating 
conditions and, more significantly, to overcome impeding ones?  
Shop steward organisation and the role of stewards  
As this study has already highlighted, according to commentators such as Gall (2003: 
163), general features exist within the Royal Mail that are conducive to its worker 
collectively mobilising to defend local working practices. However, these general features 
are themselves insufficient to explain the inconsistent manner in which actual 
mobilisations have occurred. For example, strike action has been much more common in 
some areas of Royal Mail than others (ibid; 149-53). An understanding this can only be 
gained through an analysis of the way in which these general features are mediated by 
local processes. Central to this process for Gall, is the nature of local trade unionism 
within Royal Mail and in particular the effect of the values and traditions of its local lay 
officials upon the way in which managerial driven change is met (ibid.: 151). From this 
viewpoint, lay officials in some workplaces have helped foster a tradition whereby terms 
and conditions have been defended through strike action. On the other hand, in 
workplaces characterised as having a more moderate culture, management have been 
more successful at pushing forward initiatives and achieving its aims (ibid.: 151, 204). This 
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suggests that added to the clusters of factors shaping worker action discussed earlier by 
Edwards (1988) must be the influence of the type of approach adopted by local trade 
unions and their shop stewards within the workplace. Accordingly, attention now turns to 
Batstone et al.’s 1977 study of Shop Stewards in Action. This will build on Edwards’ earlier 
analysis and thus form part of the overall framework within which to analyse worker 
reaction to modernisation within Royal Mail.      
Batstone et al. (1977) provide a comparative study of two domestic steward 
organisations, both of which are based within the same workplace. The first of these 
operate within a shopfloor manufacturing setting whilst the second are ‘white collar’ 
clerical and office based. Central to this is an analysis of the distribution of power within 
the workplace and how this relates to the relationships between shop steward 
organisations in question and the members which they represent. In the interests of 
clarity, the domestic organisation within the shopfloor establishment is referred to as ‘the 
shopfloor side’, whilst the clerical based is referred to as ‘the staff side’. For Batstone et 
al., an understanding of the distribution and influence of power within a domestic 
organisation calls for a consideration of the following three points; the nature of the 
dominant ideology within the organisation, how the need for decisions is identified and 
how decisions are actually made (ibid.: 23).  By concentrating upon these phenomena the 
study seeks to identify regularities and patterns of behaviour and, from this, how 
particular patterns of behaviour are created and maintained (ibid.: 3).   
In a similar vein to Edwards (1988), Batstone et al. (1977) recognise that workplace 
relations are dynamic and that, in this sense, meaningful domestic organisation within the 
workplace has to be developed and established. This process can be influenced by a range 
of factors including employer approach, state policy and the employees themselves. Once 
established, the domestic organisation’s incumbents and creators are likely to be able to 
achieve some degree of influence over the behaviour of their members (ibid.: 4). The 
extent of this influence is by no means fixed and is dependent upon a whole range of 
factors which include (often long-standing) sources of power held by particular 
incumbents, the priorities of the membership, managerial approach and economic 
factors. The influence of these factors highlights the potential for constant change within 
organisational behaviour and that central to the relationship between management and 
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shop steward is the negotiation of order. This can be termed as the processes of give and 
take, diplomacy and bargaining (Strauss et al., 1971: 103-4). The outcome of such 
negotiations reflects the power and distribution of influence within the domestic 
organisation (Batstone et al., 1977: 6).  
The value of Batstone et al.’s analysis, therefore, lies in its combining of structural 
influences such as the organisation and layout of production with the micro sociological 
factors that are at play within the shopfloor. It recognises that the exercise of power is a 
product of the socially based success of some organisational members to persuade others 
to follow. Power here is the outcome of a decision making process and the initiating and 
directing of issues by key individuals or groups within the organisation are part of this 
process (ibid.: 8). It follows that in workplaces where unions occupy a high degree of 
institutional centrality, their representatives will be better able than those with little 
centrality to foster and maintain a set of predominant values and institutional procedures 
that operate to the benefit of those that they represent (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970: 43). 
This process is sometimes referred to as the mobilization of bias (Schattschneider, 1960: 
71; Lukes, 1974: 21-5).   
It is clear that for Batstone et al. (1977: 11) that ideology and institutions are important 
bases of power since they foster and serve to support particular views of the workplace 
and particular patterns of behaviour. From this viewpoint, the more important the union 
actually is, the more its members are likely to employ the collective means deemed 
necessary for successful worker action (Kelly, 1998; Batstone et al., 1977: 129).  An 
example of such union centrality can be found in Moran’s (1974: 96) account of local 
trade unionism within the Royal Mail. It will be recalled that strong local structures of 
branch officials and activists here exercise considerable union influence over large 
numbers of local members who have exhibited varying approaches towards workplace 
change. As this study will move on to illustrate, for Batstone et al. (1977: 128-129) these 
inconsistencies can in part be explained by particular differences in shop stewards’ 
approaches and the interrelationships between these stewards, other elements of the 
domestic union network and key individuals in the workplace.  
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If shopfloor activity is directed by values and systems of belief (Beynon, 1973: 192), any 
adequate account of activism must consider the ideology of the activists in question and 
the organisations within which they are active. In terms of their study, Batstone et al., 
(1977) argue that the key issue of shop steward ideology had given rise to a number of 
significant differences in both steward approach and membership behaviour. Crucially, 
there were particularly notable differences between the two workgroups under 
investigation. In seeking to distinguish between different types of shop steward with 
regard to their ideological approach, two (main) types were identified. These distinctions 
are relatively crude (ibid.: 34), and categorize patterns of steward behaviour in terms of 
the following two cross-cutting dimensions. The first is the extent to which emphasis is 
placed upon either a representative role or a delegate role by the steward. The former of 
these involves the adoption of a leadership role by the shop steward who takes initiatives 
and is involved in the formation of policies as well as their execution. By contrast the 
delegate role involves the official carrying out the wishes of their membership rather than 
exercising discretion in the pursuit of their interests (Burke, 1906 cited in Batstone et al., 
1977.). Secondly, is the extent to which the shop steward pursues union principles, which 
particularly involves the protection of the union as a collective based on strong principled 
leadership, in carrying out their role (Batstone et al., 1977:32, 34). Those shop stewards 
who displayed a propensity towards a strong representative role and a concern with the 
maintenance of union principles were termed ‘leader’ stewards. Those who carried out 
more of a delegate role with less commitment to union principles were termed as 
‘populist’ stewards (ibid.: 35).  
In continuing with the typology, Batstone et al. (1977: 41) go on to note that ‘leader’ 
stewards tend to be more involved with other stewards in comparison to their ‘populist’ 
counterparts. In particular, ‘leader’ stewards spent more time in contact with key groups 
of influential union-orientated workplace officials than did ‘populists’ (ibid.: 46). The 
significance of this upon shopfloor behaviour is identified by Beynon (1973: 102) who 
notes the role played by an established cohort of shop stewards in engendering solidarity 
and class consciousness within the workplace. Whilst Batstone et al. (1977: 36) found that 
populists formed the largest single type of steward in both workgroups, there was a far 
greater presence (and importantly coverage over membership) of ‘leader’ stewards in the 
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shopfloor organisation compared to the staff side. In terms of the two workgroups, the 
greater incidence of ‘leader stewards’ and the presence of a network of key activists 
within the shopfloor setting meant that the ideology, norms and values of leadership 
were reaffirmed. Moreover, the very norms and values of the shopfloor stewards which 
were reaffirmed are, as this study has already argued, a kind which facilitate a greater 
centralisation of power within the organisation (ibid.: 24, 53).  
The arguments so far put forward by Batstone et al., are echoed by Hyman (1975: 154) 
who notes that a strong tradition of solidarity reinforces collective strength and the 
bargaining power of workgroups. However, shopfloor control is not only dependent upon 
bargaining power, it must be reinforced by bargaining awareness, a sense of grievance 
and the consciousness that grievance can be remedied by collective action (ibid.). 
Through their unique role as both a worker and a leader, shop stewards have the 
opportunity not only to understand the issues of their members but also to shape their 
attitudes and views (Buttigieg et al. 2008: 251). This shaping, or as Kelly (1998: 32) terms 
‘framing’ of issues is a key means by which workgroup activists and leaders focus 
attribution onto the employer which encourages group identity and cohesion. What is 
essential here is that workers are encouraged to develop a sense of injustice and that 
they blame the employer or management for their problems (ibid.: 45). For Kelly this is 
crucial to the process by which workers mobilise towards taking collective action.  
Having developed a sense of group commonality that such attributions can help bring 
about or strengthen, workers are more likely to act in terms of the collective interest of 
the group rather than in terms of the individual facet of their identity (ibid.: 30). Effective 
mobilisation also requires that workgroup leaders in addition to both promoting group 
cohesion and identity, urge workers to take collective action and defend such action in 
the face of managerially-deployed counter mobilization strategies. The whole process of 
collectivisation therefore, is heavily dependent upon a small number of leaders or 
activists (ibid.: 35, 44). It follows from the arguments put forward by both Hyman (1975) 
and Kelly (1998) that an appreciation of workgroup power within the workplace calls for a 
consideration of Batstone et al.’s (1977: 54) second and third dimensions of shop steward 
power: the extent to which stewards identify problems requiring decisions and to which 
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they control the procedures by which decisions are made, and the outcomes of actual 
decision making processes.  
It is clear from Batstone et al.’s (1977: 57) study that stewards from the shopfloor side 
handled a lager range and greater number of issues than those on the staff side, with 
‘leader’ stewards handling more issues than ‘populist’ stewards. Furthermore, shopfloor 
‘leader’ stewards were the most likely group to actually ‘shape’ an issue (ibid.: 56). Not 
only did ‘leader’ stewards ‘shape’ and initiate more issues than their counterparts, they 
also amended and squashed over four fifths of the issues raised by others (ibid.: 58). 
These differences may, in part, be due to the greater concentration of leader stewards in 
piece work areas where there exist greater opportunities for bargaining (Cliff, 1970: 47). 
However, the authors again relate these differences to the strong presence of an 
influential steward network within the shopfloor side and the ideological support and 
reaffirmation of union principles that this provided (ibid.: 75).  
This last point may go some way to explaining the upsurge in industrial confidence 
amongst postal workers over recent years. Thus, a reduction in CWU branches from the 
early 1990s has meant that local leadership is now concentrated in the hands of officers 
from larger branches. Such officials (and the branches that they preside over) have 
tended to be more combative in their industrial attitude than the officials of the smaller 
branches that they have subsumed. Many branch secretaries within the CWU, as a result 
of the greater demands placed upon them by this have now in order to gain more facility 
time, taken on a representative role. In sum, many branch secretaries within the CWU 
have a direct involvement in workplace industrial relations and stand at the apex of wider 
array of activists and branches that are now on the whole better organised (Gall, 2003: 
146). 
Recent restructuring within the CWU would seem then to have resulted in the historically 
‘active of the active’ influential minority of the union (Moran, 1974) now locally occupying 
an even stronger position from which to espouse its traditional call for a militant style of 
trade unionism. If this is the case, branch leadership within at least some areas of the 
CWU would have appear to have further moved towards Batstone et al.’s model of a 
stratum of influential union officials who can reaffirm a strong union-orientated style of 
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trade unionism within the workplace. However, while Batstone et al. (1977) place much 
emphasis upon the role of shopfloor leaders, developments within the Royal Mail have 
created a context in which a stratum of officials with shopfloor experience now operate in 
a leadership capacity above the level of the workplace itself. Though leadership here may 
not be centred on one specific workplace, influence can in effect be transported into the 
workplace by branch officials who are employed in Royal Mail individual workplaces and, 
in comparison to the time of Batstone et al.’s study, have access to a wider range of 
effective methods of communication.  
Strong shop steward communities like this not only promote the norms of shop steward 
leadership, they also provide certain resources to facilitate appropriate action (ibid; 64). 
These include the provision of up to date information of events; theories of management 
and membership behaviour; recipes of action; various forms of action and support, and 
control over errant stewards (Hyman, 1975: 168; Batstone et al., 1977: 64-5, 74). This 
contrasts with Batstone et al.’s staff side organisation in which a weak network of 
stewards provided little in the form of information or definition of workplace situations, 
were not committed to leadership and tended not to initiate or process issues themselves 
(Batstone, et al. 1977: 75). This lack of institutional centrality meant that stewards were 
more dependent and, as such, more focused upon the pursuit of often individual 
membership wishes and frequently had to turn to full time officials for support. In such an 
environment the staff side stewards held considerably less power in terms of their ability 
to define and resolve issues (ibid.).  
The restructuring of branches within the CWU must be considered alongside both Royal 
Mail’s on-going policy of decentralisation (for evidence of this see recent BT Agreement 
2010 and Pay and Modernisation Agreement 2007) and the differential nature of mail 
volumes within workplaces. This has necessitated an increasing role for lay officers in 
negotiations and thus added further stimuli to local bargaining within Royal Mail 
workplaces (Gall, 2003: 146). The usefulness of Batstone et al.’s (1977) approach is again 
apparent here in that it seeks, in part to measure, steward power-and the subsequent 
behaviour of workers, by examining the extent to which stewards shape, define and 
resolve issues. In this sense the move towards a more localised model of bargaining 
(much of which is often ad-hoc in terms of overtime and contingency measures) has 
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potentially served to increase the bargaining scope (Cliff, 1970: 47), decision making role 
and thus power of key domestic stewards within the Royal Mail. These circumstances, in 
turn, serve to further centralise the importance of the domestic organisation and what 
was termed earlier as, ‘the mobilization of bias’, in favour of the union (Batstone et al., 
1977: 10).    
Evidence so far suggests that there are different levels of workplace strength and action 
that exists between the membership of the CWU and their respective stewards. This may 
be dependent upon whether or not there are a strong cohort of branch officials who are 
able to take advantage of the varying and dynamic presence of a number of structural 
factors as a means of strengthening control and influence in local offices. Further support 
is provided by Gall (2003: 146-7), who argues that branch leaderships are usually key in 
determining whether branches are active or inactive, vibrant or dormant. The positions of 
branches, in this regard, are generally determined by a handful of activists and the extent 
to which these seek to be consulted, promote union policies and challenge managerial 
prerogative.  
In a similar vein to Batstone et al.’s staff side organisation, inactive CWU branches allow 
most terms and conditions to be set by local management. Active CWU branches, like 
Batstone et al.’s shopfloor organisation seek negotiation on every issue and pursue 
ambitious agendas which challenge the status quo (Gall, 2003: 147). This last point is 
central to an analysis of the development and maintenance of workplace control since it 
underpins the manner in which the sectional interests of either workers or management 
come to be established and then accepted by both of these parties within the workplace 
(Hill, 1974: 228).  
Whilst the nature of branch leadership within the CWU is an important determinant of 
levels and types of action pursued by membership, Gall (2003: 146) makes the point that 
those effective models of leadership evidenced by the CWU rest upon a fulcrum of strong 
workplace unionism.  As Terry and Edwards (1988: 224) note, there is a highly ambiguous 
relationship between workgroups and shop stewards, with the later having no power 
unless they have support of their members (Batstone et al., 1977: 99, 112). It follows that 
steward leadership depends upon the ability to win membership support. Whilst this is 
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achieved in part by levels of success in substantive bargaining, it should be borne in mind 
that workers within a capitalist society are subject to a series of influences that conflict 
with the solidarity based values espoused by leader stewards. Thus, various agencies 
within capitalist society play an important part in ensuring that workers bring to the 
workplace an ambivalence and dual consciousness (ibid.: 271) part of which is based upon 
compliance and an acceptance of inequality (Hyman and Brough, 1975: 202-3). This 
means that stewards require resources which help facilitate the stimulation of 
membership consciousness of grievance which Hyman (1975: 154) regards as a 
prerequisite for effective workgroup action. One important resource is the nature of the 
steward’s relationship with their members. In particular, ‘leader stewards’ tend to have 
close relationships with what Batstone et al. (1977: 100) refer to as ‘opinion leaders’. 
These are a category of member who are respected by their fellow workers and have 
influence over them. The presence of such individuals provides an important means by 
which stewards can access social networks of workers to offer definitions of work and 
society in a manner which promotes strong union-based principles and workgroup 
consciousness (ibid.: 110, 248). 
Batstone et al.’s account of effective workplace action as being dependent upon a strong 
cohort of local stewards supported by a network of like-minded opinion formers may help 
explain what Gall (2003: 204) refers to as the unevenness in behaviour and consciousness 
between workgroups within Royal Mail. If effective localised strike action is used as an 
indicator of levels of organisation within the CWU, then its success would indeed appear 
to be down to the presence of a network of activists within recent years. From this 
viewpoint, given that strike action is a social process involving systems of power and 
influence (Batstone et al., 1978: 1) those offices displaying the capacity to execute largely 
successful strike action would be more likely to contain the above model of domestic 
organisation. Gall (2003: 139) adds to this equation the influence in recent times of the 
inward movement of many redundant workers from highly unionised strike prone 
industries. For example, many ex-dockers (Liverpool and London), car workers (Liverpool, 
Oxford, Paisley), printers (London, Oxford), shipyard workers (Glasgow, Edinburgh, 
Newcastle) and miners (Cardiff, Edinburgh, Newcastle) are reported by CWU activists to 
have become ‘good’ and ‘solid’ members within their ranks. Again, it follows that the 
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presence of such workers in certain workplaces may well be an important factor in 
strengthening a membership framework upon which a combative collective union 
ideology can be effectively imported and sustained.   
If this is the case, then it adds weight to the argument that an explanation of worker 
behaviour lies outside an overly structural analysis of workplace industrial relations. 
Assuming, therefore, that the above categories of workers bring with them the traditions 
and expectations of their previous employment, it is important to consider not only 
steward attempts to influence these members but also their expectations and attempts 
to influence steward action. Both Beynon (1973) and later, Darlington (1994) draw upon 
this line of argument when providing analysis of shopfloor organisation and worker 
consciousness in a Merseyside car plant throughout the 1970s and 1980s. From this 
viewpoint, the relationship between stewards and their members is dynamic with 
effective shopfloor action being sustained by the interplay between the opinions of 
stewards and their members. In the case of the Merseyside car plant, the collective 
consciousness of workers was nurtured by both the aggressive approach taken by 
management and the input of the class conscious battle-hardened local representatives 
who, according to Darlington (1994), espoused a brand of trade unionism that was 
shaped by a set of regionally specific social, economic and cultural factors.   
Gall (2003: 157) goes onto provide statistical evidence which identifies Merseyside as one 
of a number of areas including London, Birmingham Bristol and Edinburgh that have in 
recent years displayed disproportionately high levels of strike activity amongst local 
postal workers. Taken with Gall’s earlier point, and in light of the argument made by 
Darlington, it is possible to posit the following observation; that external and particularly 
past industrial experience may play an important part in providing a reservoir of workers 
that are not only readily mobilised but furthermore, crucial in shaping peer group outlook 
and attitude within the workplace. This mirrors an earlier point made by Batstone et al. 
(1984: 115), who noted that the influx of workers from outside industries during the 
1950s and 1960s significantly contributed to an increased willingness to challenge 
managerial authority and a general deterioration in industrial relations within the Post 
Office. Again, judged from this viewpoint, whilst social structures contain and condition 
what can be achieved through individual and collective human action, human action itself 
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constitutes, and in some circumstances transforms social structures (Darlington, 2002: 
95).            
It is useful at this point to bear in mind the earlier argument advanced by Edwards (1988: 
211). This is that whilst the day to day generation of workplace order involves the creative 
and sustained input of workers themselves, this can be constrained by structural 
conditions. This echoes the point made by Batstone et al. (1977: 152) who highlight the 
importance of structural situations in facilitating workplace leadership and the type of 
worker behaviour that this can foster. The convergence of approaches on this point helps 
provide further important insight into another factor contributing to the varying nature of 
worker behaviour and action between offices within Royal Mail and the complex 
interrelationship between structure and agency. Gall (2003: 160) identifies that a far 
greater propensity of strike action (and presumably combative consciousness that this 
requires) exists amongst Royal Mail workplaces with over 50 workers when compared to 
smaller workplaces. Not only do smaller offices experience less pressure from mail 
volumes and therefore have less issues of contention, their relative isolation from fellow 
postal workers can imbue a spirit of de-facto cooperation. As such, smaller workplaces 
often lack a tradition of oppositional union practice that is crucial in the development of 
bargaining awareness and the exercising of power (Hyman, 1975: 154; Brown, 1973: 145).  
Such an environment would be both numerically less likely to contain members of the 
active minority of branch leaders and its domestic organisation would, like other unions, 
attract the sort of shop stewards that would support and uphold what would be in this 
case a tradition of moderation (Moran, 1974: 99).         
It is clear that worker action within Royal Mail is, as Edwards (1988: 202) argues, affected 
by both structure and the on-going micro-political process of action through which order 
and understandings are negotiated within the shopfloor. The relatively high but uneven 
levels of strike activity within Royal Mail can be seen as an outcome of the structural 
pressures of modernisation and the way that these have interacted with the traditional, 
but varying, degrees and means through which workers have attempted to exert control 
over their labour process. However, although structural factors relating to workplace size 
might appear to affect localised levels of workgroup consciousness and action within the 
Royal Mail, this is not a wholly independent factor. As Darlington (1993:4) argues, the 
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nature of shop steward organisation is not a fixed static phenomenon and is dependent 
upon a range of contradictory factors which push in different directions at various times. 
Gall (2003: 160) in this sense identifies the potential for group cohesion expressed in 
terms of strike action amongst smaller offices brought about by commonality of shift 
patterns and easier economies of workgroup communication. That potential action in 
such workplace carries less industrial impact means that group solidarity expressed in 
terms of militant action is mediated by local processes. Such local processes highlight the 
inextricable relationship between structure and action since they further essentially 
include managerial attempts to structure relationships within the workplace. This is done 
through the creation of work roles and lines of authority (Rose, 1975: 297) amongst 
workers who are, however, ‘active creators in the world in which they live’ (Edwards, 
1988: 211).  
Jenkins et al. (2002: 88), contextualise managerial attempts to structure workplace 
relationships within the Royal Mail in a wider account of the development of green-field 
sites within the industry. From this viewpoint, Royal Mail, as part of a wider and on-going 
programme of modernization, has increasingly concentrated its core workload within a 
number of large automated mail centres at the expense of smaller regional processing 
centres (ibid.). This shift has been associated with the steady increase in the utilization of 
part-time staff and managerial attempts to erode established methods of workplace 
regulation. Such changes to organisational structure and work processes on the part of 
Royal Mail are redolent of managerial strategies within ‘new’ private sector workplaces 
and if realised, pose significant challenges to workgroup control.  
The advent of green-field sites and flexible working practices like those above within the 
postal industry has coincided with adoption of a succession of radical new managerial 
initiatives (Beale and Mustchin., 2013: 2). These have ranged from HRM and TQM 
(Martinez Lucio et al., 1997) through to what have been identified as ‘punitive’ employee 
involvement schemes (Beale and Mustchin., 2013: 3).  A central reason for their 
introduction would seem to rest on their following function: facilitating an environment 
in which workforce compliance and managerial control are maximised (Mckinlay and 
Taylor, 1996). From this perspective the nature of work organisation within the 
managerially-tailored environment of green-field mail centres when compared to some 
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more established depots serves to highlight two developments; firstly, that despite a 
broad commonality of conditions there exists within the Royal Mail itself a variable 
plethora of structural pressures which influence the behaviour of specific groups of 
workers. And secondly, within these contexts, managerial policy and strategy play an 
important role in affecting levels of workgroup strength.  
Jenkins et al. (2002: 88) present a somewhat negative picture of ‘new’ Royal Mail 
workplaces and their potentially damaging implications for worker influence over their 
workload. They do however, go on to note that these environments can still be 
characterised as containing a level of local managerial autonomy that has contributed to a 
wide disparity of practices regarding levels of overtime, the number of part time workers 
and the extent and degree of workplace fixed shifts. It follows that any analysis of worker 
behaviour within Royal Mail must include a consideration of the relationship between 
management and stewards and, in light of the arguments advanced by Kelly (1998), how 
this affects the latter’s ability to develop worker consciousness amongst their 
membership. On this point, Batstone et al. (1977) argue that, as they may both foster and 
support or alternatively challenge steward involvement in the organisation of work, 
management can be an important influence upon the centrality of the union and, 
therefore, the nature of domestic organisation.  
Worker manger relations here again are shaped by the central and contradictory 
requirements of management within a capitalist society (Edwards, 1988: 188). These 
include the necessity to maximise the output of indeterminate labour (Ironside and 
Seifert, 2000: 9-10), to make decisions in situations of uncertainty, and to cater for the 
structural pressures of the industry in question. The nature of geographically consolidated 
Mail Centre makes their workload unpredictable and vulnerable to disruption. Here key 
influential members of management might choose to cultivate strong bargaining 
relationships with more influential types of ‘leader’ steward who are in the position to 
lead their often strategically placed members into courses of action which result in ‘goal 
achievement’ for both parties. According to Batstone et al. (1977: 176), leader stewards 
‘goal achievement’ may mean the increase in members’ earnings whereas for 
management, it may mean the suppression of trivial employee problems and the 
maintenance of production by avoiding strikes. 
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Shopfloor power, worker and union relations 
For Batstone et al. (1977: 155-7) then, steward leadership, and the membership solidarity 
that this engenders, is reaffirmed by managerial action and attitude. It follows that in less 
crisis-prone workplaces, where there exists a lack of potential for collective worker 
pressure and low levels of managerial influence in terms of the wider organisation, there 
is little scope for the strong bargaining relationships mentioned above. Here, managers 
weaken rather than strengthen any tendency towards steward leadership (ibid.: 177). 
This analysis provides a useful insight into the scope that the structure of work within 
Royal Mail provides for effective workplace bargaining. However, Darlington (2002: 95, 
101) reminds us that workers and management do not respond automatically to 
environmental pressures and (in drawing on his earlier point in relation to the Merseyside 
car plant) though shop steward leadership can foster collective action, workers 
themselves are moulded by the world around them, but equally at the same time react 
back upon the world to change it. From this viewpoint, it is important not to lose sight of 
agency and the role that it plays in affecting workers’ capacity to take militant forms of 
action. In the case of the Royal Mail, factors such as product market boom, authoritarian 
style management, and an increase in factory-style production methods help explain the 
relatively high but uneven levels of workplace action displayed by postal workers in 
recent times (ibid.: 98). However, this action has been dependent upon a crucial 
subjective factor; the extent to which there has been a layer of workplace activists and 
militants capable of providing local level leadership often independently from full time 
officials.  
This focus on the interrelationship between workplace unionism and worker activism 
should not detract from the significant role that the wider union might actually play in 
shaping worker action. While rank and file members can put pressures, and set limits, on 
stewards’ leadership, their consciousness, aspirations and ability to collectivise will be 
further affected by factors such as the stewards’ relationship to the wider union and its 
full time officers (FTOs) (Darlington, 2002: 103). For Batstone et al. (1977) the level of this 
influence at workplace level could be gauged by the extent to which stewards within the 
two workplaces which they studied were dependent upon the larger union in terms of the 
various dimensions of power which were discussed earlier. They noted that paradoxically, 
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whilst leader stewards in the shopfloor organisation relied on the larger union to provide 
important ideological support for their espoused values and principles, they were in day-
to-day terms of general negotiations relatively isolated and independent from this body. 
Conversely, populists and staff side stewards remained more dependent upon the active 
involvement of the wider union, in the form of FTOs, in both negotiations and support 
when faced with challenges and criticisms from membership (ibid., 180, 256). The authors 
go onto argue that these differing conceptions about the proper role of the larger union 
in the definition of members interests and upon horizons of responsibility which stewards 
and FTOs have, can serve as a source of conflict between these two groups (ibid.: 211).   
The conflicting conception of interests that at times exist between wider trade unions and 
their domestic organisations, and its impact upon members becomes apparent when 
considering strike action by postal workers in recent years. Gall (2003: 64, 74) points to 
the part played by CWU FTOs in successfully supressing potential strike activity emanating 
out of local disputes within the Royal Mail in the 1980s and 1990s. In doing so, in a similar 
vein to Darlington, he provides examples of independent action that has taken place in 
contravention of repudiation by both FTOs and the national union (ibid.: 66, 73-5). In such 
circumstances, which have often arisen out of workplace specific issues such as 
suspensions and health and safety concerns, local workers and lay officials have, as Gall 
notes, not been bound by the same logic as the FTOs to keep the peace (ibid.). This 
highlights the important dichotomy between local unionism and national unionism and in 
particular the latter’s role in contributing to the tensions of workplace agency. Moreover, 
this interplay between the structural pressures of trade union officialdom, managerial 
action and subjectively perceived workplace grievance lends support to Edwards’ (1988: 
201) argument that; an understanding of patterns of relations in a given workplace 
requires attention to a cluster of influences and to their interaction.       
There is then no coalition of elements which can produce spontaneity of action by 
workers. As Allen (1981: 319-20) notes with regard to successful action by mine workers 
in the early 1970s, before realising and actualizing their power these workers had to be 
persuaded and made consciously aware of their situation by the endeavours of both local 
and full time officials. This took place within a context in which a right wing dominated 
NUM had for a period enforced collaboration with the industry’s employer. For Allen this 
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shows that the belief in action by workers without leadership is a myth. He argues that it 
is equally mythical to suggest that leaders who occupy formal union positions inevitably 
obstruct the quality of spontaneity and prevent the emergence of progressive 
movements by local activists. The primary division within the trade union movement is 
therefore, from this viewpoint, ideological and cuts through both rank and file and trade 
union officialdom (ibid.).  
The dialectic interdependency and interplay between full time and workplace unionism 
within the postal industry and its effect upon workers’ consciousness is captured by Gall 
(2003: 248). Here, the centrality of workplace unionism to Royal Mail’s industrial relations 
and postal workers growing tradition of unofficial action has provided activists with a 
base to launch intra union oppositional groupings and networks. These have been 
successful in helping to direct central policy over issues such as Royal Mail’s unitary-
centred Employee Agenda initiative, whilst heightening industrial confidence in situations 
of deleterious change. The emergence of such groupings has been helped by the frequent 
nature of FTO and local elections and consequently the strong lines of accountability 
between workplaces and union officers (Batstone et al., 1984: 250-74; Gall, 2003: 248). 
This helps to explain different workgroup responses to attempts by FTOs to supress 
action and furthermore, calls into question those who seek to understand worker 
behaviour within more top down explanations of trade unionism.   
Both Darlington (2002) and Allen (1981) highlight the dialectic relationship between 
structure and agency and the dynamic nature of the joint processes between leaders and 
workers through which worker agency is negotiated then expressed. Their arguments 
suggest that although Batstone et al. (1977) provide a useful lens through which to 
analyse the nature of shopfloor organisation and the behaviour amongst postal workers, 
more careful consideration of the dynamics of collective action is required when 
focussing on the current and on-going modernisation of the Royal Mail. Thus, central to 
the viewpoint put forward by Batstone et al. is the argument that by moderating their 
goals and cultivating strong bargaining relationships with management, shop stewards 
can achieve more for their members than they possibly could through a more militant 
perspective (Darlington, 1994: 16).  
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Any such relations however take place within parameters which are heavily circumscribed 
by capitalist and social relations which can ultimately render, from the perspective of 
stewards and their members, collaborative forms of bargaining as impotent. In the case 
of Royal Mail, the competitive market pressures emanating from the on-going 
modernisation agenda have, as strike levels suggest, served to both reduce the scope for 
‘give and take’ style bargaining and sharpened social and economic antagonisms between 
workforce and management (ibid.: 19). This may help explain why, both the threat of, and 
actual use of, strike action, rather than give and take pragmatism has often tended to be 
the method through which many workgroups have chosen to defend their terms and 
conditions in the Royal Mail (Beale, 2003). In this sense, the high level of steward 
cooperation identified by Batstone et al. could in fact serve to sap membership faith in 
their ability to resist attacks and dissipate the willingness to engage in the necessarily 
more militant strategies (Darlington, 1994: 146) like those adopted by many groups of 
postal workers.  
Additionally, it might be argued that Batstone et al.’s (1977) preoccupation with steward 
bargaining power pays too little attention to the potential of rank and file workgroups 
such as postal workers to independently limit managerial prerogative (Darlington et al., 
1993: 19). At workplace level postal workers have established a wide range of so called 
‘Spanish practices’ to decrease workloads and reduce time at work (Gall, 2003: 207-8). 
Practices like these often develop informally and spontaneously out of the rank and file 
(Darlington, 1993: 19), and provide the only means by which workers can sustain effective 
levels of job control that are favourable to their own interests. In doing so they contrast 
with more formal workplace bargaining which, in a similar sense to the strong 
managerial-steward bargaining relationships mentioned by Batstone et al., can serve to 
impose a peace obligation and leave management with the prerogative of initiative 
(Hyman, 1975: 159).  
Since steward legitimacy is dependent upon the active support of membership, stewards 
are under considerable pressure to respond to and support such rank and file initiatives 
like those above (Darlington, 1993: 21: Hyman, 1975: 161). The case of postal workers 
certainly supports the assertion Batstone et al. (1977: 110) that, leader stewards may 
look towards influential networks of opinion formers to reinforce domestically driven 
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lines of argument which promote strong union principles. However, they must adopt 
differing and sometimes conflicting patterns of behaviour depending on the issue, 
workgroup involved and shopfloor confidence. From this viewpoint, the power of 
workplace unionism is not the property of the steward, with the leadership relationship 
being a dynamic two-way interaction between members and shop stewards (Darlington, 
1993: 19).   
The above arguments raise questions with regard Batstone et al.’s study of the effect of 
shop steward behaviour on workplace organisation. In particular, it perhaps fails to pay 
enough attention to the independent and dynamic ways in which workers outside the 
official structures of workplace industrial relations can influence their labour process. 
They also highlight problems relating to stewards who are bureaucratically divorced from 
the shopfloor and encouraged to think in terms of the interests of the company 
(Darlington, 1994: 138). Fosh (1993) attempts to resolve what can be seen here as the 
tension between democracy and bureaucracy by identifying the positive role that key 
workplace leaders might play in both bringing about membership participation and an 
increasing union influence within the workplace.   
According to Fosh, shopfloor members feeling towards the union are dynamic, context 
linked and dichotomous with views which shift between a commitment to solidarity and 
union-centred goals, to that of a more individualistic, instrumental outlook (ibid.: 579-80).  
Their levels of participation and solidaristic commitment to workplace unionism rise when 
issues of concern to the membership are being decided or widely discussed. This is 
particularly the case when union leadership is of a participatory style which 
communicates, consults and involves members in decision-making (ibid.: 581). Here then, 
a local participatory style of leadership that contrasts with the more didactic model 
identified by Batstone et al. (1977) is seen as key in the development of strong workplace 
unionism and moreover, union renewal (ibid.: 589).  
Conclusion 
Despite the foregoing criticisms, Batstone et al.’s (1977) study serves, in conjunction with 
the approach adopted by Edwards (1988) to provide a framework within which to 
understand worker responses to managerial-driven change within the Royal Mail. At first 
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sight this framework may appear somewhat dated for the study of the effects of 
modernisation on an area of the UK public services in the 21
st
 Century. However, it should 
be born in mind that industrial relations within the Royal Mail stand in stark contrast to 
most other industries and are still based on strong workplace trade unionism and 
traditional negotiations of order. This, along with an absence of suitable more recent 
literature, required that the author looked to existing theories that were sympathetic to 
traditional models of workplace organisation.   
Edwards brings invaluable insight to this study in appreciating that worker action is 
shaped by the unity of both subjective and objective factors. This takes place within the 
context of an employment relationship which is predicated on structural antagonism 
between capital and labour, both of whom are to some extent dependent upon the 
other’s co-operation. This relationship is dynamic and is influenced by a cluster of 
structural factors such as product market conditions and the technological organisation of 
work. For Edwards (1988: 201), these pressures have to be interpreted by, and interact 
with, the central actors within a workplace context, namely workers and managers and 
the patterns of social relations that exist between these two parties. In the case of Royal 
Mail, influences at a structural level have taken the form of ongoing modernisation and 
marketization of the UK’s postal services. While this has carried widespread threats to 
their job security, job discretion and remuneration (Gall, 2003: 277), it has evoked a 
variety of responses and outcomes from a group of workers with similar task, skill mix and 
nationally agreed terms and conditions, in the context of a single industry. It follows that 
any understanding of worker action must therefore include a micro-level analysis of the 
social processes, through which external pressures such as those emanating from 
modernisation are mediated at workplace level.    
Batstone et al.’s (1977) study of shop stewards’ organisation adopts a workplace based 
focus to examine how domestic relations and structures act to mediate external 
influences. In doing so it helps to explain for the variety of worker responses and levels of 
resistance to modernisation within the Royal Mail. From this viewpoint, the ability of 
workgroups to mediate external pressures and to favourably influence their work 
situation is related to the level of power which they are able to realise within the 
domestic organisation. Central to this is the existence of a strong domestic shop steward 
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network that is able to; successfully make decisions; identify, shape and direct issues in 
the manner required; and, finally, maintain a particular set of ideologies and institutions 
which serve to support and legitimate particular patterns of behaviour (ibid.: 252).  
Whilst shop steward leadership can be seen as crucial, Batstone et al. also recognise the 
importance of management, particularly within the context of crisis-prone workplaces, in 
contributing to this. Through the strong bargaining relationships which they can develop 
with powerful leader stewards, management are able to resolve issues in ways that are 
favourable to workers and in doing so bolster the standing and indeed power of their 
representatives in relation to their members (ibid.: 255). This echoes Edwards’ (1988: 
194) argument that management play a key role as mediators of external conditions and 
that conflict and consent are interwoven within the same phenomena. It is out of the day-
to-day processes, through which these contradictory pressures upon both labour and 
capital are negotiated, that patterns of workplace order are generated (ibid.: 188). 
This thesis began by focussing on the role played by the state with regard to the 
marketization of public services and how this fits with in terms of its wider objective of 
securing an economic structure to meet business needs. This led on to workplace-based, 
investigation of how change such as that which is met by workers at the point of 
production which located the logic of market-driven reform within a wider debate about 
the capital-labour relationship. The relationship between management, state and workers 
was then examined within the more specific context of the Royal Mail and the wider Post 
Office itself. From here attention turned to worker agency and an evaluation of the 
factors that influence workers to behave in the way that they do at the locus of the 
shopfloor itself. Such depth of focus provides the foundation for a discussion of this thesis 
research, which makes up the next chapter.    
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Chapter Six: Researching Modernisation in the Royal Mail  
The aim of this study has been to examine how Royal Mail workers within a variety of 
settings, respond to managerial-driven change in the context of rapid modernisation of 
the postal industry. Whilst the modernisation agenda has brought about a significant 
change in relationships between employers, their managerial agents and workers within 
the wider public sector (Bach and Kessler, 2012: 5), this has been neither even or clear 
cut. Thomas and Davies (2005: 689) and Worrall et al. (2009: 120), for example, note the 
importance of worker agency, and workplace setting in mediating the raft of managerial 
initiatives that have come to be associated with public service modernisation. If 
managerial-driven change is context dependent, then it follows that any meaningful 
understanding of change within the postal industry must take account of the specific 
characteristics of what are a wide range of different types of workplace within the Royal 
Mail. Accordingly, the ambit of this study   extends to four Royal Mail workplaces each of 
which differs in terms of size, nature of work organisation, age and geographical setting. 
This calls for a comparative study through the medium of a series of case studies which 
Kitay and Callus (1998:102) identify as a research approach which has provided insight 
into areas such as workplace trade unionism and the process of industrial action 
(Batstone et al., 1977, 1978) and the changing nature of work in the mass production and 
continuous process industries (Goldthorpe et al., 1968; Beynon, 1973; Nichols and 
Beynon, 1977). Attention is concentrated, in particular, on the experiences of manual 
postal workers within these various workplaces at the level of the shopfloor, since there 
are a range of studies which point to this location as a key area where Royal Mail 
management have in recent times attempted to restructure its relationship with both its 
employees and their union representatives (Beale, 2003; Beale and Mustchin, 2013; 
Beirne, 2013).  
Research is conducted in the qualitative tradition of traditional industrial relations 
research (Whitfield and Strauss, 2000: 141) and is deductive. This means that the 
research questions are driven by existing academic literature and a theoretical framework 
that is developed from existing theoretical approaches to the study of workplace 
industrial relations. That said, sound empirical research begins with strong grounding in 
related literature, identifies a research gap and proposes research questions that address 
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that gap (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007: 25). As such, there was a particular concern 
that the research design provided scope for an approach which built on earlier studies of 
worker agency and more macro-level studies of impact of modernisation on public sector 
workers.        
Research Design 
From the outset, this study has sought to gain insight into how and why workers respond 
to and react back to changes to their working environment within the context of on-going 
managerial- driven change. Central to this has been an investigation into how patterns of 
conflict and accommodation (Edwards, 1988) are created in a work place setting and the 
factors which influence the efficacy and form of worker action. This has been pursued 
through the medium of a labour process analysis the core strengths of which involve the 
theoretical concern with the contradictory relationship between capital and labour, and 
an empirical interest in the experience of work at the point of production (Edwards, 2010: 
42). The research, therefore, was initially concerned with conducting a series of individual 
workplace case studies adopting an ethnographic method of study which has historically 
played a critical role in the study of work (Friedman and McDaniel, 1998:114).  
Central to ethnography is a concern with understanding what happens in particular 
settings, how the people involved see their own and others actions, and the contexts in 
which the actions take place (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995: 1-2). Such an approach 
would serve to provide a rich insight into the perceptions and social interactions of the 
postal workers under analysis and the opportunity to discover emerging issues (Friedman 
and McDaniel 1998: 114-7) emanating out of a production process that is undergoing 
considerable change. However, first-hand experience of the practical difficulties 
associated with ethnographic study, notably that it is extremely time consuming and 
requires a high degree of access to the subject of study (ibid.: 121) soon rendered it 
beyond the scope of this study. That said, the researcher was guided by, and did draw 
upon his own work experiences and knowledge within the Royal Mail in order to 
elaborate upon and enhance this study’s findings. Such an approach, as is discussed 
below, is referred to as auto-ethnography.  
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Before moving on to discuss the benefits that auto-ethnography and the case study 
approach might bring to the field of industrial relations research, it is necessary to say a 
little more about the factors which shaped this study’s research design. Since fieldwork 
sought to investigate a number of different workplace settings it was important to 
identify a range of Royal Mail sites that were potentially accessible and diverse. The 
researcher here drew on his previous knowledge of working processes, area-specific 
industrial relations and a network of union contacts gleaned from time spent as a branch 
official and workplace organiser for the CWU. While such sound understanding is vital in 
helping select the appropriate sights for research, it perhaps raises questions relating to 
researcher bias. This is addressed below in the chapter’s evaluation of the research 
methods and fieldwork.   
A final consideration in the design process was that of any potential ethical problems that 
may have arisen. As Burgess (1984: 185) notes, research fieldwork is associated with a 
series of common ethical and political problems relating to inter alia data collection, data 
analysis and data dissemination. This fieldwork took place against the backdrop of an 
impending national dispute between the Royal Mail and the CWU. Similar such contexts 
some in recent years have seen Royal Mail target a number of activists and union officials 
(see Lyddon, 2009). As such particular care was taken throughout the fieldwork to protect 
the confidentiality of the participants. All those interviewed and all workplaces covered 
retained their anonymity, equally each of the four workplaces that were investigated was 
referred to through this study purely by a given number (for example, Delivery Office 1, 
Mail Centre 1).  That said, the researcher did seek the fundamental ethical principle of 
informed consent on the part of each interviewee which itself may reduce levels of 
anonymity and increase the risk of identification (Burgess, 1984). This was reinforced 
through the secure administration and retention of interview transcripts which were kept 
in a locked cabinet in an office which was in turn locked and accessible only through a key 
pad. Before being deployed, the fieldwork approach received consent from its sponsoring 
body’s ethics committee (see Appendix 3).   
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The researcher and auto-ethnography as a research method: 
As a method, auto-ethnography combines characteristics of autobiography and 
ethnography. It is therefore, an approach to research and writing that seeks to describe 
and systematically analyse personal experience in order to understand cultural 
experience (Ellis, 2004: Holman Jones, 2005). According to Ellis et al. (2011) scholars have 
turned to auto-ethnography as a means of producing meaningful, accessible, and 
evocative research grounded in personal experience. This is research that seeks to 
sensitise readers to issues of identity politics, to experiences shrouded in silence, and to 
forms of representation that deepen the capacity to empathise. When adopting this 
approach, researchers are attempting to produce aesthetic and evocative thick 
descriptions of personal and interpersonal experience. This is accomplished by the 
researcher first discerning patterns of cultural experience evidenced by field notes, 
interviews, and/or artefacts, and then describing these patterns by way of storytelling 
(e.g., character and plot development), and showing and telling. As such, the auto-
ethnographer not only tries to make personal experience meaningful and cultural 
experience engaging, but also, by producing accessible texts, they may be able to reach 
wider and more diverse mass audiences that traditional research usually disregards 
(Bochner, 1997; Ellis, 1995). 
This highly personalised mode of qualitative research was a key means of providing 
greater insight into the nature of shopfloor life in the Royal Mail. It allowed the 
researcher to employ personal working experience of the industry itself to highlight the 
long-standing cultural and historical factors which shaped the actions and beliefs of 
workers in four Royal Mail workplaces. This was important in rendering this study’s 
contribution as both important and unique in comparison to others which have previously 
examined industrial relations in the Royal Mail (see for example, Martinez Lucio et al., 
1997; Gall, 2003; Beale, 2003; Beale and Mustchin, 2013). While these all largely examine 
the impact of market-driven change upon postal workers, none have really done by way 
of such an intimate account of the informal and not just formal ways in which workers 
view and respond to this. This echoes the sentiments of Wall (2006) who notes that the 
freedom of a researcher to speak as a player in a research project and to mingle his or her 
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experience with the experience of those studied is precisely what is needed to move 
inquiry and knowledge further along.  
At a practical level, the author’s biography was of great benefit to the fieldwork process 
itself. The researcher had worked for the Royal Mail for twenty-two years during which he 
had spent long periods first as a trade union activist followed by many years as a lay 
representative and later union official. As such the researcher had a comprehensive 
understanding of workplace layouts, senior officials and key activists in all the sites under 
research. Added to this was an awareness of the local workplace histories and the long-
standing traditions and micro-politics of each workplace. As such, he was better informed 
than most on both the nature and extent of illicit and informal practices that had 
historically been carried out beneath the waterline and the methods through which 
theses were maintained. It should be borne in mind here that the latter part of the 
researcher’s employment was one of poor worker-manager relations and considerable 
workplace and area-wide unrest. This was to culminate in an indefinite strike over 
restructuring and the researcher’s compulsory transfer to another Royal Mail site some 
forty miles away. The author was ever mindful of both the accusations of bias that such a 
situation might invite and the lack of systematicity and methodological rigor that is 
sometimes associated with auto-ethnography (Wall, 2006: 155). It was vital therefore 
that this subjective method of analysis formed part of a wider case study approach to 
which the focus now turns.  
The case study and industrial relations research: 
According to Kitay and Callus, the on-going popularity of the case study in the field of 
industrial relations research reflects its suitability as a method which provides 
explanations and understandings of complex social phenomena (1998: 101). Since 
industrial relations deals with values and perceptions as well as objective facts, it requires 
access to a range of information sources which help to make sense of the subjective 
elements of social and economic life. While case studies do not inherently contain several 
research methods, they often require that researchers make use of more than one, and 
often many different research methods (ibid.: 101-3). The appropriateness of the case 
study to this particular study becomes clearer when the following is considered; this 
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study’s focus with how different workgroups within an industry covered by a nationally 
prescribed terms and conditions might react in various ways to the pressures of 
modernisation means that there is a particular interest in how specific context might 
influence worker action. However, Yin (2003: 3) reminds us that the inclusion of context 
as a major part of a study raises challenges especially since the richness of context means 
that the study must rely on multiple sources of evidence. The case study is a research 
strategy therefore, which often uses techniques which include semi-and unstructured 
interviews, archival work, questionnaire surveys and observation (Kitay and Callus, 1998: 
103). It can be an effective means to cover both a particular phenomenon and the context 
in which the phenomenon is occurring (Yin, 1998: 31).  The nature of the case study and 
its position and value within the wider field of industrial relations research will now be 
considered.   
Hyman (1994: 170) argues that the bulk of writing and teaching in industrial relations has 
traditionally been empirical in character. Empiricism here may be defined as the assertion 
that what is presented as fact rests (or should rest) exclusively on empirical evidence, and 
that what is presented as theory is (or should be) derived from and reducible to 
propositions of an empirical nature. It is this tradition of empiricism based upon multi-
disciplinary research, heavily reliant on fieldwork case studies, observations and 
interviews that have historically provided insight into obscure areas of industrial interest 
such as workplace bargaining processes (Brown and Wright, 1994: 154). Writing as long 
ago as 1917, Webb and Webb, in their account of Methods of Social Study, prescribe an 
approach towards workplace relations which would appear to lend itself to the 
employment of case study research and its means of understanding complex social 
phenomena (Kitay and Callus, 1998: 101). As Webb and Webb (1932: 136) note, empirical 
studies, such as those like Schloss’ investigation of workplace payment systems, 
necessitate the close observation of the unit of analysis by the interviewer, and sensitivity 
and awareness of the facts gleaned from interviewee within a process that benefits from 
the first-hand experience of the researcher as opposed to the ‘mere pondering of second 
hand ideas’ (ibid.: 223). Brown and Wright note that this powerful empirical tradition, 
whilst tending to ebb and flow in more recent years, has involved researchers using 
techniques that have tried to explore the balance of transactional employment 
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relationships and their meaning to the actors involved. They have done so by dealing 
closely with them, by ‘talking to the data’ and by attempting to relate bargaining 
relationships to the broader structure of societal power (1994: 154).   
Despite its undoubted merits, there has, within the field of industrial relations been a 
shift away from empirically based, qualitative research in recent times (Whitfield and 
Strauss, 2000: 145; Brown and Wright, 1994). The trend towards what are regarded as 
more quantitative methods of research such as surveys are more macro-level in focus and 
have more latterly involved the application of advanced statistical methods for analysing 
workplace issues (Cully and Marginson, 1995: 1). According to Brown and Wright (1994: 
154) statistical techniques, such as the workplace survey, have in some areas significantly 
advanced our understanding of the employment relationship. Indeed, such techniques 
have a tradition stretching back from the Donovan Commission to contemporary WIRS 
and WERS surveys and share the common aspiration to provide a detailed factual account 
of workplace industrial relations which is nationally representative (Cully and Marginson, 
1995: 1). However, Whitfield and Strauss argue that there is a danger that an over-
emphasis on analytical rigour by a more quantitative approach may carry the risk of 
shifting focus away from the importance of cultural and environmental influences upon 
industrial relations and the causal mechanisms that may link these (2000: 148).  
It has been argued that the on-going trend towards a more quantitative approach within 
industrial relations research in recent years is based on greater discipline orientation. This 
has been influenced, in part, by a desire amongst industrial relations researchers to 
increase the field’s academic standing (ibid.: 147).  Accompanying this shift in approach 
has been a shift in focus brought about by the radically changing labour market context of 
the 1980s and the consequent reduction in trade union influence in the workplace 
(Brown and Wright, 1994: 160-1). The diminishing numbers of researchers engaged in 
workplace bargaining have, if anything, tended to focus on management behaviour as the 
prime influence in workplace bargaining (Guest and Conway, 1999: 367; Brown and 
Wright, 1994: 160). However, this study’s central area of interest is shopfloor relations 
between Royal Mail management and workgroups some of which, as a number of recent 
studies have indicated (see Beale and Mustchin, 2013; Beirne, 2013; Beale; 2003; Gall; 
2003), have continued to exercise considerable workplace influence over the regulation 
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of work. Indeed, a brief glance at some of the contested issues which have given rise to 
local and national postal disputes in recent times (see Lyddon, 2009) suggests the 
existence of control mechanisms such as ‘job and finish’ and task demarcation that are 
reminiscent of period in industrial relations which for Brown and Wright signified the high 
tide of empirical workplace research (1994: 158). Its success during this period in 
providing insight into strike-proneness, shop steward activity and restrictive practices 
renders an empirical approach based on a series of qualitative case studies as the most 
suitable means of gaining insight into the micro-level process of change and worker 
resistance within the context of Royal Mail workplaces.  
The decision to focus upon the workplace as the main unit of analysis gains further 
support from Cully and Marginson who view the establishment as the best locus from 
which to analyse the variety of industrial relations practices that go on within 
organisations (1995: 8). In the case of Royal Mail, Gall’s 2003 study of militancy amongst 
postal workers highlights that, although affected generally by a commonality of issues, 
workgroups within Royal Mail have tended to react differently in terms of effecting strike 
action and that this has been dependent upon a variety of context-specific factors such as 
management’s approach and its interaction with the union, the nature of task, workplace 
size and tradition. These differences have arguably been accentuated more recently by an 
increase in devolved bargaining (see the Pay and Modernisation Agreement 2007 and BT 
Agreement 2010) and a raft of managerial-driven Employee Involvement initiatives such 
as the World Class Mails programme (WCM) which seek localised involvement of staff and 
their representatives in the pursuit of greater efficiency savings (see Beirne, 2013). The 
capacity of some localised workgroups to resist and, moreover, reshape these initiatives 
(Beale and Mustchin, 2013: 17) and the continued yet uneven incidence of local action 
again highlight the need for a qualitative, comparative and in-depth mode of enquiry. 
Research Settings  
This study’s original research question necessitated the analysis and comparison of a 
number of Royal Mail workplaces which varied in terms size, nature of production, 
geographical location and age. This, along with availability of access, formed the basis for 
the selection of four workplaces which were to comprise a series of case studies. Every 
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effort was made to ensure that the workplaces under investigation provided a broadly 
representative sample of those which make up Royal Mail’s letter network. In terms of its 
delivery and collection of mails operation Royal Mail employs some 150,000 staff 
throughout the UK in a large number of workplaces that are located in a range of town, 
urban and rural settings. The main aspects of postal work that are carried out by workers 
within the area of Royal Mail under analysis are mail delivery, mail processing (or sorting) 
and mail distribution. As an occupational group, postal workers have traditionally been 
densely unionised and highly active (Jenkins et al., 2002: 81) although there are 
considerable intra-workplace variation with regard to the latter (see Gall, 2003). The 
industry’s main union, the CWU (Communication Workers Union), has proved remarkably 
resilient to the damaging effects of liberalisation experienced by postal workers within 
many other EU countries (Beale and Mustchin, 2013: 2-3). The workplaces that were 
investigated were all located in the CWU Midlands region. The details of those 
interviewed can be found in Appendix 1 of this thesis.   
The Mail Centre Context 
In recent years Royal Mail has increasingly concentrated its sorting and distribution 
operation into large Mail Centres. These are typically located on green-field sites close to 
the motorway and in spacious buildings designed for accommodating the latest mail 
processing technology (Jenkins et al., 2002: 87). The shift in mode of production by Royal 
Mail has been associated with an upsurge in new managerial HRM-based initiatives 
central to which has been the increasing use of temporal and part time employment. 
Consequently, postal workers employed within these new workplaces have expressed 
feelings of job insecurity, creeping casualisation and a loss of occupational identity (ibid.: 
98). New greenfield purpose built workplaces have replaced and contrast starkly with 
more traditional mail processing centres which have been typified as being situated in 
urban settings and containing more manual based work processes involving large groups 
of people with extensive knowledge of the postal code system. Here, work allocation has 
tended to be rigidly determined by length of service with the local union exercising strict 
limits as to the numbers and use of temporary and part time work (ibid.: 89-93). The 
transferral of many workgroups from traditional to green-field sites is representative of 
Royal Mail’s strategy of geographically consolidating mail operations at the expense (and 
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closure) of smaller regional processing centres (ibid.: 88). This renders such workplaces as 
fertile terrain in which to examine the effects of modernisation upon worker action. 
Moreover, given the tradition of strong workplace organisation within the Royal Mail such 
a context allows insight into what for the wider field of industrial relations constitutes a 
rather unique area study; how pre-organised groups of workers respond to new working 
environments that have a long association with anti-collectivist initiatives including 
flexible and team working, continuous training and direct communication (Hallier and 
Leopold, 1996: 47).  It follows that an important element of this study’s fieldwork 
involved in-depth qualitative investigation into two such green field sites which are 
outlined below. This was carried out through the medium of two individual case studies. 
Mail Centre 1 
This Mail Centre was approximately ten years old and situated on a modern industrial 
estate in the Midlands. This was roughly one mile from the city centre which had been 
the site of the previous processing centre which it had replaced and for the purposes of 
this research it will be referred to as Mail Centre 1. Around 600 workers were employed 
here of which around 75% were full time employees with the remaining 25% being part 
time. Both of these categories of workgroups also contained a number of temporary 
workers. Union membership stood at around 95% and many workers had lengthy service 
meaning that they had transferred to Mail Centre 1 from the old processing centre in the 
city centre. Whilst the workplace had, under Royal Mail’s modernisation agenda, been 
subject to a number of (voluntary) job losses, more recently new work that had been 
consolidated from another regional processing centre had been brought in and was 
accompanied by displaced workers from this site. In terms of its core operations, the 
delivery, distribution and processing of mail all took place on site with each having its own 
functionally assigned group of workers. Whilst mail delivery had its own ‘stand-alone’ 
work area, the processing operation took place in a large open plan workspace furnished 
with the latest mail processing technology. The work area itself could be described as 
light and spacious resembling that of a modern warehouse type workplace. Although 
separated from their colleagues in the delivery operation, employees in the processing 
and distribution functions often came into contact with one another during the course of 
the working day. Whilst historically industrial relations here had been relatively cordial, 
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increasing levels of shopfloor conflict had led to workers staging a workplace ‘sit-in’ only a 
few days before fieldwork began. Research here focussed upon those workers that were 
employed in the distribution and processing functions.  
Mail Centre 2 
This workplace was also situated in the Midlands and was around 1 mile from a busy city 
centre being recently built and operational for around 3 years. It was the product of the 
amalgamation of 3 traditional processing workplaces which had respectively been 
situated throughout a 30-mile radius. Each of these previous workplaces had in the past 
been regarded as militant and had all at various times displayed a capacity for both 
unofficial and strike action both on a local and national level. The workplace itself housed 
around 700 staff and like Mail Centre 1 was responsible for the core functions of mail 
processing, collection and delivery. As with Mail Centre 1 the bulk of work took place 
within a modern warehouse type setting in which indoor processing staff would interact 
with one another and their distribution colleagues throughout the course of the day. Here 
again the Delivery Office operation was a stand-alone unit with its own managers, 
designated workers and their union reps. The amalgamation of workplaces had meant 
that many of the three different groups of workers who had followed the work into the 
new workplace were now under a different Branch whose senior officials were based a 
significant distance from this new workplace. Mail centre 2 was situated in a relatively 
affluent area which had created number of resourcing difficulties in an industry that has 
historically experienced recruitment problems. While a number of local stewards were 
fully released from their everyday duties to carry out their union role, unlike Mail Centre 
1, they could not be termed as Branch officials.  
The Delivery Office Context 
The migration of considerable numbers of Royal Mail’s existing staff from well-organised 
traditional processing centres to green-field sites then points to the shopfloor in the latter 
of these workplaces as a potential locale for contestation and therefore an important 
area of research interest. These developments are, however, not exclusive to Royal Mail’s 
processing and distribution operations being part of a wider modernisation agenda that 
has extended to the reform of work processes and practices within its delivery offices. 
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Here reform has focused upon greater efficiency gains through increased workloads (Gall, 
2003: 154) and managerial challenges to local arrangements such as ‘job and finish’- itself 
being one aspect of 92 alleged ‘Spanish Practices’ identified and increasingly contested by 
Royal Mail. This has resulted in relatively high levels of localised action which has in 
recent times culminated in 2 national disputes (Lyddon, 2009: 325). However, national 
disputes notwithstanding, strike propensity amongst Royal Mail delivery offices has 
tended to vary, with some workplaces never having taken industrial action of their own 
accord, some having done so infrequently and others frequently (Gall, 2003: 149, 157). 
Whilst Gall notes, the actuality of strikes within the Royal Mail depends upon the 
different positions and actions of local management, the local union and their interaction 
(ibid.: 149) the localised nature of much of the recent action within the Royal Mail points 
to significant intra-area differences. Workplaces within a given branch under the 
jurisdiction of the same cadre of managers often react differently to a uniform set of 
initiatives within the context of the wider modernisation agenda. This again suggests that 
while there is an undoubted tradition of mobilisation amongst postal workers much 
action within the industry is context specific. Robust research into to such a situation 
requires a method of investigation that is sensitive to the values and perceptions of the 
actors involved. In practice this took the form of a case study approach which, as Kitay 
and Callus note, can be deployed to provide a wide range of informational sources that 
assist with an understanding of the subjective elements of social and economic life (1998: 
101). Again, as with the research into mail centres, attention focussed upon 2 Royal Mail 
delivery depots. Whilst the first of these had a history of militancy and activism the 
second can be characterised as densely unionised but largely inactive.   
Delivery Office 1 
This was situated on an industrial estate in the Midlands some 3 miles from a city centre. 
The building was around 12 years old and had replaced an older delivery office that was 
half a mile away. All existing staff at the time had moved into what was a purpose built 
office with work processes, which centred around the delivery of mails, on transfer 
remaining the same. Approximately 85 workers were employed here of which around 65 
were full time and 20 part-time. A small number of these, as with all staff employed in 
recent times by Royal Mail, had begun work on a temporary basis and were subsequently 
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awaiting the opportunity of substantive employment. Union density stood at around 80% 
amounting to a significant decrease from some 4 years earlier when it stood at 100%. The 
office had a history of strong trade unionism with workers exercising significant levels of 
shopfloor control over the organisation of workloads, overtime levels and local working 
practices. From the mid-2000s onwards workers at Delivery Office 1 had taken, even by 
the postal services’ standards, high amounts of both official and unofficial strike action. 
Industrial relations had throughout this period been fraught and subject to series of high 
profile investigations by both Royal Mail and the CWU. A number of long-serving union 
officials and activists had within the last few years left the organisation through either 
voluntary redundancy or in some cases disciplinary-based dismissals. 
Delivery Office 2 
Although situated in a rural setting that was some 12 miles away from the nearest city, 
Delivery Office 2 came under the same regional managerial structure as Delivery Office 1 
and was part of the same branch of the CWU. The workplace was around 70 years old and 
had historically attracted workers almost exclusively from within the surrounding town or 
its environs. As recently as the early 1980s workers here, like those in other rural delivery 
offices at the time, had their own independent branch that was later dismantled as part 
of the CWU national restructuring exercise (Gall, 2003: 143-4). Approximately 60 
employees worked in Delivery Office 2 of which around 45 were full time with the other 
15 being part time. Again, at the time that fieldwork was carried out a number of these 
were employed on a temporary basis and seeking substantive employment. Whilst the 
office had taken part in national and area-wide industrial action, at a local level it had 
historically been moderate and comparatively inactive. Nevertheless, union density was 
high standing at around 90% with a well-established local union presence.   
Access 
As Burgess notes, gaining access is an essential phase in the research process; it is a 
prerequisite and precondition for research to be conducted (1984: 45) and in its broadest 
sense involves gaining permission to do a piece of research in a particular social setting 
(ibid, 38). In recent years, significant industrial unrest and on-going managerial challenges 
to strong well organised workplace trade unionism has attracted considerable academic 
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interest (see for example Gall, 2003; Beale, 2003; Martinez-Lucio et al., 2000; Jenkins et 
al., 2002) regarding industrial relations within the Royal Mail. This has helped shed light 
on important phenomena such as the nature and dynamics of industrial action and 
resistance among postal workers (Gall, 2003; Beale, 2003) management strategy in the 
context of marketization (Martinez-Lucio et al., 2000), and gender segregation within the 
postal industry (Jenkins et al., 2002). In the case of Martinez et al. (2000) and Jenkins et 
al. (2002), access to the area under investigation provided considerable scope for face-to-
face interviews across a range of workplaces. More latterly however, studies by Beirne 
(2013) and Beale and Mustchin (2013), undertaken at a time of increasing sensitivity 
towards rationalisation and commercial confidentiality along with growing tensions in 
workplace industrial relations within the Royal Mail, have suggested certain difficulties in 
securing access to detailed on-site investigation.  
The majority of this study’s fieldwork took place against the backdrop of a national 
dispute over pay and the potential shape of post-privatisation work relations between 
Royal Mail and its workforce. Consequently, tensions were high and manifested in initial 
managerial caution regarding access to local workplaces. This meant that in terms of the 
delivery offices that were analysed, the choice of workplace (Delivery Offices 1 and 2 
were situated in an area in which there were in excess of 10 delivery units) was in some 
ways shaped by the researcher’s prior relationship with local management and their 
willingness to allow access. This was requested through informal meetings with the 
management in question after the respective workplace representatives had carried out 
some initial ‘sounding out’. Similarly, initial requests for access to the 2 Mail Centres were 
carried out through the medium of local officials who again paved the way for what were 
largely informal meetings in which the research objectives and area of study were spelled 
out. Local representatives and officials might here be referred to as carrying out a 
gatekeeper role in that they had a certain degree of power to grant access to people or 
situations (Burgess, 1984: 48), what proved particularly important was their role in 
providing access to local workers.     
Once permission was granted to undertake fieldwork in delivery offices 1 and 2 
respectively, there was little difficulty in gaining access to both ordinary workers (some of 
which were activists) and trade union representatives. Research further benefited from 
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management’s general ease with, and permission for, some interviewing and observation 
to take place directly on the shopfloor during working time. Additional access was 
granted in both of these workplaces to their respective canteen, restroom, smoking and 
loading bay areas. While the focus of the interviews was that of shopfloor workers, 
freedom to observe and access to a variety of workplace areas provided some limited 
insight into how management themselves interacted with workers and the methods 
through which they sought to communicate both local and wider organisational 
objectives. In sum, delivery offices 1 and 2 can be characterised as providing a research-
friendly environment that was conducive to the collection of a range of rich data through 
the medium of a qualitative research approach that sought to investigate problems in 
their natural setting (Whipp, 1998: 56).      
In the case of Mail Centre 1, whilst the nature of access provided opportunities to 
observe the working processes and shopfloor layout, interviews, whilst carried out on 
site, took place away from the main work area. Again, access to both union reps and 
workers was reasonably easy to obtain, restrictions around access to the shopfloor itself 
however, narrowed the opportunity to observe direct managerial interaction with 
shopfloor staff. Interviews with trade union officials tended to take place in the local 
union room which was situated on the first floor of the site and overlooked the shopfloor. 
Shopfloor workers were interviewed in a workplace learning centre that was ostensibly 
regulated by both management and the CWU in the spirit of ‘partnership’. In reality 
however, this was the exclusive preserve of workers and the union and a place where 
management rarely if ever visited. Again, as with Delivery Offices 1 and 2, Mail Centre 1 
enabled the collection of a range of rich and qualitative data. However, initial 
conversations with local representatives and interviewees revealed that, due to the 
recent industrial action tensions between management and workers were high and that 
on that basis requests for greater research access to the shopfloor itself should not be 
progressed. Finally, when it came to Mail Centre 2, interviews with union representatives 
and shopfloor staff were largely conducted within the local union’s office which was on-
site. This was supplemented by a number of separate periods of shopfloor observation on 
the part of the researcher.    
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Research Methods 
Although Whipp’s identification of qualitative methods as being appropriately suited for 
studies of culture, power and change (1998: 59) bodes well for its use in this study’s 
investigation into the meanings and action of workers in relation to workplace change, he 
notes that it is associated with three main problems.  These relate firstly to their concern 
with the particular, at the expense of the general, meaning that findings are limited in 
terms of providing a reliable base from which to generalise. Secondly, much theory within 
qualitative research emerges from the evidence collected and is sometimes the result of 
‘creative leaps’ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 553). These leaps are not always fully reported, or they 
arise from a process of constant iteration between theory, data, and relevant literatures 
that are not written up in publication. Such research is more difficult for other authors to 
replicate (Whipp, 1998: 57). Thirdly, given that many qualitative techniques rely on in-
depth investigation of research issues, the subsequent immersion of the researcher can 
result in questions around transparency. How data was collected, catalogued and 
analysed is often explained only briefly in final reports leaving other academics to 
speculate on how the results were achieved (ibid.: 58). In order, therefore, to strengthen 
both the internal validity (as in how far the researcher’s presence might influence the 
generation of data) and external validity (which refers to the whether the data that are 
obtained in studying one situation can be generalised to other situations) of this study’s 
findings, triangulation of research methods was attempted (Burgess, 1984: 144).  
Interviewing 
In its broadest sense, an interview is a purposeful discussion between two people, and 
can help gather valid and reliable data that are relevant to research questions and 
objectives (Saunders et al., 2009: 318). Interviews themselves may be highly formalised 
and structured using standard questions for each research participant, unstructured 
which are informal with no pre-determined list of questions or semi structured in which 
the researcher has a list of themes and questions to be covered but which may vary from 
interview to interview (ibid.: 320). Burgess argues that few researchers undertaking 
sociologically-based investigation have followed a structured approach preferring to use 
an unstructured or semi-structured style which gives informants the opportunities to 
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develop their answers outside the structured format (1984: 101-2). In terms of its 
relevance to the field of industrial relations research, Burgess points to the subject’s early 
pioneers the Webbs, who recognised the value of informal style conversation in providing 
rich detailed data that could be used alongside other materials (ibid.). This viewpoint is 
echoed by Whipp who goes on to add that when used in a qualitative capacity the 
interview not only provides scope for detailed and vivid accounts of events and processes, 
its flexibility also enables the researcher to open up new dimensions of a problem or to 
discover clues that connect its different elements (1998: 54). The nature of such an 
approach rendered it a central research method of this study and its concern with the 
social processes through which postal workers come to perceive and react to managerial-
driven change.  
As qualitative methods of investigation, semi and unstructured interviews (in addition to 
questions of reliability and validity such as those discussed above) can also be open to 
charges of bias on the part of the interviewer. As Saunders et al. note, this is when the 
comments tone or non-verbal behaviour of the interviewer creates bias in the way that 
interviewees respond. This may extend to the way the interviewer interprets the 
responses of interviewees (2009: 326). In the case of this study, the researcher had spent 
many years working for the Royal Mail before leaving in 2009 and had been active in both 
local branch and workplace trade unionism. This had involved general activism before 
holding office in a number of branch positions. The latter part of this period can be 
characterised as one of poor worker-manager relations and considerable workplace and 
area-wide unrest.  This was to culminate in an indefinite strike over restructuring and the 
researcher’s compulsory transfer to another Royal Mail site some forty miles away.   
In light of the above, there was an acute sensitivity throughout this study that researcher-
bias may well be inevitably present within the process of social research (Allen, 1971: 3). 
As such the construction and design of the interview schedule sought to minimise 
subjectivity. Thus, interviews were compiled by using a series of factual questions relating 
to technological and structural change within Royal Mail workplaces. Here every attempt 
was made to maintain consistency and reduce ambiguity by asking interviewees to 
provide concrete examples relating to their answers. This formed the basis for what were 
effectively guided conversations which allowed for the interviewees views to flow 
142 
  
naturally around the main topics that were covered. Throughout this semi-structured 
style of interviewing considerable care was taken to ensure the avoidance of ‘leading’ 
questions.  
The choice of a semi-structured interview model was also influenced by the nature of 
production both in Delivery Offices and Mail Centres along with the wider pressures of 
modernisation within the Royal Mail at the time. Delivery Office work involves (before 
actual delivery) the sorting and preparing of mail by postal workers for their respective 
deliveries. Despite management’s ease with the researcher’s presence, from the workers’ 
perspective, time spent away from these processes, as in this case being interviewed, 
delays the time that they finish work. Alternatively, although the nature of work within 
Mail Centres is less hurried (the practice of ‘job and finish’ is more difficult to actualise 
here), shopfloor layout renders workers much more visible to managerial scrutiny in 
terms of time spent not working. Additionally, workers here are often ‘tied’ to machine-
based, or production line type tasks (see Gall, 2003: 158). In both contexts managerial 
concern with disruption to production has been heightened in recent times by efficiency-
based cuts to staff numbers. In such circumstances, which were compounded by time-
bound access of no more than five days of research per office, the lengthier method of 
the unstructured interview was, despite its many benefits, deemed regrettably 
unfeasible.  
In practice, interviews present the researcher with a number of practical problems and 
call for a range of social skills. As Sutcliffe (1999: 146) notes, more qualitative types of 
interview often generate large amounts of data the quality of which will often be 
dependent upon the extent to which the behaviour is faithfully recorded. Operationally, 
the interviewer’s dual role of questioner and reporter can make accurate recording 
difficult meaning that some researchers seek to record observations through the use of a 
second person (note-taker) or the medium of a tape recorder. However, the quality of 
any interview is dependent upon the interviewer both gaining the respondent’s 
confidence and ensuring that they are supportive of the interview from the outset 
(Whipp, 1998: 54; Sutcliffe, 1998: 146). Whilst the first of these measures was not 
appropriate to an individual doctoral thesis, the second demands a high level of initial 
trust and may lead respondents to feel uncomfortable (Friedman and McDaniel, 1998: 
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124; Sutcliffe, 1999: 146). As such, it was decided that the interviews in all workplaces 
would be manually taken in note form. Furthermore, any potential for initial suspicion by 
respondents to the interview and observation processes was minimised by the local 
union’s endorsement of the fieldwork and the researcher’s trade union background.  
The length of workplace interviews varied and ranged from around 25 to 35 minutes for 
those that were carried out on the shopfloor, through to 40 to 50 minutes for those 
which took place in canteens and restrooms. Selection of the interview setting here was 
based on the availability and location of the interviewees themselves. A total of 15 
interviews were carried out in Delivery Office 2 and in Mail Centre 1 and 2 whilst 16 
people were interviewed in Delivery Office 1. Outside of the workplace, interviews with 
five local Branch Officials averaged at around one hour, during which respondents were 
encouraged to broaden their answers with regard to how they have viewed change within 
the wider context of their respective branches and regions (all details of those officials 
interviewed can be found in appendix one). Given that these latter interviews were 
conducted on union premises with respondents who enjoyed fully paid facility time, the 
greater demands in terms of time did not present difficulties. Whilst it may be argued 
that the shopfloor interviews were themselves, due to operational constraints, a little 
short, they formed part of a broader research strategy which also included the method of 
non-participant observation. As Sutcliffe notes this has been a relatively common means 
of research within the field of industrial relations (1999: 142). 
Observation 
Whilst the nature of access in Mail Centres 1 and 2 limited scope for direct observation, 
fewer restrictions in both Delivery Offices 1 and 2 created a favourable climate in which 
to observe worker behaviour at workplace level. This was invaluable to a study that seeks 
to understand the social processes through workers mediate and shape change within the 
context of the shopfloor. As Edwards (2010: 42) notes, systematic observation can reveal 
important information about the nature of work tasks and other key issues such as the 
ways in which managerial controls are deployed. Batstone et al. (1977: 13), in their study 
of worker action within a factory setting, regarded such an approach as the most 
appropriate as a research method which sought a high degree of flexibility and the 
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maximum collection of rich social data. Whilst they go on to note that this can often be a 
lengthy process which includes periods spent learning about the situation which one is 
observing (ibid,), it is worth pointing out that the researcher’s previous working biography 
compensated for the fieldwork’s time constraints. In this sense, prior on the job 
knowledge of production processes and what were standard workplace layouts meant 
that information could be comprehended and assimilated quite quickly. 
Further opportunities to observe worker behaviour came in the form of access to rest 
room, canteen, smoking and (in delivery offices 1 and 2) loading bay areas. This was 
informal in nature and-given that these areas were largely exclusive to workers, provided 
access to worker opinions and behaviours that might not always find expression on the 
shopfloor and the closer proximity of management. For Collinson (1992: 136-7, 149), 
areas like these constitute back regions that are free from the coercive constraints of 
management in which workers resist managerial objectives through the appropriation of 
time and space. Access here therefore added significantly to the quality of research and 
brought into light an important area of shopfloor ‘under life’ (Goffman, 1961) which the 
interview process itself would have missed.  
Outside of the immediate parameters of the workplace, the researcher also attended and 
observed a number of ‘gate meetings’ which, as their name suggests, took place outside 
individual workplaces and a number of Area union meetings. Research into the gate 
meetings extended to eight out of the twelve separate workplaces which came under the 
jurisdiction of the parent branch of Delivery Offices 1 and 2 (see table 6.1 below).  
Table 6.1: Attendance at Gate Meetings 
Delivery Office Total Number of staff 
in workplace 
Total of workgroup in 
attendance 
% of workgroup in 
attendance 
D.O. 1 85 60 70% 
D.O. 2 60 33 55% 
D.O. 3 173 97 56% 
D.O. 4  65 32 49% 
D.O. 5 35 28 80% 
D.O. 6 63 42 66% 
D.O. 7 151 87 57% 
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Each meeting lasted for approximately forty minutes. They were addressed by the Branch 
Secretary and Full time Official who sought to secure a ‘yes’ vote for forthcoming national 
industrial action.  
The meetings themselves provided the opportunity to evaluate worker reactions to 
proposed change that may not have been picked up in the more constrained setting of 
their workplaces. Since they were called in relation to the prospect of taking forthcoming 
industrial reaction, the meetings were a particularly valuable means of accurately gauging 
the effects of an employer counter-mobilization strategy that had become apparent 
during the fieldwork. In terms of the Area union meetings, the researcher attended 5 of 
these over an 18-month period. This too enhanced the quality of research since it was a 
forum in which, union representatives and senior officials could articulate their opinions 
in an environment that was free from managerial scrutiny. Throughout the observation 
process the researcher wrote consistently-even when no information needed to be 
recorded. It was hoped that this continuity of writing might minimize the obtrusive nature 
of note taking (Friedman and McDaniel, 1998: 124), and at the same time counter 
problems of artificiality of the subject’s behaviour (Sutcliffe, 1999: 143). Despite these 
measures the researcher remained sensitive to problems of reliability and validity that are 
associated with an over-reliance on observation as a research method (ibid.). In addition 
to the use of semi-structured interviews and non-participant observation, therefore, 
research was carried out via the analysis of documentary evidence. 
Royal Mail and CWU Documentation 
As an organisation Royal Mail produces regular journals which outline to employees the 
company policies, projects and aims. One particular off-shoot of the organisation’s main 
monthly employee magazine is a monthly pamphlet which updates staff on an on-going, 
and in many cases controversially regarded initiative called the World Class Mails 
programme (see Beirne, 2013). Access to these sources, which are national in scope, 
provided the researcher with an insight into the wider industrial relations developments 
within the Royal Mail and off-set, to a degree, the study’s worker-centred focus. 
Attention also focused upon national documentation generated by the Communication 
Workers Union in the form of a monthly journal. These were supplemented by a limited 
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amount of local level documentation in the form of briefings and internal bulletins 
generated by both the CWU and Royal Mail. In addition to these sources, fieldwork also 
drew on a number of national level agreements between the CWU and Royal Mail. These 
included the BT Agreement 2010, Business Transformation and World Class Mails 
Agreement 2012 and Agenda for Growth Stability and Long Term Success 2014. The 
researcher was mindful that every document that one encounters during fieldwork is a 
socially constructed piece in itself bearing certain values and assumptions (Patmore, 
1998: 219-221). The analysis of documentation here from both parties helped to ensure a 
level of balance to the research process.  
Reliability and Validity 
This study’s research strategy took the form of a multi method approach which involves 
combining a range of techniques for collecting and analysing data to address a research 
framework (Rossman and Wilson, 1994: 315). It was hoped that this, along with the 
decision to focus upon 4 individual workplaces would maximise the validity and reliability 
of what was small scale study carried out by one researcher who had previously worked 
and been an active trade unionist within the area under study. Buchanan (1999: 153-7) 
notes that such an approach is referred to as methodological triangulation which helps to 
corroborate findings and enables researchers to draw on data which might yield different 
insights into the subject matter whilst improving the quality of data collected. A focus on 
and comparative analysis of a number of workplaces sought to gauge the level to which 
the study’s findings might be ‘representative’ and ‘generalizable’ (Gardner, 1999: 58) with 
regard to the modernisation process of the wider postal industry. 
It is important at this stage to bear in mind that in addition to being small in terms of its 
scale, the study’s focus was narrower in workplace focus than would have been desired. 
In particular, fieldwork only yielded limited first-hand insight into the actual actions and 
thoughts of management within the workplaces studied. Greater access to management 
in this respect would for example have enhanced understanding of a central theme of this 
thesis- the dynamic way in which workplace regulation is played out between workers 
and managers (Goodrich, 1920), whilst bringing greater validity and reliability to its 
conclusions. In a similar vein, the nature of access and the gate keeping role of the initial 
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contacts in both Mail Centres meant that only a handful of non-unionised workers were 
interviewed. In both delivery offices, historical problems arising out of non-member 
complaints about union harassment resulted in a similar situation. Whilst non-union 
members may form only a small minority of workers within Royal Mail, greater 
representation in the fieldwork process would have been beneficial. This could have 
added clearer insight into how such workers might perceive workplace change whilst 
again adding to the research’s validity and representativeness of the wider group of 
workers under study.    
The worker-centred focus of this study and its theoretical framework clearly has 
implications for its reliability. Had the study adopted a more managerial unitary-based 
perspective through which to view the area of study, then some of the data may have 
been interpreted somewhat differently. For example, there was a commonly held belief 
amongst workers in Delivery Office 1 that Royal Mail had sacked the office’s nucleus of 
representatives in order to pave the way for the introduction of more flexible working 
practices and greater efficiency. A more unitary approach might have viewed this as 
evidence of workers struggling to adapt to rapid change and in doing so misinterpreting 
what amounted to the removal by management of recalcitrant workers who had bullied 
their work colleagues. However, data gathered from both Mail Centres 1 and 2 
highlighted similar Royal Mail tactics resulting in the removal of key workers ostensibly 
for a range of reasons ranging from breaches of attendance, which itself is privy to an 
extent of managerial discretion, through to alleged (and completely unsubstantiated) bad 
language. Conversely, there were other accounts of non-active and in some cases non-
unionised workers engaging in similar substantiated actions that were largely overlooked 
by management. The consistency of findings here suggests that whilst the study’s 
theoretical framework undoubtedly influenced the manner in which fieldwork was 
interpreted, it did not compromise its reliability.  
Further support for the reliability and validity of this study can be garnered from a range 
of recent academic research into modernisation of the wider public sector.  For example, 
the increasing lack of control over their respective labour processes, work intensification 
and heightened feelings of job insecurity reported by workers in all of the case studies 
which inform the following chapter, mirror those of other employees subject to public 
148 
  
sector modernisation identified by authors including Worrall et al., (2009), Ruane (2007) 
and Grimshaw and Hebson (2005). Similarly, interviewee accounts of the growing 
prevalence of a more unitary style of supervision within all four workplaces resembles 
trends in other areas of the public sector in which, amongst other things, managerial 
concern with the right to manage, the implementation of explicit measurements of 
performance, and workforce flexibility has according to Massey and Pyper, become a 
permanent feature of the very process of modernisation (2005: 37). The impact of this 
has been met at times by the workers under study with immediate stoppages and walk-
outs that is untypical of those within the wider public sector. However, research by both 
Beale and Mustchin (2013) and Gall (2003) point to such action as being common and 
thus a representative and reliable indication of worker behaviour within the Royal Mail. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has focused upon the value of case study research as a method of 
investigation within the field of industrial relations and its applicability to this study’s 
investigation of four individual Royal Mail depots. Yin notes that the case study is a 
suitable means of gaining insight into a particular phenomenon and the context within 
which the phenomenon was occurring (2003: 31). This deems such an approach, 
therefore, as appropriate to a study that’s central concern is to understand how workers 
respond and react back to managerial-driven workplace change. While meaningful 
examination of the workplaces in question calls for considerable time amongst the 
workers at shopfloor level, the general industrial relations environment and, initially, the 
researcher’s previous role within the industry meant that access was more restricted than 
would have been desirable. This is recognised as a potential weakness as is the possibility 
of bias arising out of the researcher’s previous role within the industry. Every attempt was 
made to remedy this by triangulation involving the use of more than one method of 
enquiry in arriving at conclusion.  
This study is by no means as comprehensive and as in-depth as earlier analyses that focus 
upon the complex and dynamic nature of worker organisation and resistance specifically 
within a local workplace setting (see, for example, Lupton, 1963; Batstone et al., 1978; 
and Beynon, 1973). Nor could it hope to compare in terms of attention to historical, 
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occupational and socio-political detail with that of commentators such as Gall (2003) and 
Batstone et al. (1984) who focus in particular on industrial relations within the Royal Mail. 
It does however, provide a contemporary insight into the manner in which a group of 
well-organised public service workers might react to and make sense of change that 
serves to threaten traditional working methods and long-standing mechanisms of job 
control. That this has been carried out during a period in which the industry in question 
has been subject to unprecedented levels of commercialisation and eventual privatisation 
renders its findings as a useful extension of earlier studies which could only predict the 
impact of full marketization upon relations within the Royal Mail. In a wider sense, the 
study makes a small contribution to academic concern with the impact of modernisation 
upon work relations within the public services and, in particular how, workers seek to 
mediate its effects upon their labour process within the context of the shopfloor. It is to 
these issues that we now turn.         
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Chapter Seven: Modernisation and workplace industrial relations - findings from four 
case studies 
This chapter discusses the findings from four separate workplace investigations into how 
workers react to managerial-driven change within the context of the on-going 
marketization of the Royal Mail. Attention here focuses on the impact of management 
approach, new forms of technology, increasing non-standard forms of employment and 
the growth in Employee Involvement initiatives (Beale and Mustchin, 2013) on the 
frontier of control in each of the workplaces in question. This involves an evaluation of 
action at the locale of the shopfloor itself and the ways in which such pressures might be 
mediated by both collective and individual worker agency.  
The researcher has at times here drawn upon his own work experience and prior 
knowledge of the research sites to illuminate both the nature and degree of change that 
has taken place in each workplace in recent years. This entailed time as a lay 
representative, branch official and branch organiser. Such a background provided prior in-
depth knowledge of shopfloor life within the Royal Mail and a clear understanding of the 
state of workplace relations in each workplace as they stood some three years before this 
study.  In line with Wall (2011), it is hoped that the freedom of the researcher to mingle 
his own experience here will help move inquiry and knowledge of contemporary 
shopfloor relations within a fully liberalised Royal Mail further along. 
The dynamic and complex relationship between structure and agency is central to 
Edwards’ (1988) analysis of patterns of conflict and accommodation which has been 
employed throughout as an analytical lens through which to understand the findings of 
this study. While this helps shed light on the different types of worker bargaining 
behaviour that variety of structural influences can help stimulate, it perhaps fails to 
adequately account for the case of Royal Mail where a set of relatively uniform industry-
wide pressures have, as has been noted earlier, evoked a range of localised workgroup 
responses. Accordingly, attention has also focused on Batstone et al.’s (1977) workplace 
study of shop stewards in action. This has enhanced understanding of the subject matter 
through its investigation into the nature of workplace organisation and how this affects 
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worker behaviour. Together these form this study’s analytical framework and have been 
discussed at length in chapter five.      
Empirical evidence has indicated that although there remain important differences as to 
how workers meet managerial-driven change within each workplace, there are also 
certain similarities. This means that any meaningful understanding of what influences 
these phenomena must therefore take place within an analytical context that serves to 
facilitate a comparison of these workplaces and in particular their varying organisational 
and social characteristics. Accordingly, the findings gleaned from each workplace are 
grouped into two main thematic categories. These both fundamentally relate to this 
study’s central question and for the purposes of analysis, fit within the overarching 
analytical framework of this study. The two categories in question are: the extent to 
which each workplace can be categorised as collective-militant, and the extent and 
nature of non-union based forms of individual and collective job controls in each 
workplace. These are outlined below and precede the main body of this study’s findings. 
The findings themselves contain quotes from the respondents from each of the 
workplaces, the details of each respondent can be found in the study’s appendices.  
Structure of the findings 
Extent to which each workplace can be categorised as collective-militant 
This section examines the extent of union centred collective-militancy in each office and 
to what degree this has been affected by Royal Mail’s on-going modernisation 
programme. This calls for a focus on two particular areas of worker behaviour. To begin 
with, attention will concentrate on the level of success that the local CWU have had in 
maintaining both formal and informal job controls within each of these workplaces in 
recent times. This will involve an evaluation of job discretion amongst local workers, and 
the extent to which they and their representatives have managed to collectively retain 
the significant levels of influence over both work allocation and wider working practices 
that have long been associated with postal workers (Gall, 2003: 29). Such a context 
provides a suitable setting in which to make analytical use of Edwards’ (1988) study of 
patterns of conflict and accommodation. Of particular value here is the author’s 
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investigation into the manner in which structural pressures similar to those emanating 
from modernisation, are themselves actively mediated by worker agency (ibid.: 211).  
This leads on to the section’s second area of investigation into worker behaviour. This is 
whether commitment to the CWU and further workplace union-centred organisation 
remains strong in the face of a set of managerial-driven initiatives which serve at least in 
part to win the hearts and minds of workers within the Royal Mail (Beale and Mustchin, 
2013: 17; Beirne, 2013:123). Thomas and Davies (2005: 685) point to a raft of studies 
which associate such strategies with the further objective of facilitating a managerial 
discourse which seeks to colonize workers’ subjectivity thereby diluting worker 
opposition (Sewell and Wilkinson, 1992; Townley, 1993; Willmott, 1993). However, it 
should be borne in mind that the acceptance of such initiatives is not inevitable. It has 
been argued elsewhere that shop stewards themselves can play a key role in influencing 
worker behaviour through their application of rules, the reaffirmation of dominant values 
and their capacity to invoke group sanctions (Batstone et al., 1977: 4). 
 It follows that an appreciation of the interrelationship between workers and the 
domestic trade union within each workplace under investigation will go some way 
towards providing an understanding of just how effective each workgroup has been in 
maintaining the collective levels of job discretion that have been associated with strong 
union-centred workgroup organisation. Here greater understanding is gleaned by way of 
Batstone et al.’s (1977) study of Shop Stewards in Action with its focus on the nature of 
shop steward leadership and how this relates to worker behaviour within the context of 
the shopfloor. Although first published in 1977 its comparative analysis of the impact of 
two contrasting models of shop steward organisation upon worker outlook, action and 
organisation renders it relevant to the study of contemporary industrial relations within 
the Royal Mail. As this study has pointed out, this has been an area where similar sets of 
structural conditions have evoked a variety of responses from workgroups (Gall, 2003) 
that fall outside Edward’s (1988) more widely scoped and multi-occupational analysis of 
worker behaviour.    
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The extent and nature of non-union based forms of individual and collective job controls   
This section examines the extent to which workers in each workplace have responded to 
market-driven change through both collective and individual non-union centred job 
controls. This phenomenon is again best understood within the context of Edwards’ 
(1988) analysis of patterns of conflict and accommodation within the workplace. Of 
particular relevance here is a focus upon different modes of adjustment by workers and 
workgroups and the causes for this (ibid.: 194-197). Edwards goes onto identify a range of 
informal adaptations by individuals and workgroups who commonly lack the capacity, 
propensity or opportunity to collectively regulate things like the division of task, 
allocation of overtime and application of discipline. This approach provides a useful lens 
through which to examine the nature of non-unionised forms of behaviour within the 
workplaces under investigation. Such a focus additionally dovetails with the study’s other 
thematic category in that it provides insight into how successful local unionism and the 
necessary membership loyalty and support upon which it relies have been in retaining 
influence over workplace change.  
Section One: The extent to which each workplace can be categorised as collective 
militant 
This section examines the extent to which each of the workplaces under investigation can 
be categorised as collective militant. This will involve an in-depth analysis of evidence 
gathered from each workplace which will then be drawn together to form an overall 
summary of the findings. To begin with attention will focus upon Delivery Office 1 and 
centre upon the study’s choice of two key indicators of collective militancy that were 
discussed above, these are; firstly, the levels of success that the domestic union have had 
in maintaining both formal and informal job controls in recent times; and secondly, levels 
of worker and membership commitment to and identification with the CWU. This process 
will then be repeated with regard to Delivery Office 2 before moving on to Mail Centres 1 
and 2 respectively. Attention in Mail Centres 1 and 2 is focused upon those workers who 
were involved in the processing and sortation of mail within the context of large new 
build factory type settings, along with a number of drivers who collected and transported 
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mail in and out of the workplace. Research into Delivery Office 1 and 2 was concerned 
with those workers who deliver mail both on foot and via delivery vans.  
Delivery Office 1: 
Extent of union-centred formal and informal job controls 
Within its delivery office network Royal Mail were at the time at which the fieldwork was 
undertaken, at various stages of implementing a new set of national working practices 
that sought more efficient ways of working and subsequently a potential reduction in 
staff. This is indicative of developments within the wider public services where on-going 
reform has been introduced within general neo-liberal aspirations which focus on solving 
the public sector labour problem. This might be defined in terms of low productivity, 
restrictive working practices and by managers feeling unable to manage (Worrall et al., 
2009: 118). The initiative itself was termed ‘Delivery Methods’ and had formed part of an 
overarching agreement on pay and modernisation between Royal Mail and the 
Communication Workers Union. The agreement provided for full union involvement and 
negotiation in its introduction at workplace level (BT Agreement 2010). Its 
implementation involved the use of a software package which sought to reroute and 
rationalise deliveries through satellite-based information of the local area based on 
agreed jointly agreed walking and driving speeds. This had become increasingly prevalent 
within the organisation in favour of the traditional ‘rule of thumb’ methods of planning. 
Within Delivery Office 1, this had been fully introduced with the full involvement of the 
local CWU. Local representatives had haggled over and disputed much of the data that 
the software package and management had generated. In doing so they had achieved 
favourable time allocation for all outdoor tasks from driving vehicles, collection of mail 
business and sub Post Offices’ and walking delivery rounds. This had been something of a 
drawn out process that had eventually been settled after being been progressed through 
the organisation’s disputes procedure. The local representatives, like the vast majority of 
staff were, on the whole, reasonably pleased with its outcome. As one local rep in the 
office commented: 
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We have just completed a revision of all the duties under Delivery Methods and I 
think that 95% of our people are happy with the way that the jobs have panned 
out. Ok we had to go through the stages of disagreement which could have 
ultimately led to strike action to get there as the members were not prepared to 
accept any rubbish….. we think that we got a good deal (Workplace 
Representative /OPG 13, Delivery Office1). 
That the union locally were largely happy with the outcome of this should not detract 
from the potential threat that the initiative itself posed to established ways of working. 
Operationally, at least in theory, this equated to a reduction in delivery support jobs, a 
concomitant increase in the content of workload in remaining duties, and greater 
workforce flexibility (BT Agreement 2010:3). In practice, however, its implementation had 
resulted in no actual reduction in jobs, and a small reduction in scheduled overtime. 
Many workers did not really appear to be working much harder than they were prior to 
this change. Some said that they had noticed a bit of an increase but that this had been 
more down to an earlier national agreement some years earlier which had involved a 
national restructuring of delivery jobs from twice per day down to once.   
The following responses capture what appeared to be the consensus amongst 
interviewees: 
I haven’t really noticed that much change in work since the last [BT 2010] 
agreement OK, you can’t make as much time as you used to do these days and we 
are working a bit harder, I used to only work 5 hours a day. I can still make some 
time but not as much as before (OPG 3 Delivery Office1); and  
….BT 2010 hasn’t really changed that much for us here….the big thing is that you 
can’t get home as early as you used to be able to, it is a bit heavier than it used to 
be but that’s down to things that the union nationally have been tied to over 
recent years…. you can still make some time it’s still pretty easy (OPG 2 Delivery 
Office 1).   
If, for Royal Mail the agreement had seemingly failed within Delivery Office 1 to usher in 
the level of ‘optimised efficiency’ that they sought (BT Agreement 2010: 23), then their 
further aims of achieving greater workforce flexibility also appeared to have fallen short 
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of the mark. Attempts to address what was a perceived lack of worker flexibility and 
thereby redefine locally accepted standards of the effort bargain in this workplace in 
particular had been a long-standing goal amongst regional (and at times national) 
management within the Royal Mail. During his time spent as a local union official the 
researcher had developed first-hand experience of the long tradition within this 
workplace of tight union control over workloads, staffing levels and overtime. The local 
shop stewards enjoyed full time release and any movement of staff or change to 
workloads were subject to their agreement. Many attempts by Royal Mail to introduce 
change in this workplace had been thwarted by industrial action, or the threat of it.  Such 
was their level of influence the local union had a list of Royal Mail managers that they 
would not allow to manage in this workplace. Should management seek to bring in 
anyone new (even if this was on a relief basis) then it was understood that they would 
first seek the ‘green light’ from the union.  
In recent times management had, for a number of years, conceded to the union’s 
requests that all workers here were paid two hours per week overtime two undergo on-
site IT and Spanish courses. In practice, workers were able to undertake these, and claim 
the overtime, within their existing duty times. It was accepted by staff and management 
that any work performed outside of set workloads would automatically be paid at 
overtime rate. Overtime was itself often carried out on a ‘ghost’ basis (see England, 1981: 
19). This is an arrangement whereby the claimant would carry out and be paid around six 
hours’ overtime for an extra delivery round within the time span of their existing duty. 
During his time as a branch official the researcher was also aware that there was a ‘sick 
rota’ being operated within Delivery Office 1 whereby workers systematically took turns 
in taking sick leave for the purpose of creating overtime for the wider workgroup when 
mail volumes were low.    
A few years prior to this study, all workers within this workplace had been involved in a 
long and bitter all-out strike which had lasted for six weeks and ended with the dismissal 
of a number of experienced stewards and activists. This was widely perceived as a 
nationally-coordinated attempt by the Royal Mail to claw back for what they saw as some 
of the deeply embedded and unacceptable workplace practices held by the local union 
and its members (Lyddon, 2009). Evidence indicated that, the local CWU, in line with Gall, 
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(2003) at the time of fieldwork had, nevertheless, continued to enjoy significant influence 
over the way in which work was organised, the allocation of overtime and annual leave 
and regulation of workloads and health and safety matters. They were also responsive to 
any membership concerns with regard to the breaching of such issues by management 
whilst further, due to the two most senior representatives being on full release, 
remaining clearly visible, and accessible to members within the workplace itself. 
Moreover, many workers themselves were in the words of one interviewee:  
...more often than not perfectly capable of defending themselves and each other 
on the floor so that the union can concentrate on bigger issues…….  if 
management try and tell us to do extra work we’ll just say ‘no’ and they know that 
if they try to suspend one of us we’ll all be out  (OPG 7, Delivery Office 1). 
Job demarcation remained widespread here then, despite the opportunities for 
garnering greater worker flexibility that the principles of the BT Agreement 2010 
presented to management. Further indications of this depth of shopfloor strength were 
clearly evident throughout the duration of research during which management 
remained confined to their office for considerable periods of time. When they did make 
brief appearances many workers remained indifferent to their presence whether ‘off 
task’ (in the sense of talking, smoking fooling around or resting) or ‘not off task’. A 
number of interviewees had put this managerial reticence down to both their constant 
haranguing by workers in the past and, as the above suggests, an unwillingness amongst 
the latter to do anything that was deemed to be outside of their daily workload. In a 
similar sense the canteen and rest room areas within Delivery Office 1 were also 
virtually exclusive to the workforce. This appropriation of shopfloor space can be seen 
as a means by which workers within this workplace had successfully restricted 
managerial control over the arrangement of work which along with the function of 
discipline have historically been contested areas between management and workers. 
Goodrich argues that these twin issues form the basis of what might be termed as the 
shifting mass of workplace rules and regulations which he refers to as ‘the frontier of 
control’ (1920: 61-62).     
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The type of workplace regulation exhibited by those workers within Delivery Office 1 in 
this instance bears resemblance to the category of organisational workgroup behaviour 
which Edwards identifies as extending beyond only the solidarity of the workgroup. Here 
worker customs, influence over manning levels and mobility of workers, along with the 
union’s legitimacy in vetoing proposed changes, are accepted as part of the structure of 
the situation (1988: 196-197). Importantly, the affiliation of union efficacy to organic 
workgroup action highlights the continued presence within this workplace of a layer of 
union activists and militants upon who Darlington (2002: 98) argues effective workplace 
action depends. That said it should be borne in mind that, there remains limitations to 
such an approach. In particular, because job controls deployed by workers within this 
type of organisational model are dependent on action at the point of production they are 
vulnerable to managerial counter attacks (Edwards, 1988: 197). In the case of Royal Mail, 
this had in many of the organisation’s geographical regions, including that of Delivery 
Office 1, increasingly taken the form of a sustained managerial challenge at workplace 
level to many of the long-standing practices such as ‘job and knock’ (Lyddon, 2009) and 
worker restriction on workload. Within a number of neighbouring offices rudimentary 
and what appeared to be individual resistance to this had in some cases led, as the 
following Branch Official noted, to the suspension or dismissal of a number of workers: 
they (management) seem to be pursuing a zero-tolerance policy in the weaker 
workplaces, the objective seems to be if we suspend enough people then 
eventually everybody will be frightened of cutting off at their finish time and 
brining what’s not been delivered back (Branch Official 1). 
Whilst it was not immune to such initiatives, the domestic organisation within Delivery 
Office 1 was able to collectively mediate their impact upon existing practices. Much of 
management’s counter-offensive at shopfloor level had taken place in workplaces that 
had traditionally within the parameters of Delivery Office 1’s region and been seen as 
moderate with little history of independent workplace action. If a powerful and 
emboldened management faced here with quiescent labour forces were successfully able 
to shift the frontier of control (Brown, 1972: 56), this arguably did not take place in 
isolation. Integral to the new ways of working contained within the Business 
Transformation Agreement was the development, and deployment, of new types of 
159 
  
technology and machinery aligned to standardized work plans (BT Agreement 2010: 13). 
This had resulted in the introduction of more sophisticated methods of automated mail 
sortation which pre-sorted mail for delivery office prior to it being dispatched for delivery 
offices (see Beirne, 2013). As such workers now spent more time outdoors on delivery 
than in the workplace sorting mail for local deliveries. As the following interviewee points 
out: 
We still see each other in the morning when we are getting our walks ready and 
still have a good crack, but we don’t spend as much time together as we used to 
now some of the mail comes pre-sorted (OPG 3, Delivery Office 1). 
Although they had managed to veto many local efficiency-based schemes, the union in 
Delivery Office 1 were saddled to the nationally agreed introduction of these initiatives. 
Moreover, they were accompanied by news forms of workforce surveillance mechanisms 
which held implications for existing levels of effort bargain in Delivery Office 1. New 
software here, in particular, had broadened managerial scope to trace workers involved 
in the outdoor, and thus traditionally difficult to monitor, function of delivering mail. All 
walking staff now carried on their delivery rounds small hand held devices which were 
downloaded in the depot on the following morning.  This provided information such as 
the speed at which an individual was walking, how many times they stood still, the exact 
location of where they were and the exact time that they finished delivery. In doing so it 
could also ascertain if workers were involved in what was the reciprocal practice of as 
covering one another jobs. This entailed workers going home early while their colleagues 
from neighbouring delivery rounds split and delivered outstanding mails between them. 
Similarly, tracking devices installed in driver vehicles provided information such a vehicle 
speed, location, duration of stops and even the level of pressure that individuals applied 
to the vehicle’s breaks. In theory this could have detected the common use of vehicles by 
drivers, both in this workplace and the wider branch for shopping, carrying out ‘school 
runs’ and transporting household refuse-usually in works time. As Brown (1972: 58) 
notes, such technologies might be seen as species of managerial information and control 
systems which can be crucial in the hindrance of custom and practice like the type carried 
out by the workers within Delivery Office1. Again, the potential threat that this posed to 
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their working practices was recognised by almost all those interviewed. The following 
sums up how many felt about how the job had changed in recent times:  
One of the biggest changes is the technology that they use now. They can, if they 
want to, tell where you are and what time you finish just by looking on the 
computer (OPG 3, Delivery Office 1); and  
In the old days you didn’t have to really worry about anything. Once you were out 
on delivery you could do what you wanted to. OK, there was the Post Office Patrol 
Officer who would watch what went on. But he was one bloke covering the whole 
of the area and he only came out once in a blue moon (OPG 5, Delivery Office 1).  
It follows that data captured from these systems might be used to provide management, 
within an increasingly efficiency-driven climate, with substantial arguments relating to 
future reduction in staff headcount. In practice, however, management in Delivery Office 
1 had neither stopped informal time making nor sought to reduce staff numbers. Many of 
the workers here clearly still enjoyed reasonable levels of task autonomy and the 
opportunity to finish early, cover for the mates and misappropriate Royal Mail vehicles. 
Although this may, in many ways, have been due to the collective strength of an 
organised group of workers within this workplace, it must be considered within the 
overarching and potentially neutralising context of a modernisation agreement which 
saddled postal workers with a level of compliance in the on-going reduction in the overall 
numbers of employees (BT Agreement 2010: 3). Again, insight into the durability of 
custom and practice within such an environment is provided by Edwards’ (1988) study of 
patterns of conflict and accommodation. Of particular importance here is the 
contradictory nature of the capital-labour relation and the patterns of workplace order 
that this generates (ibid.: 188). 
According to Edwards (1988: 188-92), despite the basic antagonism between capital and 
labour regarding how a worker’s capacity to work is translated into actual effort there are 
elements of cooperation; workers rely on the firm for their livelihoods while employers 
through their managerial agents, need to seek their continued willingness to work. In 
practice, this involves a negotiation of order involving both struggle and accommodation 
between the two parties through a host of informal and sometimes managerially- 
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sanctioned working practices at the point of production. In the case of Delivery Office 1 
much of the continued existence of practices such as job and knock seemingly rested 
upon such a set of understandings and an accommodation between workers and 
management. On management’s part, there was no doubt a level of awareness that they 
were coordinators of a complex production operation in which the primary product is 
perishable, non-substitutable and, due to the nature of the mails network, susceptible to 
industrial action (Gall, 2003: 132-9). This made them potentially vulnerable to the 
possibility of sanctions from a workgroup which had a long and proven history of 
mobilization and effective workplace regulation. For the workers within Delivery Office 1, 
whilst they remained resistant to change, many had bitter first-hand experience of the 
consequences of a nationally-coordinated attack against what was perceived by Royal 
Mail as domestic union intransigence some years earlier.  
In many respects therefore it was in the interests of workers in Delivery Office 1 not to 
disrupt production to the point that might provoke action such as that deployed by Royal 
Mail in the past. On the other hand, local management risked potential damage to the 
delivery operation should they seek to challenge or undermine local practices amongst 
workers. However, while such customary ways of working here might as Edwards notes, 
have evolved out of historical relations between the two parties, these very relations are 
dynamic with customs themselves having to be both developed and sustained (1988: 202, 
211). An insight into how this actually played out at shopfloor level in this workplace was 
provided by the following interviewees. This highlights the ways in which socially 
constructed expectations can shape the extent to which managerial objectives can be met 
(Edwards, 2010: 39):  
Management had been speaking to some people about finishing early and saying 
that they were making too much time and that they could come back and absorb 
extra work that was on overtime. Everybody for the next few days just slowed 
down and brought stuff back, management soon backed off (OPG 7, Delivery 
Office 1); and 
Management daren’t push it too much about work as they know everyone will just 
slow down, work till their time and just bring it all back. This is one of the reasons 
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why they don’t actually act upon any information that they might get from 
personal data trackers (Workplace Representative /OPG 14), Delivery Office 1).  
Such viewpoints notwithstanding, both the union and a majority of the workforce were in 
favour of working to ensure that mail was fully delivered since it served to reduce the 
prospect of unwanted attention from a cohort of senior management who had 
jurisdiction over the region. Whilst these were based a considerable distance away they 
had been perceived by reps and activists in both Delivery Office 1 and the wider region as 
‘aggressive’ and ‘unreasonable’ and also as ‘hatchet-men’. As Beirne (2013: 122-4) notes 
in his recent study of shifting boundaries and patterns of resistance within the Royal Mail, 
the authoritarian manner in which this grouping have attempted to drive through 
modernisation has led to feelings of insecurity and a concern with dilution of service 
amongst both workers and some lower level management. This suggests a disjunction 
between a stratum of higher management and those involved in the actual process of 
production at shopfloor itself- a disjunction which Brown argues is crucial in enabling the 
existence of customary practices (1972: 58) such as ‘job and knock’.  
Such a disparity in opinion and approach between regional and local management was 
evident in the form of informally high levels of ‘ghost’ overtime allocated to incentivise 
workers in completing the delivery of late mails. Whilst this may have arisen out of a 
collective unwillingness of workers to flexibly absorb this mail, it arguably reflected what 
Beirne (2013: 127) identifies as an alliance between some groups of worker and lower-
level management who were critical of the manner in which modernisation was being 
driven by those at executive level. Here then, in many ways because of the constraints 
placed on them by collective worker action, particularly in the form of output restriction, 
management, as Edwards notes, themselves played a key role in mediating external 
conditions (1988: 194).  
Levels of worker commitment to and identification with the CWU 
Viewed from Edwards’ (1988: 202) perspective, the arrangements surrounding the 
delivery of mails within Delivery Office1 is indicative of the nature of workplace relations 
within capitalist society in which workers and managers are mostly not engaged in active 
struggles but try to accommodate to the world as they find it. Although this may provide 
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fertile ground in some cases for the development of informally agreed ways of working, it 
must be borne in mind that that the decision making process within the Royal Mail as 
with most other areas of the public services (Kirkpatrick and Hoque, 2005: 114) remains 
highly centralised. As such localised workplace relations within the postal service during a 
time of on-going change exist within the wider context of senior managerial objectives 
that, in addition to a concern with increased efficiency, seek to usher in modernisation 
through cultural change amongst postal workers (Beirne, 2013: 120).  This study has 
earlier made reference to the raft of Employee Involvement schemes that this focus on 
culture change has given rise to within the Royal Mail and the threat that these might 
pose to union organisation and workgroup solidarity.  
Such initiatives were to some extent present within this workplace in the form of team-
briefing sessions and workplace newsletters. However, evidence suggests that the local 
union had actively played its part in ensuring that these had little success in increasing 
worker loyalty and commitment to the employer nor relinquishing ‘outmoded’ working 
practices (ibid.: 120). The workplace stewards here had successfully reconstituted team-
briefing session, which were increasingly being used in some offices as a method through 
which to strengthen managerial control vis-à-vis the CWU (Beale and Mustchin, 2013: 14) 
into a forum which promoted the role and views of the latter within the workplace. As 
one representative stated: 
We don’t allow management to brief anything that hasn’t been agreed with us 
first. We also have an input in the sessions and make sure that we get across all 
the things that the union has to say both locally and nationally (Workplace 
Representative Rep/OPG 15, Delivery Office 1). 
An indication as to the effectiveness of this in helping sustain the high levels of support 
that the union enjoyed within this workplace is gleaned from the following responses. 
These were typical of those interviewed in response to a question concerning where 
individuals felt that their loyalties within the workplace lay:        
My loyalties lie with the union first and my workmates as well but definitely not 
with management (OPG 4, Delivery Office 1); and 
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Where would I say that my loyalties lie within the workplace? Well first of all my 
mates and the union, I mean they’re the same thing aren’t they? (OPG 8, Delivery 
Office 1). 
Further evidence of the continued depth of support for the union was apparent in the 
belief by nearly all those interviewed in the efficacy of strike action as a means of 
defending and improving terms and conditions and the attendance of an after work 
meeting by approximately 70% of the workers where support for forthcoming industrial 
action was overwhelming. The level of organisation that this signified was echoed by the 
following branch official: 
One workplace that we can count on supporting a national strike is Delivery Office 
1. They’re always up for its (Branch Official 4).  
 It was during this period of impending strike action that Royal Mail deployed its strategy 
of writing to all individuals warning them as to the danger that this would visit on the 
industry whilst spelling out the benefits and indeed necessity of privatisation of the postal 
service. In a similar vein to the wider programme of employee involvement schemes 
deployed by Royal Mail this initiative can be viewed as a method through which 
employers might seek to counter-mobilise and delegitimise worker action (Kelly, 1998: 
35). Again, in the case of Delivery Office 1 this appeared to be less than effective with a 
majority of respondents giving credence to the arguments put forward by the union. 
There was a consensus that if anything, many workers were now even willing to strike 
and were angry at Royal Mail for ‘insulting their intelligence’ with ‘lies and propaganda’. 
Clearly then the domestic steward organisation within Delivery Office 1 was able to 
maintain both high levels of membership commitment whilst exercising considerable 
influence over many workers’ viewpoints towards Royal Mail and its modernisation 
programme. According to Batstone et al. (1977: 128-129), this situation is dependent to 
some degree upon the level of union centrality and the presence of opinion-leaders and 
leader stewards in the workplace. In particular, these groups play a major role in 
influencing the perspectives that members adopt and the likelihood of them applying 
collective means of achieving goals. Insight into the extent of union centrality within this 
workplace can be garnered from worker responses to the question of whom they would 
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first and foremost approach if a problem arose at work with all but one stating the union. 
The likelihood of this preference among workers was increased by the relatively high ratio 
of experienced representatives within the office all of who espoused strong union 
principles and collective values. Importantly, most had considerable scope to interact 
with what were key activists in work areas such as the canteen and rest room that were 
all but exclusive to workers. Such opportunities of sociability, in line with Batstone et al.’s 
study provided local representatives with access to a network of union-minded workplace 
opinion leaders which bolster the leadership role (1977: 110-1) and at the same time 
reaffirm the very values and norms which facilitate a greater centralisation of power 
(ibid.: 24, 53).  
Despite the strength of local workplace unionism within Delivery Office 1 membership 
levels had decreased from 100 per cent down to 85 per cent over the last few years. 
Findings also identified that, in contrast to the researcher’s considerable experience of 
this workplace, the emergence of a fracture in opinion towards the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of the workplace union. This involved a small, but nevertheless noteworthy 
minority of workers who remained detached from the wider collective and who had 
according to many interviewees formed a sub-group within the office. This minority was 
comprised of three broad categories of worker which have been termed here as ‘new 
starters’, ‘union-member individuals’ and ‘non-unionised individuals’. All ‘new starters’ 
were employed via agency or temporary contracts and were awaiting the opportunity for 
substantive employment. This was an area that the local CWU had been somewhat less 
successful in retaining its influence over. As recently as three years prior to this study all 
but two workers within this workplace were full time, indeed the two part-time workers 
in question were so by choice and were themselves employed substantively. Two 
attempts by management in 2004 and 2005 to introduce temporary staff had been 
thwarted with the threat of immediate strike action. As the following representatives 
pointed out, Royal Mail’s dominant narrative of ever greater efficiency in the face of ever 
greater competition and the experience of the local protracted strike had hamstrung their 
best efforts: 
The temps? They were an argument we just couldn’t win in this climate. I mean 
everywhere has got them, Royal Mail just don’t set on full time now. They’ve 
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waited here until people have left and replaced them with these (Workplace 
Representative /OPG 13, Delivery Office1); and 
After the strike people are wary about kicking off too much about temporary 
workers, the last thing any of us want is to be accused of bullying their own 
workmates (Workplace Representative /OPG 14), Delivery Office 1). 
The growing presence of this category of worker in Delivery Office 1, as with many other 
areas of the Royal Mail, was indicative of the increased casualisation of the wider public 
sector workforce (Worrall et al. 2009: 122). Many had not joined the local union and had 
never been in a union; most had also previously worked in non-unionised workplaces. Not 
only are such peripheral workers difficult to unionise, their contractual vulnerability-as 
was the case in this workplace- renders them susceptible to managerial attempts to 
secure intra-workplace cooperation (Heery and Abbot; 2000: 155; Drago, 1996: 540). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, many ‘new starters’ worked over without being paid, began work 
before their official start time and worked through their breaks. This meant that they 
were highly unlikely to enter the canteen or rest room areas during official and unofficial 
breaks. Furthermore, most new starters did not as a rule, attend union meetings.    
In line with the ‘new starters’ many within the union-member individual category whilst 
being union members did not attend union meetings. Indeed, a common feature amongst 
this group was a critical attitude toward the local union in terms of policy, direction and in 
particular, their role in a drawn out and bitter dispute within the office a few years 
earlier. For many ‘union-member individuals’, the local union’s main core of activists were 
the residue of the previously too militant regime which had in their opinion stopped 
members earning money, struck over the slightest thing and had exercised too much 
control. This apparent lack of commitment towards and identification with the local union 
was also evident in the manner in which those within this group tended to approach 
management with regard to workplace problems rather than the local union. Similarly, 
those within the non-union individual category also looked to management rather than 
the union to sort out local problems and to arrive at individual agreements. As their label 
suggests, this group were non-union members, a few of which had been at the centre of 
the office’s dispute some years earlier and had, according to many of the wider collective, 
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played a key role in assisting Royal Mail in what was the sacking of the main body of the 
union. As was also the case with union-member individuals, non-union individuals did not 
attend union meetings and rarely visited the canteen and rest room areas during official 
and unofficial breaks. As the following indicates, crucially for many of those who formed 
the main collective within the workplace, both of these groups tended to play some part 
in helping socialise the ‘new starters’ in a manner which threatened the union-based 
solidarity of Delivery Office 1: 
…you can see them that are against the union get to the new starters when they 
start and you can hear what they’re saying like ‘look after yourselves’ and ‘don’t 
listen to the union they’ll get you the sack… those sorts of things (OPG 5, Delivery 
Office 1); and 
…well it’s like this, before they sacked the union lads, all those anti-union ones now 
who are filling the heads of the new starters with anti-union messages wouldn’t 
have dared open their mouths (OPG 7, Delivery Office 1). 
Finally, as this chapter will later discuss, both non-union and union-member individuals 
were more likely to carry out informal practices that were both individual and in 
contravention of union policy.  
Delivery Office 2 
Extent of union-centred formal and informal job controls 
In contrast to Delivery Office 1, the workers in Delivery Office 2 had long been viewed by 
their branch officials and members in other local workplaces as much more moderate and 
less union centred. The workplace union itself, whilst both reasonably visible and formally 
active in terms of opposing managerial change, had less influence over the day to day 
organisation of work. As a not infrequent visitor to this workplace the researcher had a 
good grasp of the local working practices. Here, up until the time of the BT Agreement 
2010, workers had tended to cover unstaffed deliveries for half of the monetary amount 
that they were prepared to do in Delivery Office 1. Management had traditionally 
controlled the distribution of overtime and also retained tight control over allocation of 
leave. That said there had been widely accepted demarcation lines around set duties for 
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each worker with work outside of these covered through overtime. The following 
interviewee is representative of the wider workplace opinion that the workload itself in 
this workplace had been such as to afford workers time for unofficial breaks and early 
finishes of up to two hours before official finish times:  
Things here have been pretty easy if I’m truthful, when I first started I couldn’t 
believe it. I’d finished by about 11.00 am and said to the driver who took me out 
on delivery what do I do now as I’ve still got 2 hours left to go? He just said to go 
home as that’s how things work here (OPG 9, Delivery Office 2). 
Unlike most other workplaces within the area, the new ‘Delivery Methods’ way of 
working had not been implemented within Delivery Office 2 at the time of fieldwork and 
by all accounts would be nowhere near ready within the near future. Here its introduction 
remained in a state of limbo which involved the toing and froing of proposals and 
arguments between the local CWU and Royal Mail’s management team. This appeared to 
be due to a number of different factors that were specific to the recent history of this 
workplace and its geographical setting. To begin with, despite union pressure, 
management had refused to recruit against a number of vacancies in the last two years or 
so which had led to an increasing workload for the workforce in this workplace. Under the 
agreed terms of the new way of working the eventual move to the new system would 
necessitate, on implementation, an actual increase in headcount rather than the much 
sought after reduction that was fundamental to the aims of Royal Mail (see Beirne, 2013). 
In this instance management were believed by the union to be ‘dragging their feet’. This 
was reflected in the following statement from one of the workplace representatives who 
was interviewed:  
We and management both know that if they do bring the changes in they will have 
to put more time in. This is why they are backing off and making excuses about 
bringing in change. We will probably be the last office in the country to go through 
change as it will cost them that much money (Workplace Representative /OPG 14, 
Delivery Office 2).  
Moreover, the nature of delivery work in many rural offices like Delivery Office 2 requires 
specialised knowledge of specific delivery points and routes that the automated planning 
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system within the ‘Delivery Methods’ implementation process did not possess. As the 
following interviewee points out, such a system could not possibly replicate the years of 
experience that many workers had here and their recourse to the various uncharted dirt 
tracks and ‘cut throughs’ that had made their life easier:  
The can sit there all they like and plan but when it comes to it we know loads of 
short cuts that they can’t possibly pick up on which knock about half an hour a 
day of the duties. If we did it to the book they’d have loads of undelivered mail 
coming back each day (OPG 9, Delivery Office 2). 
The possession of what are tacit skills by workers here highlights, what Sturdy et al. 
(1992: 4) note, as the limitations of direct management control which, in this instance, 
provided the local union with a strong line of counter- arguments for additional ‘man-
hours’. Finally, the incumbent office manager was viewed by all interviewees as a 
moderate who, unlike his recent predecessor, was unwilling to pursue an aggressive-style 
implementation of the agreement that might resurrect earlier poor industrial relations.  
If the union within Delivery Office 2 had managed up until this point to thwart the 
implementation of a new way of working that served to threaten the employment levels 
of its membership, it had perhaps been less effective in other areas. This was particularly 
the case in terms of Royal Mail’s wider objective of ushering in increased flexibility and 
efficiency amongst its staff. Management here had taken greater advantage than their 
colleagues in Delivery Office 1 of the opportunities for greater workforce flexibility that 
were laid out within the 2010 BT Agreement. Many workers, for example, now absorbed 
extra mail from unstaffed delivery rounds into their own workload on an almost daily 
basis. As the following pointed out, while neither workers nor their union had really 
challenged this collectively, it had to some extent pegged back their finishing times and 
eaten into some unofficial breaks that were taken while out on delivery itself:  
I don’t make any time anymore, the job has gotten harder than it used to be (OPG 
5, Delivery Office 2); and 
Some of us don’t make any time anymore in fact some of us even have to ‘cut off’ 
and bring stuff back every day (OPG 2, Delivery Office 2).  
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This is indicative of a number of critical accounts from commentators such as Leys (2001), 
Mooney and Law (2007) and Pollock (2004) of the effects of neo-liberal based public 
service modernisation on workers’ terms and conditions that have been identified by 
Bach and Kessler (2012:27). Overall, these accounts have generally been pessimistic 
emphasising the loss of autonomy and work intensification brought about by 
commercialisation and systems of performance management (ibid.: 27).  
Despite the reported increase in workload by many workers within Delivery Office 2, a 
number of those interviewed said that they still made time at the end of the job and still 
worked on a ‘job and knock’ basis. Unlike the case of Delivery Office 1, it would be 
difficult to argue that this rested upon on a wider set of union-centred collective control 
measures that included the threat of collective and negative workgroup sanctions. For 
example, interviewees stated that: 
I make at least an hour a day and I am always home for 12.30 every day. OK. This 
might mean us absorbing other work but most people just do it so they can get 
done and get home. The bosses know this but turn a blind eye and let us make 
time if we mop up and get everything done (OPG 7, Delivery Office 2);  
Not everyone makes time but that’s just how it is, some jobs are heavier than 
others. Its every man for himself in here (OPG 9, Delivery Office 2); and 
Lots of people still make loads of time here most days, everyone knows that 
including management but they’re not bothered as long as all the work is 
done’….’Some people don’t make much time but that’s just the luck of the draw 
(OPG 4, Delivery Office 2). 
If anything, many workers, by absorbing late and unstaffed mail at the daily behest of 
management, were hampering the CWU’s long term bargaining objectives of defending 
headcount and upgrading part time jobs into full time positions. That this was taking 
place on a tacitly agreed and individualised basis with management in which there were 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’, meant that it arguably further undermined the sense of common 
interest and perceived injustice amongst workgroups that Kelly views as a prerequisite for 
collective action (1998: 44).  
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In a similar vein to their managerial counterparts in Delivery Office 1 then, management 
in Delivery Office 2 were prepared to overlook informal finishing times. Again, there 
appeared to be little recourse by management to any of the new technology that might 
have identified early finishes, and the misappropriation of ‘down time’ by workers. 
However, in this instance it was conditional on all mail, including that which was over and 
above worker’s designated workload was delivered, despite in breach of the CWU’s 
interpretation of nationally agreed ways of working. This ‘hand’s off’ approach by 
management was in evidence throughout fieldwork, during which workers were largely 
left to organise their own work and the allocation of work that was over and above their 
own. This provided workers with some autonomy to socialise and engage in horseplay 
with colleagues the latter of which was at times encouraged by and indeed partially 
engaged in by management itself. Edward’s (1988) typology of different categories of 
workgroup behaviour again provides a useful lens for analysis here. Rather than the more 
organisational model displayed by those within Delivery office 1, workers in Delivery 
Office 2 undertook behaviour which was characteristic of a non-militant type of approach. 
Here, workers tend to be controlled less directly and are given autonomy but do not use 
their freedom to pursue objectives which might conflict with management. Discipline 
tends to not be overt and there is an emphasis on cooperation. In that it is structured into 
any employment relationship, conflict is still present, but under such circumstances tends 
to be individualised rather than collective (ibid.: 195).   
Edwards (1988: 201) offers insight into the stark contrast between Delivery Office 1 and 
the more individually-inclined workers in Delivery office 2 whose union, though formally 
active, had less influence over day to day issues. From this viewpoint, any understanding 
of patterns of relations in a given workplace requires attention to a cluster of internal and 
external influences and their interaction. In the case of Delivery Office 2 the following 
factors appeared to be particularly significant. Whilst it had identical market pressures to 
those of all offices within its region, it had like many isolated rural offices within the Royal 
Mail a history of moderation, quiescence and inactivity with regard to its union leadership 
(Gall, 2003: 144). As such the existing ideology of comparative indifference towards the 
union by some workers and the absence of a network of activists to help facilitate union 
centrality within this workplace reflected, in part, what Batstone et al. (1977: 11) refer to 
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as past actions of members of the domestic organisation. Furthermore, Delivery Office 2’s 
peripheral location in the mails network, as the following Branch Official noted made any 
threat by its workers of strike action as a source of bargaining leverage largely ineffectual: 
It’s not like in the bigger offices, OK, they don’t want people to go on strike but 
management are not as nervous in Delivery Office 2 as they are about immediate 
walk-outs in bigger offices where they cause major disruption. (Branch Official 3). 
Such circumstances rendered the union in this workplace less likely to be able to 
propagate a set of values and beliefs which would engender membership loyalty and 
allow it to achieve power and influence within the workplace (ibid.). 
Whilst both Edwards (1988: 202) and Batstone et al. (1977: 11) recognise the important 
influence of workplace histories upon patterns of workgroup behaviour, it should be 
borne in mind that workplace relations are dynamic and dialectic (Edwards, 1988: 202). 
As Berger and Luckman (1967, cited in Batstone et al., 1977: 11) argue, although they are 
shaped by and reflect past endeavours, workplace ideologies and institutions such as 
trade unions can be changed by present endeavours. The salience of this last point was 
brought sharply into focus by two events within Delivery Office 2 that both took place 
during the time at which fieldwork was being undertaken as well as one which had taken 
place a number of months earlier. The first of these involved an attempt by Royal Mail to 
re-deploy a previous manager who had been the subject of a series of complaints of 
bullying and harassment by a number of staff within this workplace. This was met with 
overt threats of immediate industrial action by workers should it be progressed by Royal 
Mail. As the following workers pointed out quite forcefully:  
If they bring (the manager in question) back in we’ll all be out. We’ve told them 
this and I don’t think they’ll push it (OPG 6, Delivery Office 2); and 
Everyone’s up for walking out if they bring him back, we won’t wait around for a 
ballot either (OPG 3, Delivery Office 2). 
Some days later, significantly on a Saturday morning, historically associated with early 
finishes, there followed a point-blank refusal by many workers to carry out what had 
become the almost standard practice of absorbing late and unstaffed mail. Not only did 
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Royal Mail acquiesce on both issues, crucially the local union representatives played a key 
role in articulating and justifying the arguments and viewpoints of the workforce.    
Due to his connections with the local branch, the researcher was aware of, and able to 
gain insight into, a third incident that involved the potential disciplining of a driver. Like 
their colleagues in Delivery Office 1, drivers in Delivery Office 2 had, for some time been 
allowed to take their vehicles home and return in them the next day. This was on a 
voluntary basis and enabled Royal Mail to effectively extend the delivery spans of drivers-
should mail be heavy, for no extra cost. The drivers themselves had the benefit of going 
home straight from their last delivery point saving on petrol, and sometimes travelling 
back time. This was based on the strict understanding that the vehicles could not be 
driven for private use.  The errant delivery driver had been caught shopping in his Royal 
Mail vehicle at the local supermarket by a manager from a neighbouring Delivery Office at 
around 7.30 in the evening. The offence if substantiated would, after initial investigation 
by local management, be passed to an area manager with the likely outcome of dismissal.  
Having become aware of this situation the local union representatives informally 
disseminated the information on to the shopfloor. Subsequently each driver in Delivery 
Office 2 the following day prematurely finished and drove their vehicles and any 
undelivered mails back to the workplace some 20 minutes before the end of duty time. 
All stated that they were, from now on, choosing to leave their vehicles at work. Given 
the high ratio of driving duties in this workplace, it meant that management here were 
faced with a loss of 20 minutes work per day from 25 drivers and a congested delivery 
yard which itself posed problems around health and safety. The following branch official 
captures the impact that that this had on management’s decision not to pursue the issue: 
We had a phone call from (the investigating manager in Delivery Office 1) asking 
us what to do and he said that he had wished that he’d never brought it up, he 
said that he could lose up to 40 hours per week and that the workplace yard with 
all the vans coming back and parking up at the same time was unsafe (Branch 
Official, 1).  
The immediacy of this action was, as Gall (2003: 184) notes, reflective of the tactics 
through which postal workers have dealt with what here was a perishable issue. In this 
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instance, this was that had the investigating manager gone through the normal agreed 
disciplinary procedures, the case would have been passed higher and the individual 
almost certainly would have been dismissed. In light of events, local management the 
next day said that they were prepared to overlook this incident and reissued ‘clearer, 
specific guidelines’ around non-use of vehicles for domestic purposes.   
It would of course be premature to regard these events as signifying the dawning of a 
shift within this workplace towards a more collective union-centred model of 
organisation. This is particularly so when considering that they took place within a wider 
climate of individualism. However, the significant part that they played in informally 
securing outcomes that were favourable to the workgroup does suggest the presence of 
at least some level of workplace influence and effectiveness on the part of the local 
union. For Batstone et al. (1977: 252), the success of the union in the decision-making 
process in such circumstances along with its ability to identify and the shape issues at 
stake constitute two aspects of what they identify as three interrelated dimensions of 
basic forms of power that unions might hold within the workplace.  
The danger of an over optimistic prognosis of the seemingly new found ability on behalf 
of the union to effectively regulate this workplace is apparent when considering the 
relative absence within Delivery Office 2 of Batstone et al’s third dimension power. This is 
the maintenance of a particular ideology and associated set of institutions which serve to 
support and legitimate particular patterns of behaviour (ibid.). From this viewpoint, the 
ability of local stewards to garner and furthermore maintain support for the above type of 
action is dependent upon their carrying out a leadership role based on the pursuit of 
union principles as part of wider network of stewards who serve to reaffirm these values 
(ibid.: 53). In that they played little part in the day to day regulation of workloads, that 
they were relatively isolated from the wider body of officials within their Branch, and that 
they lacked the infra-structure of a network of like-minded workplace opinion formers it 
would seem plausible to posit the following; that the two issues in question were viewed 
and subsequently addressed in terms of being particular stand-alone issues rather than 
through ideological reaffirmation and promotion of a collectively based union-centred 
model of workplace regulation on the part of the local stewards (ibid.). 
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Level of worker commitment to and identification with the CWU 
As was the case in Delivery Office 1 workers in Delivery Office 2 were themselves subject 
to newsletters and team briefing sessions. Thomas and Davies argue that such processes 
are fundamentally associated with wider public service restructuring which has involved 
the redefining of its workforce (2005: 684). However, whereas the potential threat that 
these types of Employee Involvement initiatives posed to union loyalty was recognised 
and met in the former of these workplaces with organised resistance on the part of the 
union, this was not the case with regard to Delivery Office 2. Here team briefs were held 
regularly during which the local manager would read out Royal Mail’s latest business 
objectives, the standards that were required of the workforce and in particular, given the 
wider climate, the dangers of taking part in forthcoming national industrial action. The 
process was overwhelmingly one-way with no real scope for input from workers or their 
representatives. After each session every worker present was expected to (and to a 
person did) sign a document to say that they had attended and were aware of what had 
been communicated throughout the brief. Evidence clearly indicates that in some 
workplaces these have been resurrected to subsequently substantiate dismissal 
proceedings (Beale and Mustchin, 2013: 12). This growing trend of a more punitive 
approach towards team briefing sessions adopted here by management has been 
recognised by Beale and Mustchin as a mechanism through which Royal Mail have 
attempted to whittle down their workforce in a period of on-going redundancies (2013: 
12). Unchecked by any organised resistance, it arguably further served in this workplace 
as a means through which management could control staff behaviour and crucially 
counter-mobilise the potential threat of a move towards a more collectively-centred 
pattern of behaviour on behalf of the local union leadership (Kelly, 1998: 35) and their 
members.  
Just how effective Employee Involvement schemes were in terms of realising their 
objectives of strengthening management at the expense of the union within workplace 2 
is difficult to gauge. For example, as the following responses suggest, compared to 
Delivery Office 1 there appeared to be considerably less commitment towards and 
identification with the CWU amongst the workgroup as a whole: 
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…you don’t see much of the union here they don’t really do much (OPG 8, Delivery 
Office 2); and 
The union, yes I’m a member but that’s about it, we don’t really get that involved 
here (OPG 4, Delivery Office 2). 
Yet, on the other hand, many of the same interviewees appeared to have little loyalty 
towards or identification with Royal Mail and the sweeping changes which it sought to 
implement. As the following indicates: 
Where do my loyalties lie? Not with Royal Mail that’s for sure, things just get 
worse, this modernisation thing is all about making things worse for us and taking 
things off us. (OPG 2 Delivery Office 2); and 
There’s been a real change of culture amongst management in recent times and 
its for the worst. OK (the office manager) is alright but he is told what to do from 
the ones above who are a nasty bunch of thugs (OPG 6, Delivery Office 2). 
What did seem clear was that Royal Mail’s attempt to convey via team briefings the case 
for impending privatisation and sweeping cuts as opposed to the CWU’s argument for 
national action to defend the effects of this was making some headway amongst workers 
here. Although a well-attended gate meeting was held by the Branch to mobilise support 
for national strike action, a number of senior Branch Officials had been made aware 
informally that quite a few workers in Delivery Office 2 were intent on crossing picket 
lines should strike action take place. This antipathy on the part of some workers towards 
the union’s call for collective action in this workplace was confirmed during this study’s 
period of fieldwork.   
Despite any antipathy that may have existed towards union-centred action amongst some 
of its workforce, membership levels within Delivery Office 2 remained at what had over 
the last few years been the constant figure of around 90 per cent. This, was similar to 
levels in both Delivery Office 1 and the wider Branch itself, compares favourably to the 
situation within the wider public services where on-going decline has seen overall 
membership density fall in recent times to around 57 per cent from 84 per cent in 1980 
(Bach and Kessler, 2012: 145-6). Most non-unionised workers, except for one employee in 
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this workplace could be categorised as recently employed temporary staff. The union had 
tried to limit the introduction of these with some success but had, like their colleagues in 
Delivery Office 1 been forced to concede some ground. Again, most of these had 
previously been employed in non-unionised service sector and retail areas of the 
economy. Since they were awaiting the opportunity for a substantive job offer, these 
workers tended to unquestionably work over and above the normal workloads of 
substantive workers. As the following interviewees pointed out, such a situation 
additionally helped to undermine traditional areas of demarcation that had for 
management been, even in the relatively quiescent environment of Delivery Office 2, off-
limits: 
The thing is, I’ve seen management ask people to do extra and when they’ve said 
no then management have turned around and said, well [the temporary worker] 
managed to do it easily last week so you should have no problem (OPG 2, Delivery 
Office 2); and 
It makes it difficult for us when management get a new starter to do something 
that’s over and above. If we try to argue they’ll say that the temp who has less 
experience can do it so there should be no problem. (Workplace 
Representative/OPG 14, Delivery Office 2). 
In contrast to Delivery Office 1, the fieldwork research found no presence of an organised 
and articulated opposition to the CWU within this workplace that might have dissuaded 
these workers from joining the union whilst moreover serving to factionalise the wider 
workgroup as a whole.   
There is a danger that too narrow an interpretation of the evidence gleaned from Delivery 
office 2 might lead to an overly critical and somewhat simplistic picture of a domestic 
union that was constrained through long-standing organisational patterns of behaviour in 
bringing about commitment to union centred goals amongst its membership. Any 
evaluation of worker commitment to the union here must again be contextualised within 
a wider analysis of a cluster of influences related to this workplace and crucially, as 
Edwards (1988: 201) argues, the way that these influences interact. What is particularly 
important in this instance is the role played by management in encouraging a particular 
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type of working practice, the manner in which workers embraced this and its effect upon 
the union’s attempts to build effective workplace organisation. As has been noted, 
workers within workplace 2 were overwhelmingly subscribed to a union which many 
seemed largely indifferent towards. Furthermore, whilst many workers were prepared to 
err on the side of managerial arguments which sought to negate the union’s national call 
for strike action to defend worsening terms and conditions, they had demonstrated 
willingness, on two occasions during fieldwork, to oppose initiatives which threatened 
their immediate work situation. This animosity towards the employer was at times made 
quite clear amongst many of those interviewed.  
The co-existence of both radical and unitary outlooks amongst workers here is indicative 
of what Batstone et al. (1977: 248) refer to as the essentially complex and ambivalent 
nature of worker attitudes. This again calls for a consideration of the ideological 
dimension of union power through which stewards, by emphasising one element against 
another, can influence member consciousness. However, it will be recalled that workers 
never really interacted outside of their immediate labour process, even opting to take 
meal breaks, if at all, at their work stations. Since this took place under the often benign 
but nevertheless watchful gaze of management it provided little opportunity for local 
representatives to bring about the more union-centred aspect of worker consciousness 
amongst their members within this workplace that would bolster organisation. As this 
chapter will move on to discuss, the lack of independent social interaction exhibited by 
the workers within this workplace was intrinsic to an informal and more individualised set 
of working practices that, in a similar vein to where they existed in Delivery Office 1, 
contravened union policy.         
Mail Centre 1 
Extent of union-centred formal and informal job controls 
As with their counterparts in Royal Mail’s network of delivery offices, workers employed 
in the organisation’s Mail Centres were themselves subject to the terms of the BT 
Agreement 2010. It will be recalled that this committed local work units and, in particular, 
their representatives to engage in a Royal Mail change programme (Beirne, 2013: 123) 
that for the employer sought to establish ‘one lean modern business with the right 
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amount of people’. In the case of Mail Centre 1 this was the latest in a succession of 
similar initiatives in which the union had been fully involved, as one interviewees noted:   
The good thing about here is that the union are always fully involved in any 
changes. We joke that (a local representative) who is virtually on full release to 
deal with management’s proposals, hasn’t done any proper work for about three 
years as they’ve constantly been negotiating with management over changes 
(OPG 3, Mail Centre 1).  
Indeed, during fieldwork it became apparent that the local union had maintained its 
traditionally high degree of institutional centrality (Batstone et al. 1977: 10) within the 
workplace. The researcher had previous knowledge of this workplace that had been 
gained during his time as an official. It was, even by Royal Mail’s standards, well organised 
and had consistently produced the highest returns in the country with regard to both 
local and national elections. While worker-manager relations had historically been 
cordial, traditionally there had been strict demarcations around jobs and the movement 
of workers. Workers stuck to their jobs and all change with any movement being agreed 
by the union.  Workers here in the past had sometimes finished up to thirty minutes early 
per night. The union had however, largely due to occasional recruitment problems, been 
more accepting than other areas with regard to part time working. However, this had 
been predicated on agreed levels of substantive rather than temporary contracts. Many 
workers and nearly all union representatives and officials had transferred here from a 
previous now defunct Royal Mail processing centre.   
 At the time of research, there were at all times at least four members of the local 
organisation who were fully released from their operational duties to carry out 
negotiations and representations over a wide range of issues such as health and safety, 
duty and overtime allocation and general day-to-day industrial relations matters. In terms 
of the BT 2010 negotiations themselves, the union had managed to secure an outcome in 
which only a handful of jobs were lost through the medium of voluntary redundancy. The 
extent of their organisational presence within the Mail Centre is reflected in the following 
statements: 
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We try to make sure that we negotiate over as many issues as possible. Any 
potential changes to jobs, any new ways of working, overtime levels, manning 
levels, most things really. It helps that we have a lot of experienced reps and 
members on the ground who will flag up issues that we can jump on (branch 
official, Mail centre 1).   
This depth of involvement in the regulation and organisation of work by the local CWU is 
indicative of the entrenched nature of workplace unionism within the Royal Mail (Beale 
and Mustchin, 2013: 16). An example of the way that this was transposed into everyday 
shopfloor life was to be found in the way that unforeseen overtime for absence or 
increased mail traffic was allocated. Here, it had been a long-standing practice that all 
overtime that was unforeseen was advertised on a whiteboard in the collections office. It 
was filled on a first come first served basis, on the understanding that once an individual 
had put their name against a certain allocation, then they would be debarred from taking 
on more until other people had had such opportunity. Such was their sphere of influence 
any disputes between prospective volunteers were sorted out through the local union 
rather than management.  This type of control mechanism is a common feature within 
many Royal Mail workplaces including what was the parent of ice of the author. When 
applied to holiday and job allocation, these enhance postal worker collectivity while 
guarding against management favouritism (Gall, 2003: 29).    
In Mail Centre 1 union consciousness was reinforced by the permanent on-site presence 
of the Branch Office and its officials, most of who were employed in this workplace. As 
Gall (2003: 147) notes, the Royal Mail branch leaderships, because they contain the most 
active that have access to information (from management) and ideas (from their own 
experience), are key in both determining whether branches themselves are active or 
inactive whilst additionally serving to validate action and frame issues. Although he goes 
on to argue that this indicates the relatively low levels of involvement and consciousness 
of workers within the organisation (ibid.), the following should be considered; the 
presence of what were an active cohort of Branch Officials in Mail Centre 1 who were 
prepared to seek negotiations on every issue, provided the union with considerable scope 
to access social networks of workers. Such a situation would allow, what in this instance, 
were a union-minded group of local officials to offer definitions of work and society which 
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would promote strong union-based principles and workgroup consciousness (Batstone et 
al., 1977: 110, 248).  
For Batstone et al. (1977: 10) such centrality on the part of the union might enable it to 
strengthen workplace controls through the development of a predominant and 
favourable set of values, beliefs and institutional procedures. It should however, be borne 
in mind that workplace relations are dynamic and, as Edwards (1988: 194) notes, subject 
to tension and movement. In particular, a change in economic, political or commercial 
circumstances can provide impetus for managerial challenges to what have sometimes 
been long-standing and jointly-accepted patterns of behaviour and areas of worker 
influence. Thompson and Bannon (1985) provide the example of a rapid disappearance of 
job controls within an electronics factory during a period of rationalisation and 
competition thus identifying the shopfloor itself as a key locale for the contestation of 
work regulation between management and organised workgroups. Significant on-going 
economic and commercial change within the Royal Mail had, in the case of Mail Centre 1, 
more recently given rise to a period of such shopfloor challenges which in many ways 
mirrored the employer offensive which had occurred in the Region in which this study’s 
Delivery Offices were situated. Although this had at the time of fieldwork to some extent 
abated, it was for many respondents within this workplace symptomatic of a shift, albeit 
coordinated from above, to a more hard-line approach by management. As the following 
interviewees note: 
There’d been a real change in management’s approach recently, they had started 
to try and challenge everything we do its obviously coming from above (Workplace 
representative /OPG 12, Mail Centre 1); and 
They’d been trying to clamp down on all sorts of things, watching you more closely 
and challenging things that they never used to challenge (OPG 7, Mail Centre 1). 
What perhaps served to heighten the sensitivities of these workers was the nature of the 
job itself which differed considerably to that of their delivery office colleagues especially 
in terms of its technical organisation. Edwards (1988: 199) notes that technology and in 
particular the manner in which management might socially align workers to systems of 
production as a possible determinant of workgroup bargaining behaviour. From this 
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viewpoint, although workers might often be capable of exerting influence on the conduct 
of work, they enter a terrain whose contours have already been shaped by managerial 
decisions such as plant layout (ibid.: 194)    
In comparison to their counterparts in the organisation’s delivery office network, both 
indoor processing staff and distribution staff that together made up the workforce in Mail 
Centre 1 spent, as do workers in all other Mail Centres, significant amounts of their time 
in close proximity to management. Indeed, while the latter intermittently drove and 
collected external mail that they helped to process on the shopfloor, processing staff-at 
least in theory, spent their entire working day on the shopfloor. Jenkins et al. (2002: 88-
98) have identified new Royal Mail settings like Mail Centre 1 as constituting laboratories 
in which Royal Mail have pursued the development and deployment of a plethora of 
HRM-style managerial practices which focus on increased workforce flexibility and the 
eradication of traditional forms of task allocation and regulation. Located in ‘greenfield 
sites’ these workplaces resemble people-less offices in which workers who are physically 
separated by large pieces of equipment, have expressed feelings of increased job 
insecurity, a loss of occupational identity and decreasing levels of sociability (ibid.: 98). 
Those respondents who had relocated to Mail Centre 1 from the old mail processing 
centre which it had replaced put forward viewpoints that supported these observations 
and highlighted the increased scope for managerial control that this move had brought 
with it:  
This place is a lot different than the old workplace, we all worked close to each 
other and everybody could have as great laugh. Management didn’t know who 
was doing what job and where anyone was supposed to be. That is one of the 
biggest changes in the job (OPG 4, Mail Centre 1); and 
The trouble is now they can see what you’re doing all the time, everything’s on one 
level. The old workplace was great for just finding somewhere to talk with your 
mates and keep out of the way. We’d talk about union stuff and have unofficial 
meetings and things (workplace rep/OPG 11, Mail Centre 1).  
More recently management in this workplace had taken down a dividing wall which many 
workers had regarded as an attempt to increase surveillance over a work area that was 
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up until that point difficult to monitor. This took place within the wider context of the on-
going deployment by Royal Mail of increasingly sophisticated means of surveillance in its 
Mail Centres. These included swipe-card access, satellite vehicle tracking and number 
plate recognition systems. Swipe cards provided management with the precise times that 
each worker entered and left the building and held obvious negative implications for the 
informal practice of arriving late and leaving early on the part of some workers. Satellite 
vehicle tracking, as was the case in Delivery Office 1 and 2 provided management with 
comprehensive information of driver whereabouts and finish times. The vehicle 
recognition system in this workplace again, provided management with details of when 
staff’s personal vehicles arrived and left the mail centre premises. Such initiatives of 
course potentially held implications for the ways in which workers had tried to adjust 
formal measures of the effort bargain in this workplace. These had in Mail centre 1, 
involved some individuals, leaving significantly early and arriving for work late and, 
particularly for those not ‘tied to’ mail sorting machines, covering for one another’s 
absence from the workplace.   
The drivers in Mail Centre 1 were also subject to potential closer technological scrutiny by 
way of a new model of barcode scanning device which drivers carried on collection and 
were obliged to activate at every mail collection point that they visited. These again 
provided management with a clear picture of the times at which drivers collected mail 
down to the last second. The data that this process generated was scrutinized daily by 
regional management and can be viewed as the latest in a long line of TQM mechanisms 
(Jenkins et al., 2000) that have intensified as Royal Mails exposure to competition has 
grown.  While such arrangements had been in place for some time, workers had, with 
previous models, been able to forward their digital timing devices and effectively scan 
early before subsequently resetting them. In doing so, drivers were able to make time at 
the end of, and during their shift without drawing attention from management. What is 
more, they could cover each other’s rounds by doubling up on their colleague’s collection 
routes, and further covering unstaffed collection routes in their existing duty times whilst 
claiming overtime.  
The latest systems were now set and locked by management themselves which, along 
with a more advanced timing and scanning mechanism, rendered them seemingly 
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incorruptible and highly reliable.  Not only did this scupper the above practice, it served 
to thwart an important source of what Flanders (1965) refers to as cut price industrial 
action through which drivers periodically kept management in check. In the author’s 
parent office, this was widely referred to as the scanner strike. It involved all drivers, 
deliberately not scanning three of the barcodes from their collection points.  The drivers 
would to a person, put this down to their faulty scanner which, though management 
knew otherwise, was, up until now, plausible.  This would significantly skew the 
performance figures of the office and bring unwanted attention from a regional 
management that were hyper sensitive to dips in such performance indicators. In such 
circumstances, local management would usually withdraw from the initiative that this 
had given rise to.   
As Rosen and Baroudi (1992: 215) note, because technology has tended to be developed 
for management, it has frequently enabled the social relations and structuring of work in 
a way which increases managerial control over the labour process. As the following 
suggests, many respondents in this workplace, in addition to feeling more physically 
scrutinized, tended to associate the Mail Centre environment as one in which personal 
discretion was increasingly ceded to ever more sophisticated and omnipresent methods 
of production and workforce monitoring:     
The biggest change is the technology, they can tell what time you come on shift 
and when you leave, where you go when you’re at work and what time’ (OPG 5, 
Mail Centre 1); and 
As a driver, the biggest problem is the changes in technology, they know what 
time you arrive at a certain place and what time you leave, how long you spend in 
the traffic and even how fast you’re going and how many times you stop’ (OPG 7, 
Mail Centre 1).   
Nevertheless, in spite of this, union-centred job-controls remained very much in evidence 
within Mail Centre 1. In particular, workers employed in both processing and distribution 
functions were still able to operate long-standing practices such as ‘job and finish’ and 
collective unofficial rest periods. They had also managed to retain reasonable levels of 
demarcation in terms of tasks performed. Whilst these had been challenged by 
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management during what had recently been a period of considerable conflict, they had 
been met with strong and organised worker opposition. This initially took the form of 
outright refusals to deviate from everyday tasks followed by union intervention from 
what were a highly visible and accessible cadre of local reps. The following responses 
capture the thoughts of many respondents: 
Management kept trying to shift us round but we said no, when they tried again 
we just kept calling the union in, you can always get hold of a rep (OPG 5, Mail 
Centre 1);    
If management asked us to do something that was over and above what we 
usually do we’d just say ‘no’ and stop work until the union intervened’ (OPG 4, 
Mail Centre 1); and 
When they started trying to tell us what to do we really got stuck into them (OPG 
2, Mail Centre 1). 
Management’s proposals to tighten their control over late start times on the part of some 
workers by recourse to data generated gathered from swipe cards was also (despite a 
rear-guard action on the part of the union itself) given short shrift. The following 
interviewee alludes to a tactic that had also been used in Delivery Office 1: 
They tried to clamp down on start times and said that they were going to start 
disciplining people who came late or left early over ten minutes a month. We let 
them know through the union, that if they did that we’d have a line up every day 
(OPG 10, Mail Centre 1). 
The researcher was familiar with, and had once witnessed, a ‘line up’ in Delivery Office 1 
in response to management attempts to clamp down on start times. This entailed all the 
workplace’s 100 workers meeting en masse outside of the workplace five minutes before 
duty. From here the workers entered the building and queued up in single file by the 
designated signing on desk and sheet. At the stroke of 6.00 am, the official start time in 
that office, the first worker in the que painstakingly checked their wristwatch and signed 
on. They then passed their pen on to the next person who did the same. This process 
continued down to the last person in the line. By this time over 25 minutes had elapsed 
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and many people had of course started late. An exasperated management quickly 
withdrew from their position.  
In Mail Centre 1 then managerial attempts to make inroads into task autonomy and what 
had been some flexibility around start times was constrained by a combination of organic 
membership action and formal union intervention. This highlights what Darlington 
identifies as the crucial role played by rank and file workers in establishing counter-
control measures within the workplace through the mechanism of spontaneous and 
informal action (1994: 19-20). In the case of many workers within Mail Centre 1, long-
established patterns and meanings of behaviour carried over from the previous site from 
where many had transferred arguably acted as a well-spring from which to draw upon 
aggressive shopfloor tactics (Hyman, 1975: 154)    
In terms of Edwards’ typology of work groups and modes of bargaining behaviour, 
workers in Mail Centre 1 certainly conformed to that group which were deemed able to 
exert considerable collective influence over things such as manning levels, the division of 
tasks, allocation of overtime and influence over the application of discipline (1988: 196). 
However, the application of discipline itself along with the related issue of absenteeism 
had, in line with the generally tougher stance that management for a period adopted 
within this workplace, begun to take on a more punitive and managerial-determined 
complexion within this workplace. This took the form of a zero-tolerance approach 
towards minor misdemeanours and absenteeism that had previously been considered by 
both parties to be the norm, and the de-facto removal of union influence over conduct 
procedures. For Goodrich (1920: 61-62) the issue of discipline, and management’s right to 
apply it, is intrinsic to the wider struggle in which they and workers strive for control 
within the workplace the frontier of which must be viewed as being shifting and dynamic. 
Management’s attempts within Mail Centre 1 to challenge and make inroads into 
previously acceptable standards of worker conduct threatened both what was for 
workers the customary legitimacy (Brown, 1972: 55) of long-standing and established 
patterns of behaviour and an important mechanism through which their representatives 
could keep management in check.  
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In response to this initiative, the workforce within Mail Centre 1 had shortly before the 
start of fieldwork taken unofficial action in the form of a workplace sit-in which had lasted 
for a number of hours. Gall (2010: 112) notes that this has been a tactic through which 
postal workers have over the last few years sought to resist both the victimisation of 
workers and unilateral action on the behalf of management. Its effectiveness in terms of a 
tactic through which workers were able to collectively repel the recent wave of aggressive 
managerialism was recognised by many respondents: 
It was great, management have really backed off they weren’t expecting it, it was 
straight out of the blue as far as they were concerned (Workplace Representative 
/OPG 14, Mail Centre 1); 
They’ve stopped trying to bully people now; they had it coming to them (OPG 12, 
Mail Centre 1); and 
There’s a real difference in the way that they are with you since the sit-in. All the 
reps have noticed it. It had got to the point where they were issuing warnings over 
anything and not listening to anything we said. That’s changed now and they are 
reluctant to issue anything in case there’s more trouble (Workplace 
Representative/OPG 12, Mail Centre 1). 
The action itself like most unofficial strikes within the Royal Mail was organised and 
premeditated (Gall, 2003: 168) in that it was tacitly endorsed by the local union and 
promoted and called for by local shopfloor activists. Since it again resulted in 
management retreating from their occupation of a key area of established worker 
influence, it was indicative of the dialectic and continuous way in which understandings 
and accommodations are generated within the context of the shopfloor (Edwards, 1988: 
202). Moreover, it highlighted that the institutional centrality of the local union was such 
that it enabled both reps and activists to mobilize bias (Batstone et al., 1978: 32) in favour 
of both an unofficial stoppage and what earlier had amounted to other collective 
sanctions. 
Although the union had played a significant part in thwarting what was a wave of 
managerial unilateralism that had been co-ordinated from an executive level, there was 
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clear evidence that some workers within Mail Centre 1 at times took action that was both 
collective and what Darlington (1994: 19) terms as organised and independent. An 
example of this was to be found amongst a group of drivers who spent certain periods of 
their day sorting bags of mail in to different regional postcodes for dispatch. Here the 
deeply sensitive issue of over-zealous managerial surveillance had not only evoked such 
action but furthermore provided impetus for the development of a mechanism through 
which workers could influence the effort-bargain through what Edwards (2010: 39) 
defines as tacit disobedience. Thus, the following respondents note: 
They used to watch us all the time and try to make us work harder but we just all 
stopped work, they kept telling us to start again but we’d argue with them until 
they stopped. Then we’d work again. They realised after a while that they were 
wasting more man hours by watching us than just leaving us alone to get on with 
it (OPG 5, Mail Centre 1);     
Management can see where you are in this workplace but they don’t really bother 
us when we’re sorting because we’ll just slow right down or stop. This way we 
manage to get unofficial breaks as we can cover for each other (OPG 7, Mail 
Centre 1). 
Workers then were able to stem managerial control and moreover establish a customary 
system of output restriction which enabled them to periodically gain unofficial leisure 
time throughout the working day. For Edwards (1988: 191) group fiddles such as this can 
often be more developed than those which involve individual workers and, as the 
workgroup in question had demonstrated, can sustain rules and customs that 
institutionalise a system of secondary adjustment. Whilst it may have originated out of 
independent worker action, this practice unlike workplaces with little collective 
organisation, was sustained in part by the prospect of collective support for anyone 
penalised (ibid.). Since as has been indicated above, this could ultimately involve the 
intervention of local workplace reps whom Flanders refers to as the principal guardians of 
custom and practice (cited in Brown, 1972: 59), the action itself can be regarded as not 
just collective but also union-centred.       
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Finally, while this workgroup’s customary right to regulate this aspect of their labour 
process had arisen out of an essentially conflictual situation between themselves and 
management, forms of secondary adjustment like this contain elements of cooperation 
with production as well as restriction (Edwards, 1988: 190). Workers here were keen to 
complete the sortation of mail bags as quickly as possible to gain free time between this 
and their scheduled outdoor driving tasks which followed. This often involved working at 
a pace which was above that which was considered the norm during which there were 
often breaches to local health and safety standards. As Edwards (1988: 192-3) notes, 
management have often tolerated and at times encouraged fiddles since they have 
provided benefits including getting the job done more quickly. In a similar vein to Delivery 
Offices 1 and 2 this appeared to be the case in Mail Centre 1. Here the rapid processing of 
mail and subsequent period of ‘downtime’ provided breathing space in which 
management could prepare for any unforeseen spikes in mail traffic whilst enabling them 
to meet strictly monitored targets and timescales. That the managerial benefits of these 
particular arrangements emerged only after a period of significant contestation within 
this workplace again serves to highlight the complex and contradictory interrelationship 
between conflict and consent within the workplace.  
Level of worker commitment to and identification with the CWU 
Worker agency within Mail Centre 1 then had proved relatively effective in mediating the 
structural pressures of product market liberalisation and the subsequent increase in 
managerial challenges to working practices. Much of this managerial action, which 
appeared to be driven by a stratum of senior executives acting on regionally coordinated 
directives, may be seen as bureaucratic and visibly based on mechanisms that sought to 
enable control of the labour process.  However, like their colleagues in the Delivery 
Offices, workers here were additionally subject to more unobtrusive forms of control such 
as team briefings and newsletters. While the former of these took place on a weekly 
basis, the latter were displayed on notice boards and distributed both in the workplace 
and to workers’ home addresses. Rosen and Baroudi (1992: 217) term these as ideational 
control initiatives in that they are concerned with the control of workers’ beliefs, value, 
attitudes and their underlying rationality as a means of bringing about behaviour which 
will result in suitable levels of output. Put another way, these might be seen as 
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mechanisms which, in addition to the generic features of capitalism such as the system of 
wage labour, the subordination of the worker to the labour process and the mystifying 
effects of the market, serve to realise for management what is distinctive about the 
capitalist labour process: the simultaneous obscuring and securing of surplus labour 
(Burawoy, 1979: 193)      
Again, as with Delivery Office 1, there appeared to be little evidence to suggest that these 
initiatives had brought about an increase in either greater output or commitment to 
Royal Mail as an organisation amongst these workers. The following respondents when 
asked whether they thought that workers needed to be more flexible in terms of their 
working practices in order that the organisation could progress capture the views of the 
majority of interviewees:  
We have changed enough, it’s a con they just feed us all this rubbish so that they 
can get us ready to be sold off. Nobody believes that there’s any benefit in it for us 
(OPG 5, Mail Centre 1); and 
Everybody knows that what they come out with is just lies and rubbish. It’s the 
people at the top who ought to change. They are just here to run it down and 
strengthen the case for us to be sold off (OPG 4, Mail Centre 1).  
Management’s inability in this instance to appeal to what this study has earlier identified 
as the more unitary element of worker consciousness (Batstone et al., 1977: 24) was due 
in no small part to the role of the local union. In particular, workplace reps were able to 
use team briefing sessions as platforms from which to communicate union objectives 
while at the same time criticising management policy. In addition to this, the branch itself 
sought to negate the effectiveness of employer communications through well attended 
on-site meetings and additionally with their own regularly published briefings which were 
distributed in the workplace by local stewards. The latter contained information on CWU 
national policy, counter-arguments with regard to the benefits of privatisation of the 
industry, and up-dates on events at workplace level. Again, the union were able to utilise 
these processes to promote a definition of interests amongst workers which differed from 
that put forward by management. The sources of what, here, are social beliefs calls for a 
consideration of ideology which, according to Snow and Benford (1998), serves to frame 
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an event, issue or situation. The use of injustice or illegitimacy frames similar to those 
deployed by the local union in Mail Centre 1 are critical for collective organisation and 
action since they begin the process of detaching subordinate group members from loyalty 
to ruling groups (Kelly, 1998: 29).          
The cohort of shop stewards within Mail Centre 1 when viewed from the perspective put 
forward by Batstone et al. (1977) carried out what would be termed as a leadership role 
with regard to their union position. This meant that they were able to successfully shape 
issues which arose in the workplace whilst exercising, and moreover, imbuing amongst 
the wider workforce a commitment to union principles and the achievement of collective 
goals (ibid, 24 56). If the former of these points is apparent with regard to the manner in 
which they had influenced the outcomes of a period of shopfloor conflict, then the latter 
is evident in the following responses: 
Where do my loyalties lie within this workplace? Well first and foremost with the 
union (OPG 3, Mail Centre 1); and 
My loyalties in this place lie with the union and my mates, definitely not with Royal 
Mail and their managers (OPG 5, Mail Centre 1). 
While the efficacy of this action was intrinsically related to the on-site presence of the 
branch and the wider body of experienced stewards that this brought with it, it was again 
further affected by a cluster of other influences and their interaction in the workplace 
(Edwards, 1988: 201). Though the Mail Centre environment may have ushered in greater 
scope for workforce surveillance, on the other hand in the case of Mail Centre 1, it had 
served to reinforce a strong union-centred approach by the workplace representatives. In 
particular, the indoor nature of the job and proximity of time spent under the same roof 
meant that levels of peer group interaction and patterns of contact amongst the workers 
were such as to foster a collective orientation. This itself is associated with the greater 
propensity towards a leadership type role on behalf of the local stewards (Batstone et al., 
1977: 149, 152).   
Although certain structural situations might help to facilitate leadership amongst 
stewards they do not automatically bring this about. Whether or not leadership actually 
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occurs is dependent upon processes of negotiation (Batstone et al. 1977: 152) and the 
manner in which structural forces themselves are mediated within the workplace itself. In 
Mail Centre 1 scope for local representatives to promote a culture of union-centred 
collectivism had itself been significantly enhanced by three key factors. Firstly, 
management’s quest for ever-greater levels of productivity and headcount reduction 
meant that workers, at the behest of their union, were now more cautious in rushing to 
make time at the end of their shift. Secondly, the recent introduction of technologically 
advanced machinery that now sorted individual delivery rounds, meant that many 
workers, due to longer sorting sequences, made less time at the end of their shift and 
now spent more time than in the past together the Mail Centre itself. Thirdly, some 
workgroups were willingly prepared to independently defend and moreover build on 
long-standing informal arrangements. This not only gave opportunities for sociability and 
leisure time, it provided greater scope for union contact. Worker agency itself, therefore, 
played a key part in both tempering managerial aggression and strengthening union 
organisation amongst this workgroup. As Darlington (2002:95) notes, social structure and 
social action are intimately related with each continuously affecting the other in a 
dynamic fashion. Such arguments serve to caution against misconceptions of collective, 
union-based action and indeed strong level of identification with the union on behalf of 
workers as being the exclusive outcome of a top-down didactic process. 
Union membership levels within Mail Centre 1 were high and stood at around 85-90 
percent.  As Jenkins et al. (2002: 94-5) note, the shift to Mail Centre type environments 
has been associated with a significant increase in the use of part time employment and 
the development of a more casualised workplace. This was the case in Mail Centre 1 
where the union had lost some of its influence over the employer’s introduction of non-
standard contract holders. Again, it was evident that the union, while maintaining some 
control over the limits of such employment models, found the climate of ever greater 
liberalisation a difficult one in which to argue: 
We have had to accept an increase in temporary working, we don’t want to but 
what can we do? They won’t employ substantively against vacancies and if we 
don’t agree we could fail (as in not meet dispatch times) and we’ll be under 
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scrutiny to be the next office closed down (Workplace Representative /OPG 14, 
Mail Centre 1). 
Consequently, there was now an increasing minority of workers in this workplace who 
were temporary and awaiting substantive job offers. While some of these were non-
unionised, most had joined. Like their counterparts in Delivery Offices 1 and 2 many had 
previously worked in areas of the labour market such as retail in which trade unionism 
might be termed at best as being weak.  
Shop stewards in Mail Centre 1 were, since they presided over a much larger workforce, 
faced with disproportionately greater challenges than their colleagues in both of this 
study’s delivery offices. They had to attempt to recruit a disproportionately large category 
of employees who were less likely to join the union (Heery and Abbott, 2000: 155). In 
doing so they had to maintain a context in which to counteract what Burawoy (1979: 140-
4) refers to as the imported consciousness of a group of workers who had not been 
traditionally associated with or familiar with the notion of trade unionism.   
In terms of the last point, a final observation is worthy of note here since it reinforces 
Edwards’ argument that an explanation of patterns of relations within a given workplace 
requires attention to a cluster of influences and to their interaction (1988:201). As was 
the case with their substantive colleagues, temporary workers within Mail Centre 1 
largely looked first and foremost to the shopfloor representatives to resolve issues. 
Furthermore, as the following responses suggest they were less likely than temporary 
workers within both Delivery Offices 1 and 2 to be managerially coerced into working 
over and outside of what was considered to be their normal daily workload:  
Management have tried in the past to mess the temps about and shift them round 
and things. We have been made aware of this and have stepped in to stop it. 
(Branch Official, Mail Centre 1); and 
 We just do the same as the others. If management try to bully us or try and keep 
shifting us around and things we just refuse or get the union involved. (OPG 3, Mail 
Centre 1). 
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The institutional centrality of the union in this workplace undoubtedly helped local 
representatives to maintain influence over, and loyalty amongst, a type of workforce who 
due to the precarious nature of their employment have been deemed as being 
susceptible to ‘management by fear’ (Drago, 1996) and organisational whim (Kalleburg, 
2001: 481-2: Heery and Abbott, 2000: 155). This was further bolstered by what Edwards 
(1988: 199) refers to as the technical organisation of work which in this instance, despite 
on-going changes in production methods, still involved the interaction of large groups of 
workers in one large work area. In such an environment, temporary workers would feel 
less isolated than their Delivery Office counterparts and the union would be better 
available to deal with any managerial misdemeanours towards them. Finally, in that their 
entire working day involves socializing with the wider more experienced workgroup 
within the Mail Centre temporary workers in this workplace would have an earlier and 
much more comprehensive induction into what here were the specific union-based 
traditions of the workplace in comparison to those temporary staff within both Delivery 
Offices 1 and 2. 
Mail Centre 2 
Extent of union-centred formal and informal job controls 
All aspects of The BT Agreement 2010 had also been fully implemented in Mail Centre 2. 
As was the case in Mail Centre 1 its potential impact on the terms and conditions of the 
workforce had seemingly been mediated by a cluster of influences and their interaction 
(Edwards, 1988: 201). In sum it had resulted in a handful of voluntary redundancies which 
went to those who were approaching retirement age.  Again, one important factor was 
the embedded on-site presence of the well-organised local union and its representatives, 
a number of who were fully released from their everyday jobs to carry out their 
representative roles. Unlike Mail Centre 1, the representatives here were not officials of 
the Branch itself which was situated off-site and a considerable distance away.  
Mail Centre 2’s parent Branch covered a wide geographical area encompassing a number 
of other mail centres and stand-alone delivery offices. The three old mail centres that 
merged and moved into form Mail Centre 2 had all had a reputation for militancy. Each 
had taken significant amounts of unofficial and official strike action over what Gall (2003: 
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188) determines as substantive reasons such as victimisation of union reps, the ill-
treatment of colleagues and, increased pressures for flexible working. The issue of flexible 
working had been something that the Branch and its constituent Mail Centres that now 
made up Mail Centre 2 had in the past been particularly effective at staving off. Up until 
the merger, as the following interviewees note, job demarcation had been significant, 
allocation of overtime was controlled by the union and there had been successful 
unofficial action that had countered the introduction of temporary and part time staff: 
When we worked in the old office the union had complete control. When they 
tried to introduce casuals (part time and temporary staff) we just walked out, we 
were all full time permanent with everything that they couldn’t staff against 
covered on overtime (OPG 8, Mail Centre 2); and 
Nobody would ever be moved from what they were doing. The union would 
intervene and what was outside of your job would be covered on overtime or not 
get done (OPG 2, Mail centre 2). 
The reps in Mail Centre 2 were, as the above suggests, not integrated into the wider 
network of their higher ranking Branch Officers and full time officials- to the same extent 
as their colleagues in Mail Centre 1. As Batstone et al. (1977: 64, 252) note, such 
networks not only serve to promote the leadership role of local stewards, they also 
provide certain resources which bolster and steward power. These include up to date 
information of events, interpretations of events and recipes of action.  
Nevertheless, as the following responses point out, reps were involved in, and had 
influence over, a wide range of work-related issues up to and including those which 
potentially involved worker dismissal: 
I’d say that we are heavily involved in negotiating over most things that go on in 
the workplace, management never really try to change things without running it 
past us. (Workplace Representative /OPG 13, Mail Centre 2); and 
We’re involved in most things really. I mean, we have recently had on-going 
negotiations over the BT agreement, we deal with Health and Safety issues, 
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everyday issues and discipline and attendance.  (Workplace Representative/OPG 
14, Mail Centre 2). 
Additionally, the local union prided itself on the considerable influence that it had over 
staffing levels. That said they had given ground on the issue of temporary working since 
this workplace opened. Although they had been unable able to stem an influx of agency 
staff and temporary workers, the local union had managed to establish a local agreement 
which regulated the numbers of these. On this point, representatives had appeared to be 
considerably more successful in winning substantive contracts for agency staff in this 
workplace than those in all other workplaces. However, since they could be utilised more 
flexibly than substantive staff, such workers had, as the following interviewee suggests, 
reduced the union’s ability influence over overtime levels and annual leave: 
Where we used to have a say over exactly how many hours went on overtime, 
management sometimes now will say that they can resource some of the hours 
with a less than full time temp. It’s cheaper for a start as they don’t have to pay 
overtime rate (Workplace Representative/OPG 15, Mail Centre 2); and 
We still control annual leave but not to the extent that we used to do. Before we 
could go into the resourcing, which is covered by one of us anyway, and just get 
them to cover people at short notice with overtime. It’s different now, the 
resourcing bloke can only sanction it if there are the right amount of agency staff 
or temps to cover it for the flat rate (Workplace Representative/OPG 14, Mail 
Centre 2). 
That said, the method of advertising unforeseen overtime on a board with the union 
adjudicating over any disputes, free from management interference was still a recognised 
means of resourcing in this workplace.    
In terms of its relationship with management the union within Mail Centre 2 at the time 
of fieldwork can be said to have adopted a partnership style approach towards 
bargaining. Proponents of this model, as Heery (2002: 20) notes, regard unions as 
intermediary organisations that should cultivate the resources of employers in order to 
bolster institutional security and obtain fresh opportunities to recruit and retain 
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members. The focus here on social partnership, with its connotations for mutual gains 
and cooperation (Tailby and Winchester, 2000: 374), was reflected in much of the 
discourse of the local union’s senior officials:   
We try to be responsible and operate on a give and take basis. This is the best way 
to achieve things in the current climate. (Workplace representative/OPG 15, Mail 
Centre 2). 
Further evidence of this approach was to be found in the complete absence of industrial 
action within this workplace since it had been opened a few years earlier. Whilst this 
mirrored the espoused shift in approach of the national CWU in recent times (see BT 
Agreement 2010), it differed at a local level from the more conflictual nature of relations 
within both Mail Centre 1 and Delivery Office 1 in the main, and at times Delivery Office 2 
-all of which it will be recalled came under the same nationally agreed terms and 
conditions relating to one single employer. Moreover, it differed considerably from the 
approach of the wider Branch within which Mail Centre 2 was located that had a long 
history of workplace militancy. As Batstone et al. (1977: 11) note, as institutions, domestic 
union organisations can be important sources of power that foster particular views of the 
workplace and behaviour. Changes in these patterns of influence may occur through 
either a turnover in key personnel or as the result of a host of other political, legal or 
social factors (ibid.: 5). In this workplace the nucleus of local reps had spent considerable 
time in a previous Branch workplace that merged with a number of others to form Mail 
Centre 2 and that itself had been associated with militant action. As such they will more 
than likely have played a role in instigating or endorsing the action mentioned above 
(Gall, 2003: 168). It follows that any understanding of the more conciliatory means by 
which the union here sought to mediate the pressures of modernisation must take place 
within an analysis of wider external factors.  
In contrast to the other workplaces under investigation and even the former individual 
offices from which it was formed, Mail Centre 2 was situated in an area in which 
unemployment at the time of fieldwork stood at around 3.6 %. This was significantly 
lower than the national UK average of 7.8 % and meant that management here had 
difficulty in attracting and retaining labour in an industry that has long been associated 
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with low wages and unsocial hours. As Ironside and Seifert note, when faced with staff 
shortages management are under pressure to pay more and improve conditions to attract 
staff and retain them (2000: 93). In the case of Mail Centre 2 this was reinforced by the 
potentially strong bargaining position of a strategically placed workgroup who were 
responsible for processing, and therefore potentially disrupting the flow of, 20% of the 
country’s mail. As a consequence, the approach of both local and senior management, 
according to the following union reps, appeared to be somewhat less strident than their 
colleagues within the other workplaces under investigation:  
The blokes here don’t have any problems really, nobody bothers them. 
Management are really ok. If anything arises we can usually sort it out (Workplace 
Representative/OPG 14, Mail Centre 2);  
We’ve had people take loads of sick leave and who are then on a stage 3 (potential 
dismissal meeting). I’ve never lost one yet-everybody keeps their job (Workplace 
Representative OPG 15, Mail Centre 2); and 
Management are really ok with everyone here, there’s never any trouble really. 
Why should the union and the members risk losing money by striking over things 
when things are like this? ‘(Workplace Representative 13, Mail Centre 2).   
That a local group of reps that had in the past looked to more militant methods of 
achieving their aims now felt able to mediate the structural and potentially damaging 
effects of modernisation through the medium of a more moderate model of bargaining 
was again then related to a cluster of factors and their interaction (Edwards, 1988: 201). 
In particular, local economic conditions and the manner in which Royal Mail had chosen 
to organise work had served to constrain the employer’s wider strategy of unitarism and 
work intensification. This highlights that the policies and positions which unions adopt to 
some extent reflect the strategies of employers (Ironside and Seifert, 2000: 93), and that 
structural pressures are mediated by the subjective features of actors and their actions at 
workplace level. However, Edwards reminds us that the relationships between these 
actors are dynamic, involving a continuous negotiation of order (1988: 194). In times of 
change such as the present climate of competition and rationalisation within the Royal 
Mail, this may result in the erosion and indeed disappearance of job controls (Thompson 
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and Bannon, 1985) like those which have been historically associated with many groups 
of postal workers (Beale, 2003; Gall, 2003; Batstone et al., 1984). From this viewpoint an 
accurate understanding of the true nature of relations within Mail Centre 2, must-as with 
the other workplaces under investigation, include a micro-level focus on the shopfloor 
itself and the perceptions and actions of workers.           
Although the union were on the whole satisfied with their attempts at limiting change, 
this at times conflicted with perceptions of some workers on shopfloor. Evidence here 
suggested that management had made significant inroads into some of the traditional 
areas of shopfloor regulation that the union, in previous times, had whole-heartedly 
defended. While the majority of interviewees in contrast to Beirne’s (2013: 123) recent 
study of modernisation within the industry reported that they had perceived no negative 
change to their occupational security and workload in recent times, many stated that 
they had felt some reduction to their level of workplace autonomy. This had been 
particularly evident with regard to the gradual erosion of unofficial breaks and the 
clamping down on cigarette breaks by management. Additionally, while workers still 
operated some discretion over the movement of labour, this, as the following 
interviewees suggest, had in recent times been diluted: 
 If management ask us to do another job while we’ve still got work in front of us 
we usually say no. Usually that’s enough to make them back off but sometimes 
they’ll push it and say things like the world has changed and we need to be more 
efficient, if this happens most people will eventually say things like ‘ok just this 
once but don’t ask again (OPG 2, Mail Centre 2); and 
We still say no and won’t let them shift us around but sometimes if they are really 
struggling they’ll push it and then ultimately most people will carry out what’s 
been asked. This doesn’t mean that management have got carte blanche and we’ll 
still tell them where to go if what they’re asking is unreasonable (OPG 8, Mail 
Centre 2). 
Indoor non-driving staff on the whole also reported that they now made comparatively 
less time at the end of their shift than they had done in the past. Moreover, where early 
finishes had previously involved the whole of the workgroup, they now increasingly took 
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the form of ‘sneaking off early’ by individual workers. Again, management sought to deter 
this and worker opposition to flexibility through appealing to workers to think of its 
impact on quality of service and the subsequent threat of the movement of work to 
another mail centre. This was a view which was endorsed by the local union and its 
network of representatives at shopfloor level.  
As with the other workplaces under investigation, management in Mail Centre 2 seemed 
to have been reticent to deploy available surveillance to gain tighter control over the local 
workforce. Management in this workplace too had access to swipe card data, CCTV 
footage of workers and barcode scanning systems that revealed workers time spent on 
particular task. Again, this would appear to contrast with other areas of the public 
services in which some commentators have noted the negative consequences for 
employees resulting from increased surveillance and managerial control (Glover and 
Noon, 2005). What did perhaps differ here in comparison to Delivery Office 1 and Mail 
Centre 1 in particular was that the potential impact of increased managerial scrutiny was, 
as the following interviewees point out, exclusively mediated by the formal body of the 
local union rather than either actual organic worker action or the threat of this: 
Yes, we know that they’ve got all the latest technology and could watch us all day 
with it if they wanted to. The union have made sure that this doesn’t happen so we 
they don’t really monitor where we are all the time. (OPG 8, Mail centre 2).    
In practice this took the form of a tacit understanding that management would refrain 
from over-scrutinising workers on the understanding that the union would not oppose a 
reasonable amount of flexibility with regard to the movement of staff.  While not 
conceding that that they may have surrendered some control to management, the local 
representatives did justify what were shopfloor concessions on the part of both workers 
and their union which had, in part, been influenced by the potential consequences of 
surveillance. As the following representative pointed out:  
We don’t want to push it too much with management, give and take. If they 
wanted to clamp down they could, there’s probably enough information from 
cameras and swipe cards to hang everybody if they used it (Workplace 
Representative 13, Mail Centre 2).  
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In some instances, the inroads made by management on the shopfloor here might be 
regarded as being indicative of a shift in their favour of the frontier of control away from 
that of a more quiescent workforce and their union (Brown, 1972: 56). This is at first 
glance perplexing since a number of factors combined to provide workers with 
considerable bargaining power and the capacity therefore to defend long-standing forms 
of custom and practice However, worker action itself, aside from subtle, yet omnipresent 
threat of closer surveillance, was tempered by the structural influence of liberalisation 
and, in particular, what Edwards (1988: 201) refers to as the legitimatory resources that 
this provided management with. From this viewpoint management were able to appeal to 
workers often on an individual basis to behave responsibly in a climate of competition 
and shrinking market share. Such an approach resembles the more sophisticated means 
by which management, for Edwards (ibid.: 196), seek to prevent the emergence of open 
struggles around the effort bargain. This was given further legitimacy by the local union’s 
adoption of a cooperative, give and take type of trade unionism. Whilst union strategy 
was up to a point shaped by its relationship with, and experience of, a management 
whose preferred agenda was hamstrung by a tight local labour market, its reticence in 
terms of attempting to exploit this, as will be discussed below, was also related to recent 
changes in the nature of its membership and the effects of these on workplace 
organisation.      
Level of worker commitment to and identification with the CWU 
Like their colleagues in the other workplaces under investigation, workers within Mail 
Centre 2 were themselves subject to weekly team briefing sessions. As might be expected 
here, these did not take on the more punitive appearance of the type that was identified 
in Beale and Mustchin’s recent study of the Royal Mail (2013: 12). Nevertheless, the flow 
of managerial information emanating from the process did focus strongly on the 
workplace’s vulnerability to both internal and external competitors (Jenkins et al., 2007: 
638). For its part the local union, who had licence from management to engage in the 
meetings took the opportunity, despite its leanings towards a cooperative relationship 
with the employer, to raise issues on behalf of the workforce. In contrast to their general 
acceptance of worker flexibility and its implicit acceptance of management’s right to 
manage, the union, as the following correspondents point out, adopted a somewhat 
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oppositional approach raising questions that were often at odds with the everyday 
interest of management:  
A member had been stopped and warned by management for the way that they 
were pushing a York (metal mail trolley). We waited until the next team briefing 
and raised it with management in front of everybody that management, more 
than anyone, were guilty of this too and that they should also be disciplined. This 
resulted in the warning being revoked. (Workplace Representative /OPG 14, Mail 
Centre 2); and  
In the team briefing sessions we would constantly ask for temporary workers to be 
made permanent. We’d argue that we were a responsible union who cooperated 
but also needed to prove to temporary workers that the employer was fair and 
interested in their futures. This often put management in a position and we’d get 
people made-up onto substantive contracts as a result. If they weren’t already in 
the union they’d join afterwards. (Workplace Representative/OPG 12, Mail Centre 
2).    
The representatives extended this approach towards other forms of employee 
involvement such as newsletters and the ubiquitous presence of plasma screen 
televisions which have in recent times increasingly replaced the printed word in pushing 
the employer’s business message to employees (Beale and Mustchin, 2013: 14). This 
involved the dissemination of union counter-briefings through both the notice board and 
hand-to-hand circulation. Again, the union gained managerial permission to undertake 
this by framing such initiative within the discourse of partnership and ‘balance of 
opinion’.  
Within Mail Centre 2 then, the local union’s model of a partnership did not, in contrast to 
the opinions of commentators such as Blyton and Turnbull (1998: 106), rest upon a de-
emphasis of the role of workplace organisation in advancing the interest of workers. 
Rather, it extended opportunities for representative participation (Heery, 2002: 23) and 
crucially served to mitigate the structural effects of a managerial discourse. As Beirne 
(2013: 123) the discourse in question was predicated on the employer’s wider objective 
of bringing about cultural change and worker acceptance of modernisation and lean ways 
203 
  
of working. The effectiveness of union action in this instance was apparent in the 
overwhelmingly critical views of those interviewed in terms of Royal Mail’s modernisation 
programme. Whilst many saw this as an attempt to ‘cut jobs at any cost’ in preparation 
for privatisation, nearly all respondents believed that the union acted in their interests 
and stated that they would always approach the union rather than management when 
faced with a problem. Furthermore, in line with the following respondents, most 
interviewees were mistrustful towards Royal Mail’s wider Employee Involvement 
initiatives and said that their loyalties lay first and foremost with the union:  
The Work Time Learning sessions here are just an attempt to try and justify the 
fact that Royal Mail are ruining our jobs and the service. When we are in there 
nobody takes any notice of what management are saying because we all know 
that its just lies and propaganda (OPG 5, Mail Centre 2); and 
Management are always trying to get us on board at the Work Time Learning 
Sessions. Nobody really falls for this. I mean, we listen to the union here rather 
than those Royal Mail stooges (OPG 4, Mail Centre 2). 
On the other hand, there were, according to the reps, a sizeable number of members who 
were detached and indifferent towards the union and its objectives.  
Despite the presence then of a range of managerial aids which were underpinned by the 
wider objective of increasing managerial control at the expense of the CWU (Beale and 
Mustchin, 2013: 17), a majority of workers within Mail centre 2 appeared to be 
committed to their union and its role within the workplace. The existence in such 
circumstances of what might be termed as a trade union ideology amongst these workers 
is related in part to the institutionally centralised position of the local union within this 
workplace. This crucially enabled reps to foster and promote a particular set of views and 
patterns of behaviour that operated in favour of the union (Batstone et al., 1977: 10-11). 
While this suggests that like their counterparts in both Delivery Office 1 and Mail Centre 1 
the reps in this workplace carried out what for Batstone at al. was a leadership approach 
with regard to their role, its influence in this case was less far reaching. Moreover, in 
contrast to these two workplaces there appeared to be little evidence within Mail Centre 
2 of the organic fulcrum of workplace activism upon which worker leadership within the 
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Royal Mail has traditionally rested (Gall, 2003: 146). While this may have meant that local 
representatives here were relatively free from the pressures of supporting independent 
rank and file initiatives that such activism gives rise to (Darlington, 1993: 21; Hyman, 
1975: 161) it on the other hand served to dilute their potential bargaining power. As 
Ironside and Seifert (2000: 17) argue, efficacious collective bargaining by trade unions 
implies the use of power within negotiations, namely the potential or actual mobilization 
of union members to harm, disrupt and distort the employer’s business. It will be recalled 
that much successful strike action within recent times in the Royal Mail has itself been 
underpinned by the type of independent workgroup activism that was largely absent 
within Mail Centre 2 (Darlington, 2002: 98). This suggests that the representatives’ 
adoption of a partnership approach may, in this workplace, have been born as much out 
of expediency than an ideological commitment to a cooperative model of workplace 
relations.  
Although this dearth in membership activity might in more established Royal Mail sites be 
influenced by particular workplace history and its effect upon patterns of behaviour 
(Edwards, 1988: 202; Batstone et al., 1977: 11), it will be recalled that Mail Centre 2 was 
itself less than three years old. Much has been written about the detrimental effects of 
these greenfield environments upon worker organisation (see, for example, Mckinlay and 
Taylor, 1996). However, the workplace itself was comprised of workers and reps from a 
number of defunct Royal Mail sites that each had a tradition of activism which the latter 
had in their capacity as union reps transported into this new setting. Moreover, the 
technical organisation of work and lax nature of managerial control could not be deemed 
such as to inhibit trade union activity (Rose, 1998: 111). Here then, the structural effects 
of union policy, managerial approach, and accelerating modernisation in this instance had 
appeared to evoke a cleavage in the levels of union identity and commitment amongst a 
group of workers who were subject to a largely uniform set of terms and conditions of 
employment. It follows that any understanding of workplace behaviour and in particular 
the propensity of workers to adopt a collective union-centred outlook within Mail Centre 
2 must again extend to a consideration of the manner in which these structural forces 
themselves interacted with a number factors that were specific to the locale itself.        
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As with all the other workplaces under investigation, membership levels within Mail 
Centre 2 were high standing at around 85 to 95 percent. As has been outlined above, in 
line with other workplaces under investigation, the union had been unable to stop an 
increase temporary employment amongst the workforce. There were, however, 
important differences with regard to the issue of worker recruitment in comparison to 
the other three workplaces. This potentially militated against the local union’s ability to 
maintain a context in which to defend previously sacrosanct areas of worker control. In 
particular, recruitment difficulties meant that management in Mail Centre 2 had in recent 
times looked outside the local area to attract workers. This had resulted in a large influx 
of students, young and inexperienced workers, and a sizeable number of Asian workers, 
from a neighbouring town. In contrast to the other three workplaces management were 
more disposed to offering a range of substantive contracts to new starters in order to 
bolster both recruitment and retention. Nevertheless, there was, as the following 
interviewees point out, a significantly high turnover in numbers of these workers:   
There has been about 200 hundred new staff that have started over the last couple 
of years that I would describe as ‘green labour’. Lots of them have come from 
places where there is no union presence such as call centres or retail and many 
have come straight from college. Although they’re mostly in the union they tend to 
be more individualistic in outlook and don’t really bother with union issues and 
things. Many of them don’t stay that long and move on to other jobs (Workplace 
Representative/OPG 12, Mail Centre 2); and 
Although there are quite a number of people who are up for dealing with things 
through strikes and other action, there’s still a lot of new starters who don’t stay 
long and who are, along with one or two other groups of people not really 
interested (Workplace Representative/OPG 13, Mail Centre 2).   
Under these circumstances, union attempts to realise a collective union-centred identity 
amongst the wider workforce would have faced a number of countervailing influences. 
Firstly, the majority of young inexperienced workers here would have no standard of 
comparison when assessing the fairness of managerial systems of control (Edwards and 
Scullion, 1982: 76) which in this case included the encroachment on some areas of 
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custom and practice. Secondly, those new starters who did have prior work experience 
were more than likely now to be working in comparatively more benign surroundings 
than the warehouses and call centres where they had previously worked. And thirdly, the 
large contingent of Asian workers, who here often looked to group elders before the local 
union to resolve issues, constituted a group of workers who, did not always engage with 
union structures in the way that more established groups of workers might do (Healy and 
Kirton, 2000). As will be argued below, such a context would create challenges for both 
the legitimacy of a local union that lacked the on-site presence of a senior network of 
supporting officials and the process through which it identified the collective interests of 
the workers in question (Simms and Charlwood, 2010: 136). Moreover, the set of diverse 
and transient, characteristics pertaining to this workgroup would, along with a general 
lack of experience of workplace unionism, render it more difficult for local reps to 
cultivate a sense of collective identity and injustice that is essential to effective worker 
mobilisation (Kelly, 1998: 44).     
Section Two: The extent and nature of non-union based forms of individual and 
collective job controls.  
In contrast to the preceding section, attention now turns to those forms of worker action 
within each workplace which may be regarded as being non-union based. These can be 
either individual or collective and essentially involve worker practices that take place in 
isolation from, or even in contravention of, the local union and its policies. Worker action 
in this sense does not, therefore, resemble a wider organisational approach which 
Edwards identifies as seeking to influence issues such as the division of tasks, allocation of 
overtime and staffing levels (Edwards, 1988: 196-7). Overall, evidence so far suggests that 
local union organisation in the offices under investigation has, by and large, managed to 
retain much of their long-standing influence over such issues (Gall, 2003; Beale 2003). 
This has, at times, been quite clearly bolstered by the independent yet union-centred 
action of the workforce themselves who on the whole, have exhibited high levels of 
commitment to and identification with their local union officials and representatives. 
However, fieldwork has also uncovered a propensity amongst some workers to actively 
make sense of, and to achieve a degree of control over, their work experience (Salaman, 
1986: 21) through actions and mediums that had little to do with the collective principles 
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of trade unionism This study now moves on to examine to what extent such practices 
exist and the factors that have influenced these.  
Delivery Office 1 
Although there was clear evidence of well-established union-based control mechanisms 
within Delivery Office 1, a minority of workers undertook working practices that were 
individual and instrumental. This contrasted sharply with the situation here some four 
years earlier where, except for a few isolated examples, the workforce largely observed 
local union policy and the long-standing, if often informal, norms of the wider collective.  
As this chapter has earlier intimated, this minority tended to consist of those workers 
who were termed, ‘new starters’, ‘non-unionised individuals’ and ‘unionised-individuals’. 
One notable practice, which had been a particularly sensitive one for the union, was that 
which involved some of these workers working through meal reliefs and starting work 
before duty time. Whilst the actions of new starters here is perhaps understandable, the 
practice allowed other established staff to finish earlier and in some cases boost earnings 
through the delivery of unstaffed delivery rounds within their own duty time. The very 
same practices, on the part of two individuals had been at the heart of the protracted 
dispute in this office several years earlier. This had resulted in the dismissal of the main 
body of the local union who were accused of attempting to stop the practice through 
‘bullying and ‘intimidation’ (see Lyddon, 2009).  As such, local representatives, albeit still 
well organised and effective, were now reluctant to directly challenge, and therefore 
forced to dilute their opposition to, a mode of behaviour which they regarded as posing a 
threat to both job security and, worker health and safety. For their part management 
largely here rebuffed formal union protestation instead cloaking these practices in the 
standard HRM-based discourse of personal choice and increased efficiency. As Edwards 
(1988: 192) notes, management at times not only accept but often take for granted such 
fiddles and breaches to health and safety since they help speed up production and pose 
little threat to managerial prerogative. 
Royal Mail’s championing of the individual rights of employees and the ever-present 
spectre of the previous dismissals seemingly impacted upon union-centred effort 
controls. Firstly, it served as a countervailing pressure (Beynon, 1973: 102) upon both the 
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collective consciousness and willingness of shop stewards and activists to combat a 
practice that had breached both jointly agreed patterns of attendance and health and 
safety procedures. Secondly, it provided opportunities amongst a minority of workers for 
the development of other types of behaviour which were non-union based and on the 
whole, individual. One such practice involved the discarding by these workers of 
cumbersome delivery trolleys in favour of delivery pouches which enabled speedier 
delivery of mail and earlier finish times. This again constituted a violation of safety 
standards and was potentially subject to disciplinary action. Once more, as the following 
interviewee points out, a management that was pressed for time and restricted in its 
flexible utilisation of workers turned a blind eye or at best paid lip service towards 
outlawing it if pressurised by the union:  
We sometimes have difficulty getting management to clamp down on people 
running around without their proper delivery equipment. Everybody likes to make 
a bit of time but some of these are rushing around and putting their health at risk. 
Management either pretend they haven’t seen it or stall if they can (Delivery 
Representative 4/OPG 16), Delivery Office 1).  
The coexistence within this single workplace of what amounted to two different modes of 
bargaining behaviour serves here to highlight the limitations of wider organisational 
patterns of workgroup behaviour (Edwards, 1988: 197) and led, in this instance, to a 
somewhat ironic outcome.  This is that a small minority of non-militant workers were able 
to exploit and at the same time violate a set of control measures that had been 
developed by a more union-centred majority whom they largely regarded as being too 
militant.         
Another practice that was periodically carried out by some workers within Delivery Office 
1 involved the deliberate sabotaging of delivery vans. This would invariably result in the 
temporary replacement of regular vehicles with reserve vehicles that were not installed 
with the latest surveillance equipment. As the following interviewee points out, this 
brought about a number of benefits for those concerned:  
If you can manage to get your own van taken off the road and get a replacement, 
they have no idea as to where you are. You can go home like the old days or just 
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park up anywhere you like and have a sleep or read the paper (OPG, 11, Delivery 
Office 1). 
Edwards (1988: 197-8) notes that essential acts of sabotage like this may, as a 
phenomenon, vary considerably between work groups and the bargaining models to 
which they have access to. While such action on the behalf of strictly controlled workers 
is likely to be an act of spontaneous frustration, other more utilitarian types of sabotage 
(Taylor and Walton, 1971) are a result of attempts by workers to make the job easier. In 
the case of Delivery Office 1, reserve vehicles allowed workers to park up and ‘make time 
on the job’ whilst further enabling them to slip off route, or take breaks at home without 
fear of being detected. Although for Edwards (1988: 197) these types of sabotage may be 
more developed where there is a collective approach, in this case the action was very 
much individualised, covert and therefore not underpinned by the capacity of the wider 
group to defend it. As such it constituted an attempt by individuals to create a degree of 
distance from a technological system which potentially provided increased scope for 
managerial control over their labour process; a system whose implementation the union, 
whilst able to mediate through the omnipresent threat of negative sanctions, was unable 
to halt.  
The union’s inability to halt Royal Mail’s unilateral introduction of a set of sophisticated 
data gathering technologies, highlights the point that while workers might be capable of 
exerting influence over the conduct of work, they enter a terrain whose contours are 
largely shaped by management (Edwards, 1988: 194). This is key to an analysis of patterns 
of worker behaviour since the manner in which a particular production process is 
structured will, as has been argued with regard to Royal Mail’s Mail Centre network, 
influence the nature and efficacy of shopfloor organisation. In general, the propensity of 
shop stewards to carry out a leadership role based on the promotion of collectively based 
union values amongst their membership is more likely when the nature of work itself is 
such as to foster peer rather than management contact (Batstone et al., 1977: 152). This 
study has highlighted both the scope that existed for worker interaction and the 
collectively-based union-centred model of workplace organisation that this helped to 
sustain within Delivery Office 1. However, the implementation of the BT 2010 Agreement 
had ushered in significant change which had removed a traditional method that had aided 
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union influence over the behaviour of workers. Now, rather than travelling out to, and 
returning from, their delivery rounds in twelve seat vans, workers travelled out in pairs 
and where possible were allowed to go directly home when finishing. Away from their 
peers and the stewards themselves, who had historically tended to drive vehicles which 
transported the workers out in groups, those who so wished had greater freedom to 
undertake behaviour that contravened union policy. Furthermore, under this system, 
workers had the option to drive home after finishing delivery in their designated work 
vehicle which they were permitted to keep at their home address. Many interviewees had 
noted that the requirement to return the vehicle the following day had, since their 
vehicles were utilised on a daily basis, acted to deter workers from taking organised and 
rotational ad-hoc sick leave. This meant that the workers had lost some influence over a 
collectively-based mechanism for increasing reward, in the form of overtime earnings, 
during periods when mail volumes had been low.           
While the issue of overtime itself was an area that local union had, retained its 
traditionally significant influence over, there were signs that there had been some change 
her. A minority of workers were prepared to undertake overtime at a rate which undercut 
that which was agreed by the union. Again, this was facilitated by the cessation of group-
based transportation, both to and from deliveries, and the subsequent reduction of social 
pressure to observe what amounted to a type of output restriction by the wider 
workgroup here. That said, these behaviours were common knowledge throughout the 
workplace and typically evoked the following responses amongst many of those 
interviewed:  
Some of those will do anything for overtime, it’s terrible really after everything the 
union’s done to make sure we get paid properly; greedy pigs (OPG 4, Delivery 
Office 1);  
They cause so much ill feeling the office’s split because of it. They’re wrecking the 
job. (OPG 1, Delivery Office 1); and 
The bosses know who to tap up when there’s no one about. The trouble is it spoils 
it for everyone else because they’ll go to the ones who will do it for less first (OPG 
7, Delivery Office 1).  
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Such animosity is indicative of the way in which the inherent antagonism between 
workers and managers within a capitalist mode of production is translated from 
hierarchical domination into lateral antagonism. From this viewpoint, all conflict is 
mediated on an ideological terrain (Burawoy, 1979: 67) which in this case involved the 
opportunity to increase levels of earnings.  In cultivating a covert system of unequal 
reward, management, whether intentionally or not, had helped to sustain divisions within 
this workplace by converting management-worker conflict into competitiveness and 
intergroup struggle (ibid.).     
Delivery Office 2 
It will be recalled that in contrast to their colleagues in Delivery Office 1, workers within 
Delivery Office 2 on the whole appeared to be less collectively inclined towards regulating 
their workplace. One specific example that was evident during the time of fieldwork 
concerned many of the workers voluntarily foregoing their designated meal break during 
the period in which they carried out the indoor element of their workload. Instead they 
spent this time sorting and preparing mail for their forthcoming delivery rounds. A 
significant number also began work before they were officially scheduled to, sometimes 
to the extent of an hour per day. In truth, this had been a situation that had prevailed for 
some years in this workplace. Some years ago, the researcher, as part of a branch 
delegation, had attempted to try to resolve this and warn against its potential threat to 
job security. It had, as far as could be gleaned however, become more commonplace in 
the last three years. The workplace representatives had made some attempts to curb this 
but, as the following points out, had enjoyed little success: 
We’ve tried to tell them about going out early and working breaks but they won’t 
listen. They just want to get done and get home (Workplace Representative /OPG 
14, Delivery Office 2). 
As this chapter has earlier intimated, and as the following responses suggest, there 
appeared to be two widely differing reasons held by workers as to why they carried out a 
practice which directly contravened union policy. Both highlight the limitations of union 
organisation here and the union’s inability to stop what had been a change to the nature 
of effort bargain in terms of the labour process of some workers: 
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I work my break because I can make at least an hour a day and get home early 
(OPG 9, Delivery Office 2); 
 By working my break, I can get out as early as possible and finish early (OPG 12, 
Delivery Office 2); 
If I didn’t work my break I’d never get around in time. If I just work to my time and 
bring stuff back it will be there waiting for me the next day, there’s just so much 
more mail these days (OPG 6, Delivery Office 2); and  
Working my break and starting early is the only way that I can cope, I’d never 
finish if I didn’t. It’s just got harder and harder (OPG 8, Delivery Office 2). 
This cleavage of opinion and the inequity to which it pertained reaffirms this study’s 
earlier observation with regard to this workplace. This is that a cluster of factors that 
were historical, cultural and structural, had militated here against the development of a 
dominant system of norms and values that might be deemed as embodying the basic 
principles of trade unionism (Batstone et al., 1977: 24-7). These principles concern both 
an emphasis upon unity and collectivity and some idea of social justice whereby those 
within the collectivity are treated fairly and equally (Brown, 1973: 133; Batstone et al., 
1977). The presence of such values helps to facilitate the greater centralisation of power 
within the domestic organisation (Batstone et al., 1977: 24). It follows that had it been 
imbued with greater institutional power within this workplace the union would have been 
better equipped to more effectively and evenly regulate what had been increasing 
volumes of mail and decreasing staffing levels, and thereby avert the following situation; 
a situation in which worker attempts to individually control their workload was to end in 
disastrous consequences for those concerned.           
A longstanding, informal practice amongst some postal delivery workers has been that of 
holding some items of mail back from one day to another as a means of reducing the 
number of deliveries per day (Harper and Emmert, 1963). This involves undelivered mail 
being taken home and ‘smuggled’ back into the office for delivery the next day. To 
remedy this Royal Mail management have historically carried out periodic ‘on the spot’ 
searches of worker’s delivery pouches on their arrival in to the office Those caught face 
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potential dismissal and, depending on the amounts of mail they are found with, the 
possibility of a home search from the Royal Mail’s investigation branch followed by 
possible prosecution. Within Delivery Office 2, there had, within recent months of the 
research, been three workers dismissed on the grounds of this practice. Two of these it 
was understood, had been unable to cope with their day to day workload and had been 
found to have significant volumes of mail at their homes. While the action on this 
occasion was both individual and, since it could not be formally defended by the domestic 
stewards, non-union based, it was, along with the sanctions that it gave rise to, 
inextricably linked to the specific nature of workplace organisation within this workplace. 
As the following union official notes: 
In comparison to Delivery Office 2, the bag searches don’t usually happen in 
Delivery Office 1. This is because the union and the blokes would do something in 
response like a go-slow or maybe a stoppage here and there. You know? Just to 
make sure that management would think twice before doing it. Management 
know that some people occasionally bring stuff back but it isn’t worth their while 
challenging this; besides, the walks aren’t that big anyway. (Branch Union 
Official). 
This suggests that, had workplace organisation within Delivery Office 2 been more union-
centred, then the subsequent bargaining awareness and power associated with this 
would have perhaps allowed the ‘bringing back’ of mail to remain a managerially-
acknowledged, if illegitimate, aspect of job regulation (Edwards, 1988: 197). Moreover, 
and as the previous interviewee intimated, the existence of a strong organisational mode 
of bargaining, would result in there being less of a need for workers to carry out the 
practice since they would have had other means of controlling the effort bargain (ibid.: 
198).   
Somewhat ironically, a number of workers within this workplace, as was the case in 
Delivery Office 1, were able to use long-standing collectively established mechanisms of 
workplace regulation to realise individual non-union centred aims. In this case for some, 
rather than serving to prevent managerial favouritism and victimisation, the traditional 
system of seniority whereby jobs are allocated on length of service (Gall, 2003: 29) was a 
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means, as the following responses suggest, of individually mediating managerially-driven 
change, potentially at the expense of other work colleagues:       
If my job changes too much and gets harder I’ll wait until another one comes up 
and pick that (OPG 9, Delivery Office 2); and 
 some of the ones who’ve been here for ages aren’t that bothered if their jobs get 
worse, they’ll just wait until there’s another re-allocation of duties and pass the 
crap onto somebody who hasn’t been there as long’ (OPG 2, Delivery Office 2). 
In a similar sense, some workers sought to gain individual control over the effort bargain 
through the medium of collectively agreed systems of annual leave and paid sick leave. 
Thus, when approaching their chosen period of annual leave some workers would slow 
down towards the end of the week which often resulted in a backlog of mail for their 
designated delivery round. The same strategy was deployed by a number of those 
workers who confessed to taking sick leave that was, at least from the perspective of the 
employer, ‘not genuine’ and pre-planned. In both instances the resulting absences would 
be covered by more junior floating staff who often, due to their precarious contractual 
status, would clear all mails that had built up thus leaving a clear round for the duty 
holder on their return. The resentment that both this and the other form of ‘off-loading’ 
outlined above caused amongst more junior staff again meant that far from being union-
centred, the practices themselves threatened wider workgroup solidarity within the 
workplace. As Edwards notes (2010: 39), in that they might be explained in terms of a 
need to escape, such individualised modes of accommodation do not alter, but in fact 
help reproduce, existing relations and managerial patterns of control. 
Again, it is useful here to consider the interaction of what Edwards refers to as a cluster of 
influences (1988: 201) and their effects upon patterns of workplace behaviour. An 
internal labour market system that had long provided the union with influence over the 
organisation and allocation of work fostered a culture of individualism amongst some 
workers and redistributed conflict in a lateral manner (Burawoy, 1979: 106). This situation 
was by no means a given, since the system itself has historically comprised of important 
control mechanisms which have been important for postal workers’ unity and 
collectivism. However, the more marginal everyday role played by the domestic 
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organisation in Delivery Office 2 rendered its members less likely to employ the type of 
collective means (Batstone et al., 1977: 10, 129) that would guard against such 
individualism. Any lack of solidarity-based action on behalf of the members was further 
stimulated by the socializing effects of the behaviour and collective consciousness of both 
workers and stewards in the past (ibid, 153). As has been earlier highlighted, this can be 
characterised as being based on acquiescence, moderation and, at times, inactivity.   
Mail Centre 1 
While collectively-based union-centred control mechanisms featured strongly within Mail 
Centre 1, evidence pointed to the presence of behaviours by a number of drivers and 
indoor staff that were individual in both action and sentiment. Before turning to these, it 
should be borne in mind that they, particularly with regard to the indoor staff themselves, 
differed somewhat to those within the two delivery offices; in doing so they echo 
Edward’s (1988: 200) observation that certain features of the nature of work facilitate the 
development of particular responses. Delivery office work is in many workplaces 
dominated by intense time-pressures and the difficulties of delivering an ever-increasing 
volume of mail (Beale and Mustchin, 2013: 15). Individually designated rounds mean that 
workers themselves are solely accountable for their workload and thus-short of going 
absent, have no real scope to reduce their output levels. Any attempt to so would 
effectively increase workload later in their working day and furthermore threaten any 
opportunities for ‘job and knock’. 
By way of contrast, in the modern factory type setting of the Mail Centre (ibid.: 16) 
workers on the whole have less individual accountability over their output, and less 
opportunity to (at least legitimately) pursue ‘job and knock’. Such a context, in the case of 
Mail Centre 1 gave rise to a number of practices which, in effect, did not reflect the 
general culture of collectivism amongst the wider workgroup itself. These had appeared 
to remain fairly marginal in recent years and were not commonplace. This suggests that 
the union had managed to limit a growth in individualised actions that might threaten its 
ability to regulate its traditional areas of influence.    
The most common form of individually based, non-union centred practice within Mail 
Centre 1 involved workers turning up late for their shift and then falsifying the signing on 
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time to that of their official start time. Although this did not appear to be widespread, it 
was for some, a frequent means through which they sought to alter their effort bargain. 
The local union had, when it formed one aspect of wider trend of managerial 
unilateralism, defended the occasional incidences of such behaviour.  However, in that 
this threatened job security and wider solidarity, it was largely unsupportive of those who 
carried this out on a regular calculative basis. The following interviewees sum up the 
situation: 
I try to pinch time off them at least three times a week by turning up a bit late. It 
makes you feel a lot better and is a bit of a perk. The work still gets done anyway 
(OPG 10, Mail Centre 1);  
Sometimes I will turn up late and sign on as if I’m on time. It’s one of the few ways 
that we indoor workers can make any time really. They keep wanting more and 
more out of you when you are here so it’s only fair really to try and claw a bit back 
from them (OPG 1, Mail Centre 1); and 
There are one or two here who threaten to spoil things for everyone and expect 
them to pull the workload in for them. If management see them sneaking off every 
five minutes then they will try to take jobs out-it stands to reason (Local Official, 
Mail Centre 1).  
Additionally, some workers would choose a time when management were not at hand to 
take unofficial breaks for up to 30 minutes at a time. This again was a minority practice 
and was something, as the following points out, that the local union had largely managed 
to limit: 
We’ve said to members that if you sneak off and leave the work for your mates, when 
it comes to jobs, yours will be the last we will defend (Workplace Representative/OPG 
14, Mail Centre 1). 
The individual and opportunistic nature of this differed from the more collectively-based 
manner in which certain workers in this workplace had developed periods of ‘down time’ 
throughout the day. Nevertheless, as the following comments indicate, it was similarly 
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underpinned with a desire for self-determination and an escape from the coercive 
constraints of authority (Collinson, 1992: 137):   
I try to sneak off for extra cups of tea and things when I can. It’s just good to hide 
for a while and do your own thing. Ok it may mean me putting extra work onto 
somebody else but its everyman for themselves. They can do it if they want to as 
well anyway, the work still gets done. You don’t get paid anymore for working 
harder. (OPG 9, Mail Centre 1); 
Lots of people sneak off for a bit when they can. It’s easier that way because 
management don’t notice when one or two of you are missing. Why should I flog 
myself? (OPG, Mail Centre 1); and 
The best thing about pinching time like this is that you actually feel like you have 
won something back from management (OPG 10, Mail Centre 1).  
This logic extended to a minority of the driving staff within this workplace who were able 
to create some space through the subversion of an official system of control which 
nevertheless contributed to management’s overall aims (Edwards, 1988: 193) of 
accelerating production. This involved drivers photocopying the barcodes that were set at 
particular collection points to ensure that workers were not collecting mail early in order 
to ‘make time at the end of or in between duties. By keeping an ‘illicit’ copy of the bar 
codes, drivers were able to collect the mail early then scan the code at the designated 
time and thereby conceal any time that they had made. In contrast, a number sought to 
gain control over the effort bargaining by purposefully seeking out traffic jams to ‘waste 
time’ in when collecting mail. The logic in both cases, as the following respondents 
indicate, had parallels with that which underpinned those individual practices within the 
indoor function of the Mail Centre: 
I do this because it allows me to make a bit of time. If management saw the real 
times they’d just put more work on me and I don’t get paid enough for that (OPG 
2, Mail Centre 1); and 
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If management find out that you’re making time they’ll just put more work on you. 
It would be stupid to let them know how much time you can really make on some 
duties (OPG 10, Mail Centre 1).  
Here then, even though workers may have seen their behaviour in terms of a form of 
resistance against management, modes of accommodation were individualised and non-
union centred (Edwards, 1988: 195). What is more, the manner in which these workers 
avoided extra work had implications for the wider workgroup, some of who would end up 
absorbing this work into their own workload and who on the whole, as these respondents 
point out, did not take kindly to it: 
You always get some who are bone idle and in it for themselves, it gets viewed as 
really bad by all the rest (OPG 3, Mail Centre 1); and 
There’s always one or two who try to dodge out of work and the rest give them 
stick about it. Most people have got more respect for the mates than to start off-
loading stuff on to them (OPG 4, Mail Centre 1). 
Again, the union in this workplace actively discouraged these actions and had managed to 
help ensure that they did not gain any customary legitimacy amongst the wider workforce 
(Brown, 1972). In a less union-centred environment, such actions might have been seen 
as amounting to an escape valve for workers discontent which does little to alter the 
nature of managerial control (Edwards, 1988: 195) or the development of effective union-
centred workplace organisation. As has been earlier pointed out, the former had more 
recently taken on a more punitive appearance which had only been tempered by the 
collective efforts of the wider workgroup and their representatives.  
In sum, individual worker action here can be seen to have taken the form of a similar 
‘game playing’ process to that which Burawoy (1979) identifies in his study of factory 
piece-workers. Whereas for the latter this involved the increasing of output to attain 
productivity bonuses (ibid.: 51), those individuals within Mail Centre 1 appeared to some 
extent to be concerned with reducing output to a level at which they regarded as worthy 
of the remuneration which they received. Burawoy (1979: 224) goes on to note that 
‘game playing’ in this sense provides workers with an adaption or mental escape from the 
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deprivation of monotonous work. However, strong workplace organisation had as it has 
earlier been argued, allowed workers within Mail Centre 1 on the whole to enjoy 
relatively high levels of shopfloor autonomy. The efficacy of this organisation was 
reflected in management’s reluctance to use available data gathering information from 
swipe cards and closed circuit to punish those individuals who turned up late or took 
regular unauthorised breaks. As was the case in both Delivery Offices 1 and 2 then, 
collectively-established mechanisms of worker control had here provided scope for the 
emergence of individually based non-union centred behaviour by a number of workers. 
That said, the institutionally centralised nature of the union within this workplace 
rendered it able to exercise sufficient ideological influence over the behaviour of its 
members (Batstone et al., 1977: 4) as to ensure that these remained marginal and 
minority-based activities.   
Mail Centre 2    
As was the case in all other workplaces, some indoor staff and drivers within Mail Centre 
2 engaged in certain practices that were individual and non-union-centred. Evidence 
suggests that in the relatively new environment of Mail Centre 2, local representatives 
had found it more difficult than in their previous workplaces to stop here what 
constituted a threat to their long-term bargaining position, as the following 
representatives point out: 
In the old workplace this would have never have happened. We were so organised 
that nobody would have dared ignore what the union was trying to do (Workplace 
Representative/OPG 13, Mail Centre 2); and   
It’s been harder since the move to stop people from going against union policy. Some 
of them will cut their own throats (Workplace Representative/OPG 12, Mail centre 2). 
Like their counterparts in Mail Centre 1 some workers here would in effect fiddle the 
effort bargain (Edwards, 1988: 200) by turning up late for work and falsifying their signing 
on time to that of their official start time. This had acquired the status of an almost semi-
legitimate practice which management as the following interviewees point out, to some 
degree accepted: 
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I often turn up a bit late and then sign on at my official start time, loads of people 
do it and management don’t say anything unless someone really starts taking the 
mickey (OPG 6, Mail Centre 2); 
Management I suppose see it as a bit of a means of keeping people happy with the 
job, as long as it’s not too often then they’re OK about it (OPG 8, Mail Centre 2).  
Edwards notes that some of the most obvious determinants of what can be seen here as 
worker bargaining behaviour are structural factors such as the shape of the product 
market and how these interact with a cluster of other influences (1988: 201-2). In the 
case of Royal Mail, the nature of the product market can be characterised as being one of 
increasing internal and external competition which for Royal Mail in terms of Mail Centre 
2 was compounded by local recruitment difficulties. Management sought to mediate the 
effects of this through the relaxation of start times amongst a group of workers which 
evidence suggests were somewhat inactive at a workplace level and divided in terms of 
their identification with and commitment to the workplace union.  
For its part the union could not condone, nor indeed stop a practice which might further 
down the line threaten manning levels and the job security of its members. Despite their 
prominent position within the workplace, the local reps it would seem could not 
effectively propagate amongst the wider workforce a set of trade union-based principles 
(Batstone et al., 1977: 11) that would serve to discourage this action. Rather than a 
concession which a strong workgroup had collectively wrung from its supervisors, the 
action here was individual, opportunistic and in breach of local union policy.  
Some workers also sought to make time through leaving their shift early which it will be 
recalled in recent times involved individuals sneaking off unnoticed before their workload 
had been completed. This, unlike the practice of starting late, was met with a significant 
level of managerial opposition since it threatened the time-critical process through which 
mail was dispatched to its outbound destination. The local representatives also opposed 
such behaviour since it potentially opened the door for managerial proposals to remove 
man-hours or, should it harm performance, the prospect of work, and therefore jobs, 
being relocated to another Mail Centre. The local representatives here were 
comparatively less successful in curbing this than they were in their previous workplaces. 
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This was in part down to the ways in which a tight labour market tempered managerial 
actions against any offenders who were found to be leaving early:   
Nobody’s ever been sacked for this or anything else really, they’d just get a bit of a 
telling off unless in was continual (Local Rep, Mail Centre 2); and 
Ok management don’t like it but they don’t really want to sack anyone for it as 
they’d have nobody to do the job (OPG, Mail Centre 2). 
While Edwards then identifies the stimulus of competitive labour markets in, at times, 
intensifying supervisory control (1988: 200), this was mediated in Mail Centre 2 by 
conditions that were specific to its local context. If managerial action here served to 
simultaneously assist the secondary adjustments (Goffman, 1961) of workers and 
threaten their long-term job security, this was in turn itself related to the nature of local 
union organisation. Although union-centred workplace activism had ironically served to 
potentially facilitate the same type of non-union centred behaviour in Mail Centre 1, 
union organisation bolstered by the on-site presence of the local Branch was sufficiently 
strong to ensure that it remained a marginal activity. It will be recalled that Mail Centre 2 
however, was sited some distance away from its parent branch. As such workplace reps 
here lacked the same immediate access to a network of senior officials who could add 
support to their attempts to dissuade workers from engaging in this action (Batstone et 
al., 1977: 64).     
Like a number of their colleagues in Mail Centre 1, some drivers in Mail Centre 2 also 
regularly subverted the bar code system of surveillance in order to make time at the end 
of or in between shifts. In the previous sites that formed to make up Mail Centre 2, this 
practice was very rare, it was here however, if not widespread, quite common amongst 
collection drivers.  As the following interviewee suggests, this was accompanied in the 
case of some drivers by the use of intimate knowledge of the area to devise quicker 
routes than those that had been prescribed by Royal Mail’s latest soft-wear package. The 
software in question, theoretically, planned the most efficient routes for driver 
collections and calculated collection times from commercial customers and Post Office’s 
sites down to the last second: 
222 
  
Royal Mail likes to think that they’ve got all the answers as to how quick we can do 
the job through their latest technology. They can’t know all of the short cuts 
though and all of the quicker ways in which we avoid traffic. There are plenty of 
routes and back streets and bus lanes that you only get to know by actually 
working on the job. Their computer systems are unable to cater for these (OPG 8, 
Mail centre 2).   
The use of tacit skills in this sense is concerned less with challenging management but 
more with employees discovering ways to make life at work tolerable (Marchington, 
1992: 156). In this sense, unlike the example in Delivery Office 1 where the wider 
workgroup collectively used their tacit skill as a form of sanction in their quest for 
workplace control, the apparent willingness of workers to effectively contribute to 
managerial goals (Edwards, 1988: 189) here served to reproduce the very conditions 
which bolstered management’s control (ibid). In that they were carried out covertly by 
lone workers and constituted a recognised sack-able offence which could neither be 
endorsed nor readily defended by the local reps, such practices were both individual and 
non-union based.  
In addition to the above, the fieldwork research uncovered a particular example of 
worker behaviour in Mail Centre 2 that was both collective and non-union centred. This 
involved a number of workers who were union members formally writing to the Chief 
Executive of Royal Mail in an attempt to speed up their transition from temporary to 
permanent employment. This took place through the medium of an Employee Question 
and Answer forum in the organisation’s quarterly staff magazine journal. As Salamon 
(2000: 380) suggests, this initiative is but one of what are broadly termed Employee 
Involvement Schemes which include appraisal, suggestion schemes and attitude surveys. 
Such schemes have grown in popularity in recent years and seek to raise worker 
awareness of business needs and increase productivity whilst negating or incorporating 
unions into organisational frameworks (Ramsay, 1997: 211-2). Unsurprisingly, the local 
reps here bemoaned this behaviour and pointed to their own success rate in helping bring 
about swift substantive employment amongst temporal. Despite its previous success in 
staving off managerial-based normative controls and its significantly centralised position 
in Mail Centre 2 the union in this instance was found wanting and unable to mobilise bias 
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(Schattschneider, 1960: 71) in its favour amongst a particular strata of the wider 
workgroup whose members were often unfamiliar with the concept of workplace 
unionism and given to leaving after short periods ‘on the job’. In a tight labour market 
such workers may be regarded as occupying a strategically powerful position in the 
production process (Turner et al., 1967: 223) and be more likely to by-pass the union in 
favour of mediating workplace issues through outside bodies.                
Conclusion  
This chapter has examined the findings from four separate workplace studies into how 
workers have reacted to managerial driven change within the context of the on-going 
marketization of the Royal Mail. This has involved an investigation into both formal and 
informal modes of worker behaviour at the point of production and moreover, how these 
workers identify with the trade union in their respective workplaces. The researcher has 
at times drawn on his own work experience as a means of moving both enquiry and 
knowledge further along (Wall, 2006). Findings have highlighted that in comparison to 
their counterparts within the wider public services (see Worrall et al., 2009), workers in 
all the workplaces under investigation had been reasonably successful in tempering the 
impact of marketization on their labour process. That said, all case studies reflected a 
degree of change in terms of the level of control held by local workers and their union 
over their work and workplace environment at the time of the study when compared to 
the recent past. This is discussed below through an evaluation of the impact of new 
technologies, what has been a growth in growth in both casual and temporary forms of 
employment and employee involvement initiatives on the frontier of control (Goodrich, 
1920) in each of the workplaces under investigation.  
Delivery Office 1  
The research has shown that the local workforce and its union had managed to retain 
largely similar levels of influence over their work environment as they had some three 
years earlier. The effort bargain between Royal Mail and their workforce here had not 
appeared to have changed in the last three years nor too had the latter’s influence over a 
range of issues including resourcing and annual leave allocation. However, the 
introduction of new technologies had helped management make some inroads into the 
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long-standing methods of job regulation amongst what were, even by Royal Mail 
standards, an extraordinary well organised group of workers. The first of these 
technologies were surveillance based types of software which presented management 
with the opportunity to challenge traditional forms of custom and practice (Brown, 1972: 
58) and support their arguments for greater efficiency. In practice however, these had 
barely dented such customary practices like ‘job and finish’ and the appropriation of 
unofficial breaks in what were largely no-go zones for local management. When a 
challenge to the former did arise the workgroup was sufficiently organised to repel this 
through the collective expression of a go-slow. Neither had surveillance eroded other 
workgroup controls over the effort bargain such as job allocation and work speeds. The 
balance of power in this sense had remained largely the same as it had when the 
researcher had spent time in this workplace some two years earlier.   
Workgroup ability to hold the line here was related to the institutionally embedded 
nature of the local union itself, and the relatively high numbers of workplace 
representatives who adopted a leadership role in the workplace. These circumstances 
provide workplace unions with greater scope for promoting a set of values and beliefs 
which operate in their favour (Batstone et al., 1977: 10). Steward power here was 
bolstered by their close communicative and physical proximity to their parent Branch and 
the support that this provided in terms of up to date information of events, theories of 
management and membership behaviour, and potential support and control over errant 
stewards (Hyman, 1975: 168; Batstone et al., 1977: 64-65, 74). Added to this was the 
workplace’s strong history of action which, as Hyman notes, can provide workers with 
credible examples and remedies for generating a sense of grievance that is essential to 
the efficacy of shopfloor control (1975: 154). This environment was conducive to the 
union’s ability to stem a down-stream employee involvement initiative which sort to 
enhance managerial control vis-a-vis that of the local union (Beale and Mustchin, 2013).      
Such a context could not however fully counter the effects of the second type of 
technological change. This involved new types of machinery that standardized patterns of 
work, and pre-sorted mail in the dispatching Mail Centre that was previously sorted in 
Delivery Office 1 itself. Outdoor delivery durations had subsequently increased and 
served to dilute collective control over some areas that the workgroup and their union 
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had historically held considerable sway over. Change here meant that workers spent less 
time with both the union and their work colleagues. As such, errant worker behaviour 
was less subject to what Lupton (1963: 155) terms as the often well-defined sets of 
behavioural norms and informal sanctions through which workers protect group interest 
and solidarity. Consequently, in contrast to the main body of workers, a minority of 
individuals were now less reticent when it came to undercutting overtime rates to attract 
managerial favour. In sum, technology had assisted management in permeating an area 
of shopfloor life that had previously been held as sacrosanct by the wider workforce and 
their union. 
The union had also managed to limit, but not stop an influx of non-standard contract 
holders into Delivery Office 1. These had acted as a channel through which management 
were able to pick a way both at union regulation over overtime rates, designated start 
and finish times and the collective culture of the wider workgroup. This was due to the 
former’s precarious employment status (Drago, 1996) which rendered them 
managerially-compliant and furthermore, in some cases, reluctant to join the union.  This 
had served to dilute what some five years earlier had been a de-facto closed shop in this 
workplace. While these formed only a small group of the staff in Delivery Office 1, their 
susceptibility to what was an anti-union narrative from a minority of substantive staff 
held potentially negative implications for the long-term solidarity of the wider workgroup 
and their union.  Hindering the union’s attempt to maintain their previous level of 
steadfast opposition to such an initiative was the omnipresent threat of privatisation and 
the stewards’ first-hand experience of employer reprisals relating to the right of 
individuals in this workplace to break union policy. This latter point may help explain what 
had, in the last two year or so, been the emergence of a number of practices on the part 
of a minority of individuals which went against union policy.  
Delivery Office 2 
This study has argued that there had been a long history of worker moderation within 
Delivery Office 2. The local union, while involved in general negotiations over change, had 
historically played a comparatively more marginal part in day to day issues than those in 
many other Royal Mail workplaces (Gall, 2003). Evidence has shown that such an 
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environment did not constitute a blank canvass upon which management were, through 
the medium of new technology and a national, jointly agreed, restructuring initiative, able 
to freely redefine the effort bargain. On the contrary, the intricate nature of their 
members’ rural-based delivery jobs provided an effective basis for the union to defend 
existing job patterns in the face of a new software package which sought to reduce 
worker headcount.   
That said, the union and its members here could not stave off management’s quest to 
introduce greater intra-workplace cooperation (Drago, 1996: 540). Except for an 
occasional glimmer of resistance, workers now covered unforeseen spikes in mail traffic 
and unforeseen absence within their own duty times. In doing so, the workforce in 
Delivery Office 2 had given some ground on job demarcations and set workloads that had 
been a longstanding feature in this workplace. This, along with the general ‘benign’ 
sovereignty that they held on the shopfloor itself, may explain why management felt little 
need to employ other new technologies in the form of a range of available surveillance 
software in their quest for ever greater efficiency. Unlike the other workplaces under 
investigation, this benign sovereignty was reinforced through the medium of a weekly 
employee involvement session that itself effectively helped to marginalise the voice of 
both the local and wider union in this workplace. 
Management’s successful encroachment into some of the traditional job demarcations of 
workers in Delivery Office 2 in recent times had been assisted by the union’s inability to 
stem what was an increase in temporary workers in this workplace. Not only were these, 
in line with Heery and Abbot (2000) less likely be union members, their vulnerable 
statuses meant that they were a channel through which management could introduce 
greater levels of job tractability that could be subsequently used as a coercive precedent 
towards permanent staff. Again, much more so than any of this study’s other research 
sites, management conveyed their objectives convivially to individual workers rather than 
the local union. This highlights the ways in which social relations of work can prevent the 
emergence of open struggles around the effort bargain (Edwards, 1988: 197). 
In spite of this, membership levels in this workplace had remained at the same level of 
90%, as they had when the author last visited here as a union official some three years 
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earlier.  Moreover, the workforce here had recently shown what appeared to be new 
found signs of resistance to two instances of management action that had been 
traditionally absent in this workplace. This may have suggested an emerging propensity 
amongst these workers to collectively challenge traditionally accepted areas of 
management jurisdiction here. However, any such proposition, in an environment where 
the long-standing propensity of workers to mediate any increase in their workload 
through individual actions that were at odds with collective shopfloor organisation, must 
be tempered with caution.   
In sum, though they demonstrated a capacity to formally resist Royal Mail’s national 
change initiative (Business Transformation Agreement 2010), the local union and its 
members had been less successful in maintaining their prior positon over the frontier of 
control than their colleagues in Delivery Office 1.  Worker behaviour in Delivery Office 2, 
in part, reflected a different set of historical circumstances than did so in Delivery office 1. 
These formed one of and at the same time interacted with a particular cluster of 
influences (Edwards, 1988: 201) which were responsible for shaping the pattern of 
relations in this workplace. Here then, a history of worker moderation and a relatively 
peripheral position in both the regional mail network and the structure of the local 
branch, had led to a more marginal role on the part of local representatives and less 
collectively-centred modes of behaviour amongst its workgroup as a whole.  
Mail Centre 1  
Findings also highlighted that workers and their union in Mail Centre 1 had maintained 
similar levels of control over working practices, resourcing and overtime allocation as 
they were some three years prior to this study. As with all recently built Mail Centres, 
Mail Centre 1 was furnished with new surveillance-based technologies (see Jenkins et al., 
2002) that potentially increased management influence over the local workforce’s labour 
process. These included swipe card access, satellite vehicle tracking and closed circuit 
camera systems. In practice, these had not enabled management to eat into established 
collectively-based workforce controls such as unofficial rest periods and job demarcation. 
This was largely because management had, so far, been reluctant to use the data that 
these generated in such a vein. When they had at one stage attempted to monitor start 
228 
  
times, they had been forced to retreat when threatened with a collective ‘work to rule’ in 
the form of a tried and tested time consuming tactic of en-masse signing in.  Perhaps their 
attempts in this workplace to reconstitute long accepted processes around discipline and 
absence were a precursor to the more punitive use of such technologies by management. 
That the former had been driven back through an unofficial ‘sit in’, along with the 
threatened ‘line up’, explain why available opportunities for closer worked force 
monitoring had, at the time of fieldwork, remained in abeyance.  
Technological changes in production itself had however enabled management to peg 
back some unofficial early finish times. As such, workers now spent more time together 
which increased sociability and importantly greater scope for Branch Officials and local 
stewards to propagate, amongst them, a commitment to union principles and the 
achievement of collective goals (Batstone et al., 1977: 24, 56). The effects of this were 
evident in the continued, largely successful reactions of shopfloor workers to creeping 
managerial incursions into job demarcation. Ironically, here then, technological change 
had helped to bolster union influence and their ability to ward off management incursion 
into an area of workplace relations that they had long held influence over.  
As with Delivery offices 1 and 2, the local union had conceded some ground on their long-
held opposition to temporary working.  An increase in temporary workers in Mail Centre 
1 had, unlike Delivery Office 2 in particular, not appeared however to have acted as a 
vehicle through which management could make inroads into worker job controls in this 
workplace. Temporary workers here adhered to the same standards of job demarcation 
as their full time colleagues. Moreover, a considerable percentage of these were 
unionised in a workplace where membership levels stood at the same level of 85-90% as 
they had some five years earlier. In this workplace more than all others, there was less of 
likelihood for temporary workers, or substantive ones for that matter, to engage in 
working practices which were at odds with the wider collective and their union.   
Union success in maintaining traditional levels of shopfloor influence when faced with the 
introduction of employment models that have been seen to divide rather than collectivise 
workers (Heery and Abbott, 2000: 156) was related to three main factors. Firstly, a 
network of local activists that helped to ensure adherence to wider workgroup norms 
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(Batstone et al., 1977). Secondly, the supportive on-site presence of the parent branch 
itself. And thirdly, the permanent workplace presence that their actual jobs themselves in 
the Mail Centre afforded the workplace representatives here. Such an environment 
further enabled a network of union-minded officials to effectively counter the potential 
corrosive influence of a range of ideational control-based initiatives (Rosen and Baroudi, 
1992: 217) such as team briefing sessions upon workgroup solidarity.  
Mail Centre 2 
The relatively new environment of Mail Centre 2 was a product of a recent merger of 
three defunct mail processing centres. It provided fertile terrain for management to dilute 
the previous considerable level of workplace control that the union and its members had 
enjoyed prior to their moving here.  The presence of technologies such as CCTV, vehicle 
recognition systems, and swipe cards had, if not overtly so, certainly affected some areas 
of shopfloor life that the union and its members had in the past steadfastly defended. 
Here management had again largely refrained from using available data from swipe card 
systems, CCTV and vehicle recognition systems to exercise tighter control over workers. 
However, this was predicated on the tacit understanding that the workplace stewards 
would not oppose some increased flexibility on the part of workers on the shopfloor. 
Many interviewees felt that they had less job autonomy since they moved to what was a 
relatively new workplace and had, albeit, partially, relinquished their traditional veto 
around deployment to other tasks. The union nevertheless still maintained its same 
significant levels of influence over issues such as duty patterns, work organisation and 
health and safety.   
Trade union membership levels within Mail Centre 2 remained at the levels at which they 
were some three year earlier when the Mail Centre first became operational. However, 
like their colleagues in all other workplaces under investigation, the union in Mail Centre 
2 had been unsuccessful in the last two years in halting an increase in non-standard 
contract holders. Heery and Abbott’s (2000: 154) observation that such changes have 
been perceived by unions as to pose a threat to their power is born out here. For 
example, since they could be utilised more flexibly than substantive staff, an influx of 
temporary workers had seemingly reduced the union’s traditional levels influence over 
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overtime levels and annual leave in Mail Centre 2. Unlike temporary workers in the other 
research sites, most here were young, contractually and culturally diverse and transient. 
The young inexperienced workers in particular, would have no standard of comparison 
when assessing managerial systems of control (Edwards and Scullion, 1982: 76), which 
here included the encroachment into some traditional areas of custom and practice. 
What is more, many came from a community which did not traditionally look to the union 
to resolve workplace issues (Healy and Kirton, 2000).  
Such circumstances meant that, unlike, Mail Centre 1, the union in Mail Centre 2 had 
failed to maintain what had previously been a strong sense of collective identity amongst 
the workforce. This may go some way towards explaining the workplace representatives’ 
inability to preserve the same tight veto that they held when first moving to this 
workplace over a range of individual practices that potentially undermined their wider 
bargaining position. That said they had worked hard in countering Royal Mail’s growing 
strategy of direct employee communication. A decline in influence here was again, 
temporary workers and technology notwithstanding, further related to the recent 
workplace merging into one new site. Local representatives were now, like their 
colleagues in Delivery Office 2, geographical and communicatively some distance from 
what was their industrially aware and effective parent branch and its cohort of senior 
officials. Again, closer proximity would have provided greater access to the resources 
through which trade union values could be reaffirmed and steward leadership sustained 
(Batstone et al., 1977: 41, 253). 
Having summarised this thesis findings, attention now turns to what is its concluding 
chapter which is comprised of two sections. The first of these involves a discussion about 
the contribution that a contemporary workplace-based study of this kind adds to the 
wealth of existing literature on the Royal Mail and change within the wider public 
services. This involves an evaluation of the appropriateness of the study’s main 
theoretical frameworks and the continued value that these might bring to current 
industrial relations research. The second section reflects on the wider practical and 
analytical lessons that might be drawn from this study. Firstly, this examines what the 
findings form the cases in question might say about the effectiveness of new-wave 
models of management when faced with organised and combative shopfloor unionism. 
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This is followed by a consideration of what other public sector unions might learn from 
the policies, structures and priorities of the CWU at both a national and local level.   
  
  
232 
  
Chapter Eight: Conclusions 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section discusses two main issues. First 
is the distinctive contribution that this thesis adds to the existing body of work on 
industrial relations within the Royal Mail and the wider public services. It is argued here 
that this study provides a current insight into shopfloor relations in a post-privatised 
Royal Mail through a unique focus on the informal and formal shopfloor actions of postal 
workers. In doing so the author importantly addresses a dearth in shopfloor-based 
analysis of worker action in recent decades by way of a study that is novel, insightful and 
valuable in terms of a basis for future research. This is followed by an explanation of the 
thesis’ use of Batstone et al, (1977) and Edwards (1988) as its main analytical framework, 
as opposed to more recent material.  From this viewpoint, the fusion of what are two 
ostensibly dated studies provides the most effective conceptual basis from which to 
analyse worker agency in an industry that is quite different from most others. 
The second section is a conclusion which reflects on the wider analytical and practical 
lessons that might be gained from this study. Firstly, this involves a consideration of what 
the findings of a study, which follows the traditions of the classic workplace-based studies 
of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s might add to current academic understanding of the limits 
of modernisation and new management practice on the actions of organised workgroups 
and individual workers. Secondly, attention focuses on what trade unions might learn 
from the cases here. This involves a discussion about the comparative effectiveness of 
organic autonomous shopfloor organisation on the part of the CWU and how this is 
bolstered through close linkages to parent branches and their officials. The adoption of 
similar such structures and policies, it is argued, may go some way towards revitalising 
what is currently weak shopfloor organisation within many parts of the public sector 
(Bach, 2010; Bach and Stroleny 2013).        
Discussion 
Industrial relations within the Royal Mail have attracted considerable academic interest in 
recent decades, some of which has been drawn upon to support this thesis. For example, 
Clinton’s (1984) focus on trade unionism within the Post Office itself is written from the 
position of a historiographer, and, as Gall (2003: xi) notes, locates developments within a 
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wider context. Batstone et al (1984) too initially adopt a historical perspective as a lead in 
to their analysis of labour relations and management strategy within both the postal and 
telecommunications arms of the Post Office. More recently, Martinez Lucio et al (1997) 
and Martinez Lucio et al et al (2000) have examined change in the form of rationalisation, 
restructuring and organisation within the Royal Mail. As liberalisation began to take hold 
within the industry both Beale (2003) and Gall (2003) examined militancy amongst postal 
workers in response to the encroachments of the free market. Finally, both Beale and 
Mustchin (2013) and Beirne (2013) provide an insight into the actions of workers and 
managers within an industry that appeared to be rapidly accelerating towards full 
liberalisation. This thesis has sought to build upon this body of research and, in doing so, 
provide a contribution to studies of both UK postal workers and contemporary industrial 
relations that is both unique and important in providing a firm foundation for future 
research.        
Much of this study’s fieldwork took place during 2013 -2014. As such, it is the first of its 
kind to carry out an analysis of industrial relations within what was a transitional phase, 
during which the Royal Mail moved from a nationalised industry through to privatised 
entity. Its focus then is more contemporary than that of both Beale and Mustchin (2013) 
and Bernie (2013) who, concentrate upon the period 2009-2010. Since this research 
preceded the government’s decision to privatise the industry (see the Postal Services Act 
2011) their analysis could not extend to the effects of imminent and certain privatisation 
on the perceptions, long-standing behaviours, and strategies of postal workers and their 
representatives in the workplace itself. Moreover, the above took place during the early 
stages of an efficiency agreement in which the CWU had committed to a workplace 
rationalisation scheme with resultant (jointly agreed) mail centre closures and 
subsequent job losses. By undertaking an analysis some four years later, the author was 
able to gauge the agreement’s impact upon the ways in which postal workers identified 
with their union. Key to this was an insight into current workplace employee involvement 
schemes which, in itself, provides an update of an issue that was central to Beale and 
Mustchin’s area of interest.  
The detailed nature of this study and its workplace focus goes beyond the research 
undertaken by both Gall (2003) and Beale (2003) by explaining, in significantly more 
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detail, the complexities of industrial relations in a variety of Royal Mail workplaces.  Gall, 
as well as Beale and Mustchin, carried out a series of semi-structured interviews with a 
range of full time, local and lay officials. However, neither study really penetrates the loci 
of the shopfloor itself to the extent of identifying the ways in which both actual union 
agency and independent worker action might mediate and temper management action in 
the wider struggle for the frontier of control (Goodrich 1920). Since the focus of this 
research extends to ‘ordinary’ postal workers both union members and some non-
members, it is able to provide a much deeper analysis of the relationship between the 
formal and the non-formal modes of behaviour of these workers. This serves to enhance 
understanding of, and shed new light on, the intra-workgroup and worker-union tensions 
that lie below the waterline of an industry characterised by a high degree of occupational 
uniformity (Gall, 2003).  
In terms of its choice of research settings, this thesis brings a dimension that is absent 
from existing literature relating to modernisation within the Royal Mail. Beale, both in his 
study in 2003 and later with Mustchin in 2013, concentrates on a single Branch within the 
North of England. Gall (2003) alternatively focuses on one Royal Mail Delivery Office along 
with interviews with a range of union officials from different parts of the UK. As such, 
neither examines the context-specific pressures which shape the differences between 
postal workers actions in both an intra-branch and regional sense, nor their particular 
responses to workplace change. This study has gone some way to addressing this through 
a detailed comparative investigation into four workplaces that differed in terms of size, 
history and setting and which included two workplaces from the same branch. The 
variation in workplace responses and richness of data that the fieldwork process 
uncovered, in terms of local union approach, workplace traditions and localised worker 
practices has additionally opened up new avenues for potential research in the future.  
In their analysis of restructuring within the Royal Mail in the late 1990s, both Martinez 
Lucio et al. et al (2000) and Jenkins et al (2002) note the growth of automation in the UK 
postal service. The latter further identify the growth of more peripheral forms of 
employment that has accompanied automation and its impact upon the identity of Royal 
Mail workers within the context of what were, at the time, relatively new green-field mail 
centres. Some 15 years later, this study provides a detailed exposition of the limited 
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impact of these developments upon the labour process of postal workers from the 
vantage point of a fully liberalised Royal Mail.  Such a perspective offers valuable insights 
into how worker agency has contributed to what Beale and Mustchin (2013) refer to as a 
remarkable resilience on the part of the CWU to market-driven downward pressures. 
Again, this provides the basis for future research in the form of a longitudinal study which 
gauges developments in these areas in perhaps 3 years from now when privatisation of 
the industry has had time to fully take root.   
In contrast to the existing extensive body of work relating to restructuring within the UK 
postal service, this study is unique in that it undertakes meaningful analysis into 
workplace change through the eyes of a former worker, lay activist and union official who 
spent many years working in the Royal Mail. Here the author’s wealth of experience and 
former status facilitated a study that is more intimate and informative than others in this 
field. The researcher’s background was crucial in quickly establishing a kindred level of 
trust and confidence that went beyond that which is considered vital to the success of the 
qualitative interview process (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). In tandem with the author’s 
intimate knowledge of the intricacies of the job and shopfloor life within the Royal Mail 
this provided informed access to a range of worker opinions and at times illicit workplace 
behaviours that lay undetected by, and indeed out of the reach of, preceding researchers.  
In a wider context, this thesis makes an important contribution to extant studies of 
marketization of the public services. This is an area that has attracted much academic 
interest in recent years (see, for example, Whitfield, 2006; Mooney and Law, 2007; 
Kessler and Bach, 2012). However, few studies, if any, have sought first hand insight of 
this through an analysis of the actions and perceptions of workers at the level of the 
shopfloor. This is symptomatic of a wider sea change in the study of industrial relations 
where there has been a shift away from empirically based qualitative research in recent 
years (Whitfield and Strauss, 2000:145; Brown and Wright, 1994). This thesis has 
attempted to address this gap through an overdue detailed workplace-based study that 
examines the impact of marketization upon an area of the public sector whose workforce 
have exercised, and in many respects continue to exercise, unusually strong levels of 
workplace controls. In doing so, it is able to unearth both a range of union tactics and 
strategies as well as worker actions which provides an effective basis for future research 
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into wider public sector industrial relations. Of particular interest here should be whether 
popular narratives which view the inevitable weakening of trade unions in the face of 
marketization are valid.   
This thesis brings further value to the field of industrial relations research through its in-
depth investigation into two greenfield Royal Mail sites. Until now, most studies of 
greenfield workplaces have focussed upon the effects of these on newly formed groups of 
workers. As Hallier and Leopold (1996: 49) argue, new site, layout and workforce offer 
management a blank piece of paper on which to establish a set of commitment-based 
working practices that are free from the constraints of brownfield sites. This study 
involved an examination into the actions of two groups of postal workers that had largely 
been transferred from their previous workplaces to purpose-built mail centres. In doing 
so it provides an important, and as yet absent, investigation into how pre-existing well-
organised groups of workers have responded to a series of pressures that have for some, 
helped maximise the scope for managerial control and workforce compliance (McKinlay 
and Taylor, 1996). 
Such comparatively high degrees of union density and unrivalled levels of workforce job 
controls have, in recent years, served to distinguish industrial relations in the Royal Mail 
from both most other public services (see Bach, 2010) and the wider UK labour market as 
a whole. While this provided an interesting arena in which to conduct a unique close up 
investigation into the effects of marketization at the point of production, it presented a 
two-fold challenge to the researcher. Firstly, there was the issue of how to effectively 
analyse what research (see Gall, 2003) had indicated was a variety of responses to on-
going restructuring from workers employed by a single employer under relatively uniform 
terms and conditions and represented by a single union. Secondly, the research required 
conducting an investigation into modes of worker actions and attitudes that had, 
lamentably, long ceased to be central to academic debate in the field of industrial 
relations. These factors crucially shaped this study’s conceptual framework which is both 
innovative, yet, appropriate for an industry in which worker-management relations are 
still based on the traditional negotiation of order. So too, as the following suggests, did 
the character of existing public sector studies.   
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As with the Royal Mail, there is a wealth of literature relating to restructuring within the 
public services. Again, this proved invaluable in enabling the researcher to examine 
change within the Royal Mail through a discussion of marketization and both the nature 
and effects of new public management in the wider public sector. While this was the case, 
extant studies, a number of which are discussed below, appeared unsuitable as a basis 
from which to conceptualise this study’s micro-political analysis of worker action in four 
densely unionised, and largely, well-organised research sites. Bach and Kessler (2012) for 
example, provide a recent study of the modernisation of the public services. This offers an 
integrated account of changes in the management of the employment relationship in the 
public services by combining insights from public sector management literature and 
draws on the workplace traditions of employee relations. The authors here develop a 
framework which connects upstream changes in the organisation and management of 
public services to downstream developments in employee relations (ibid, 16). However, 
this is largely a top-down focus upon relations within the NHS, local government and the 
civil service, and as such, is inadequate as a foundation from which to analyse action on 
the part of an occupational group that has, on the whole, displayed much higher levels of 
resistance, and shopfloor organisation than others in the public services in recent 
decades.      
Alternatively, Massey and Piper (2005) examine the political, economic and social forces 
which have been the driving force behind modernisation of the public sector. This 
provides a lens through which to examine the central tenets of new public management 
which they identify as a managerialist perspective on the delivery of public services (ibid, 
5). Again, the study offers useful insight into the form and nature of market driven styles 
of management. However, it is unsuitable as means of providing meaningful insight into 
this study’s central concern of how such models might be mediated by workers’ action at 
the point of production. Fairbrother (1994) on the other hand examines restructuring in 
the civil service by way of two case studies as part of a wider research project on 
workplace management and local trade unionism. Although the author does seek insight 
through the views of local union officials, the focus does not extend to a first-hand 
consideration of the views and actions of ‘ordinary workers’ and as such is inadequate for 
a study that places much emphasis on the informal action of workers on the shopfloor. 
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Neither does Fairbrother really discuss to any extent the role of worker representatives, 
who, in terms of the Royal Mail, play a key role in workplace organisation and shopfloor 
industrial relations. Finally, at the time of his study, there had been relatively limited 
delegation of managing change to local managers from the centralised civil service 
structures. Such a direction of travel has been a key feature within the Royal Mail in 
recent times and has had a significant impact upon shopfloor relations here.    
In their 2005 article Kirkpatrick and Hoque examine to what extent decentralisation of 
employment relations has taken place within the public sector from the 1990s which they 
compare to developments within the private sector. In doing so they provide insight into 
how market driven change within the public services has been sought through the 
dissemination of new HRM-based management ideas, attempts to erode national 
bargaining and the replacement of some large unified service providers into smaller more 
focused business units. Such a focus usefully draws attention to some of the pressures 
shaping local management action within the Royal Mail currently, the limited nature of 
decentralisation in practice and how this has often been resisted by both and workers 
and their managers. However, Kirkpatrick and Hoque (2005), analysis is drawn from a 
national survey of 2191 workplaces and focuses on the responsibilities of and authority of 
local level managers with responsibility for employee relations (ibid, 107). Their focus 
does not extend to a qualitative analysis of the views of workers themselves or the ways 
that they both formally and informally react to marketization at the point of production. 
As such, the study itself was inappropriate as an overall conceptual framework from 
which to analyse the central concerns of this thesis.    
Located in the private sector, Darlington’s (1993) case study of three Merseyside 
manufacturing plants does focus on relations at the locale of the shopfloor. Building on 
Beynon’s 1973 study of plant based trade unionism’ Darlington examines the impact of 
economic and political pressures upon shop steward organisation in the 1990s. This 
provides useful insight into how shopfloor organisation might fare in the context of 
market-driven restructuring such as is now the case in the Royal Mail. What is more, it too 
examines the contradictory nature of shop steward’s organisation through a Marxist 
conceptual framework (ibid). Though the author did at times draw upon this study, its 
value as a wider framework from which to understand the primary concern of this thesis 
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was limited. This is because Darlington’s (1993) research sites are three individual 
workplaces in which each workgroup and their representatives are covered by separate 
terms and conditions of employment. As such, his evaluation of shop steward action 
cannot extend to the more uniform nature of workplaces within the Royal Mail or shed 
light on the types of often informal illicit forms of behaviour carried out by ordinary 
postal workers within the sites.    
Though written nearly thirty years prior to this thesis, Edwards’ (1988) study of conflict 
and accommodation appeared to be the most appropriate means of understanding how 
an occupational group often attributed with significant levels of shopfloor control (Gall, 
2003) responds both formally and informally and individually and collectively to the 
pressures of market-driven change. What was particularly salient was Edwards’ concern 
with the manner in which workplace relations and in particular, the actions of specific 
workgroups are shaped by a cluster of both external and internal influences and their 
interaction (ibid, 201). In the Royal Mail such pressures have taken the form of 
management’s requirement to introduce market-driven change as a result of the 
increasing liberalisation of the UK postal service. Change, as in other area of the public 
sector, has not been clear cut but mediated by context and worker agency (Worrall et al., 
2009) 
Edwards’ exploration of a variety of workgroup actions was, therefore, crucial to the 
analysis of an industry in which workers have displayed, and continue to display, a wide 
range of responses to managerial driven change (Gall, 2003). Both the unevenness and 
sources of these responses can only be understood through the close-up investigation of 
the processes through which management and workers negotiate order at the point of 
production that Edwards’ approach brings. This attention to shopfloor based agency 
provided immeasurable value to a study of an industry where the employer has 
increasingly attempted to restructure relations with its employees and their union at the 
loci of the workplace itself (Beal and Mustchin, 2013; Beirne, 2013). Moreover, Edwards’ 
discussion of the nature of workplace fiddles around the effort bargain provided the 
necessary arena in which to discuss a host of often illicit types of action by postal workers 
that this thesis unearthed. While perhaps dated then, this approach offered greater 
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insight than extant literature relating to the effects of market-driven change upon public 
sector workers. 
Useful as it was, Edwards’ (1988) study presented the author with two issues. Firstly, 
unlike those workgroups in his study, workers within the Royal Mail had, as this thesis has 
pointed out, exhibited a range of responses to relatively similar occupational pressures. 
Secondly, Edwards’ study does not really focus on the role that trade unions themselves 
might play in mediating market-driven change at the point of production. Such a concern 
is essential in an industry in which trade unions are well organised in the workplace and 
have on average membership density levels of 85%. This thesis, therefore, drew upon 
Batstone’s et al’s (1977) study of shop stewards which relates to a period when shopfloor 
organisation resembled that which is currently present in many Royal Mail workplaces.  
What Batstone et al (1977)  brought in particular to this study was insight into the factors 
that influenced the variety of workgroup responses to change on the part of postal 
workers through its focus on the nature of domestic trade union organisation and the 
effects of this upon worker agency. Much attention in this thesis focuses on the role of 
workplace stewards, who play a vital role in mediating change in the Royal Mail, and who 
moreover, given the downward direction in which change is being pursued (Beirne, 2013), 
will continue to do so. Again, this contrasted sharply with more recent literature which 
was not sufficient in helping to identify those factors that affected the variety of postal 
worker’s responses to change or the foundations upon which unparalleled levels of 
workplace organisation exhibited by many contemporary groups of these workers rests. 
Finally, the postal workers in the four workplaces studied had a  relationship with their 
domestic union organisation that was, on the whole, much closer to the manual work 
factory setting of Batstone et al’s study than the less unionised largely white-collar 
current public services. In light of these arguments, Batstone et al.’s (1977) and Edwards’ 
(1988) studies were fused together to make a framework that is robust and appropriate 
for an investigation into shopfloor industrial relations within the Royal Mail. 
Beyond this study itself, the framework that the researcher adopted, far from being 
outdated, holds on-going value for research in contemporary public sector industrial 
relations. As has been earlier highlighted, a now privatised Royal Mail will, as their latest 
241 
  
agreement with the CWU indicates, continue to seek greater efficiency through 
workplace restructuring and work intensification (see agenda for Growth, Stability and 
Long-term Success 2014). The framework is a tried and tested model through which to 
effectively gauge the longer term effects of these pressures upon working practices and 
workplace trade unionism in a fully privatised UK postal industry. Such an approach would 
enhance current analysis in the wider public sector in two primary senses. Firstly, as an 
effective means of revisiting a fully marketized Royal Mail it would yield findings that 
could provide a basis from which to compare and analyse the relative lack of organised 
resistance to marketization in other areas of the public services. Secondly, the framework 
itself would be appropriate to an analysis of intra-sectoral differences regarding worker 
responses to market-driven change in a given service delivery. Areas of interest here for 
example, would be the civil service and local government where Bach and Stroleny (2013) 
identify a trend towards localised managerial attacks on incremental pay progression, 
allowances and starting salaries. 
In summary, this thesis provides a current micro-political insight into worker action in a 
now privatised Royal Mail. As such, it makes an important contribution to the study of 
workplace relations within the UK postal service and the effects of market-driven change 
on postal workers and their labour process. It seeks to do so through a conceptual 
framework which is robust, innovative and appropriate to an area of the public services 
that is quite different from that of its wider constituents. Its findings provide significant 
opportunity for future research into the actions of postal workers as the full effects of 
privatisation begin to take hold. Finally, the findings from this study serve as an important 
benchmark by which to assess some of the current dilemmas faced by workers and their 
trade unions. This issue is discussed more fully in the following and final section.    
Conclusion 
This study has examined what, at first sight, might seem like an example of outdated 
industrial relations in a sector of the labour market where workers are still heavily 
unionised and exercise strong levels of job controls. In a time when workplace trade 
unionism in the public services has been regarded as being in retreat (Bach, 2010), 
analysis of until what was recently one of few remaining public corporations provides 
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wider lessons to the practical and academic spheres of industrial relations. This chapter 
now discusses this by first examining the analytical importance of a case like this. This is 
followed by an evaluation of what trade unions might learn from the findings of this 
thesis in terms of the linkages between workplace and union leadership. 
This study has highlighted the continuing value of Edwards’ study of Conflict and 
Accommodation (1988) in helping to understand contemporary unionised work group 
resistance to changes to the labour process. However, it has also demonstrated its on-
going importance in providing insight into the ways in which groups or individuals 
respond informally to changes to the labour process. In following this lead, this study’s 
exposition of the ongoing incidence of individual and informal worker resistance reveals 
two important analytical lessons relating to what is a currently an under-researched area 
of industrial relations. These are firstly, that, despite the prevalence of ever more 
sophisticated methods of workforce surveillance, informal, and often illicit, forms of 
individual worker adjustment continue. This was evidenced for example in the practice in 
both Delivery Offices 1 and 2 of workers bringing undelivered mail back from delivery 
rounds to be delivered the following day. That the very same practices were identified 
over 50 years ago by Harper and Emmert (1963) study of postal workers highlights that 
certain occupational contexts provide the opportunity for particular types of informal 
working practices to emerge and flourish. Given that newly recruited workers were both 
aware of and at times involved in the above, it would seem that tradition and worker 
socialisation continue to play an important part in in helping to sustain certain fiddles and 
malpractice.   
The second point is that unions can at times facilitate the types of informal practices 
which actually undermine job security and long-standing mechanisms of collective 
control. In Delivery Office 1 for example, some individuals were able to take advantage of 
the wider groups veto over flexible working to wring concessions out of management 
whilst breaching group norms around breaks and overtime rates. The strength of the 
union in this workplace had, ironically created space and scope for these workers to 
develop practices that were both illicit and, ironically, in contravention of union policy. 
Such an analysis reflects both the continuing validity of and need for traditional 
sociological workplaces studies such as those by Roy, Lupton, Buroway and Edwards.  
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Recent studies have suggested that, in a pervading climate of marketization, trade 
unionism within many areas of the public sector has become, on the whole, increasingly 
ineffectual in mediating managerial driven change within the workplace itself (Bach and 
Stroleny, 2013: 350; Bach, 2010). The cases from this study have shown that this is by no 
means inevitable and have highlighted that local trade unionism and organic worker 
agency can be effective in limiting the effects of such change. In doing so it serves to warn 
against uncritical acceptance of more popular narratives relating to the inevitable decline 
in public sector trade unionism. What the study fundamentally highlights is that effective 
resistance to modernisation by public sector unions cannot be realised through top-down 
models of unionism that mask weak workplace organisation. It must be predicated on 
strong shopfloor organisation on the part of workplace representatives who are able to 
maintain a sense of solidarity and trade union consciousness amongst their membership.  
This depth of shopfloor organisation can, as this study has shown, act as a bulwark against 
‘softer’ forms of management control systems such Employee Involvement initiatives that 
seek to weaken or marginalise trade unionism at ground level. The case studies here have 
highlighted that it is possible for workplace representatives to reconstitute such forums 
into platforms which conversely promote workplace trade unionism and serve as a 
channels through which to communicate to members.  This provides important insight 
into an area of industrial relations which has, according to Beale and Mustchin (2013: 2), 
experienced relatively few contributions in recent years. Moreover, it suggests that 
meaningful analysis of the impact of such initiatives must consider the role played by 
workplace unionism and the degree to which its agents can provide a counter narrative 
that articulates both its policies and aims and the interests of its membership.  
Attention also focussed on two Royal Mail greenfield Mail Centre sites and in doing so, as 
has earlier been argued, offered an alternative but important insight in this area of 
industrial relations. A range of authors (Hallier and Leopold, 1996; Guest and Hoque, 
1994), have noted that such sites offer management the opportunity to start anew often 
through recourse to a set of HRM-based practices and philosophies which seek to elicit 
employee commitment by breaking with the past. The two workplaces here offered the 
opportunity to assess the impact of these circumstances on pre-organised as opposed to 
newly formed groups of workers. Evidence highlighted the limitations both of Greenfield 
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workplace layout and its associated forms of ideational management control systems in 
the face of organised workgroups that have strong traditions of mobilising against 
change.        
As Jenkins et al (2002) have pointed out Royal Mail’s increasing preference for 
consolidating mail processing into these out-of-town greenfield sites has been associated 
with a steady increase in non-standard, flexible forms of employment. The impact of this 
upon the frontier of control in all workplaces under investigation was a key concern of 
this study since such categories of employment can pose a threat to the security of 
existing employees and the power of their union (Heery and Abbott, 2000: 158). Evidence 
highlighted the benefits of a model of workplace unionism which, in line with Fosh (1993), 
sought inclusivity and participation amongst non-standard workers. Such an approach 
had gone some way towards limiting management attempts at making inroads into 
working practices and trade union organisation in the case studies here. This serves to 
endorse what has been a shift by both the CWU (Jenkins et al, 2002) and many other 
unions in the UK away from policies in recent years which had often previously sought to 
exclude and discourage contingent workers from union membership (Heery and Abbott, 
2000).  
Jenkins et al. (2002) also identify the advanced technological production methods that 
have been integral to this shift towards mail centre production and which contrast 
significantly from the more manually-based work processes in the workplaces that they 
have subsumed. This thesis has examined the effects of these and the latest in a range of 
workforce surveillance mechanisms both on shopfloor organisation and working practices 
of UK postal workers. Its findings indicate that these workers have been reasonably 
successful in mediating the effects of such pressures both on the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of local trade unionism and on a host of long-standing, often informal working 
practices. This success, and in particular management’s reticence to fully exploit such 
mechanisms was, in part, down to the potential or actual use of negative sanctions by the 
workers under investigation. Any investigation into the effectiveness of technologically-
based managerial control strategies must, therefore, consider the ways in which actual or 
anticipated resistance on the part of workers can affect both their development and 
implementation. That the implementation of such technologies, particularly in Mail 
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Centre 1, formed part of a wider more aggressive approach by management that served 
to add to their perceived illegitimacy on the part of workers underlines an important 
point. This is that the given direction of a strategy pursued by management may address 
resistance in a way that acts to strengthen it (Ezzamel et al, 2001). 
This study’s analysis of an occupational group that, in contrast to most others (Lyddon, 
2009), has exhibited significantly high levels of strike action in recent years also provided 
important lessons for the study of industrial action in contemporary employment 
relations. Nearly twenty years after Kelly (1998), its workplace based focus reaffirms that 
effective mobilisation is best realised through a network of workplace stewards and 
activists who hold the support and confidence of their members at ground level. Even in 
the constraining context of increasing workplace rationalisation and pressure to reform, 
these actors can still play a key role in the process through which workers develop the 
sense of injustice and common interest that underpins collective action (Kelly, 1998). In 
the cases under investigation this involved justification and nurturing of worker 
grievances which served to disaffirm a range of counter mobilisation strategies through 
which Royal Mail management sought to negate collective action.  
Meaningful academic analysis of strike activity must, therefore, play close attention to the 
factors which either inhibit or facilitate local unionism in the micro-political process of 
mobilising their membership. This must firstly involve a workplace-level focus of the 
impact of commitment-based models of HRM upon membership perceptions of both the 
legitimacy and efficacy of their local union. And secondly, an evaluation of the policy 
which national unions adopt towards ground level organisation and the autonomy and 
direction that they bestow upon their local shop stewards. The cases here additionally 
provide wider lessons for other trade union. Much of this, as will be argued below, has to 
do with the linkages between the workplace and union leadership and how these might 
affect the ability of unions to mediate managerial- driven change.  
The empirical findings have highlighted that the development of an appropriately 
autonomous and empowered union organisation at the level of the shopfloor itself 
should be crucial to any wider strategy through which public sector trade unions might 
seek to limit the impact of marketization. This involves local stewards occupying a 
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considerable level of institutional centrality and carrying out what Batstone et al (1977) 
term as a leadership role with regard to their union position. In such circumstances 
stewards in the workplaces under investigation were able to successfully identify and 
shape issues in the workplace whilst imbuing amongst the wider workforce a 
commitment to union principles and the achievement of collective goals (ibid, 24, 56). 
This was particularly the case in both Delivery Office 1 and Mail Centre 1. Here workers 
espoused high levels of union loyalty and deployed a range of regulatory controls that 
were indicative of the type of workgroup behaviour which Edwards identifies as being 
able to exert considerable collective control over the organisation of work (1988: 196).  
It is true that a top-down approach has often characterised organising activity on the part 
of unions within the UK. However, some unions, notably Unison and the PCS in the public 
services have, in recent years, made considerable efforts to support and strengthen the 
sort of self-activity exhibited by postal workers in the workplace (Darlington, 2010). That 
said, a dearth of experienced workplace level organisation continues, according to Bach 
and Stroleny (2013) to contribute to the on-going wane in public sector trade union 
influence in the public sector. This thesis has highlighted specific features of postal 
workers’ organisation which might serve as best practices for others to both revive 
workplace unionism and defend or advance their members’ terms and conditions of 
employment. Of particular importance is the relationship between a unions’ parent 
branch and its constituent workplaces. Findings indicated that steward’s strength is 
bolstered by their closer proximity to their local branch particularly when this entity itself 
contains experienced officials which together provide the following resources: up-to-date 
information of events; theories of management and membership behaviour; recipes of 
various forms of action and support and control over errant stewards (Hyman, 1975: 168; 
Batstone et al. 1977: 64-65, 74). Such a model might provide much needed support and 
advice to shop stewards in a public sector characterised by weak shopfloor organisation 
and declining union density (Bach and Stroleny, 2013) 
This study has further pointed to the need for unions to where possible invigorate a much 
broader layer of grass roots activists who are not necessarily integrated into formal union 
structures. Evidence suggested that a network of such actors is key in stemming what is 
the growing twin-threat of HRM practice and casualisation on workplace union 
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organisation. This was evident in Mail Centre 1 where local activists had helped ensure 
adherence to wider workgroup norms amongst a stratum of temporary workers that in 
other circumstances would have been both difficult to recruit and susceptible to 
managerial whim (Kalleburg, 2001: 481-482; Heery and Abbot, 2000: 155). In workplaces 
with greater organisational depth of shopfloor activists workers in general tended to be 
more receptive to the arguments and values of the local union. This proved to be crucial 
in helping the latter to successfully counter localised Royal Mail initiatives which sought 
to both garner worker commitment and weaken the influence of their union within the 
workplace (Beale and Mustchin, 2013: 14). 
Finally, this thesis earlier argued that the most effective way through which public sector 
unions might stem the effects of marketization is through the adoption of a more 
autonomous model workplace organisation. However, any initiative of this type must, 
where possible, include the devolution of greater bargaining rights to local stewards with 
regard to issues such as technological driven change. Such an approach enabled the CWU 
in the cases here, through the stewards’ intimate knowledge both of local jobs and the 
context-specific pressures facing their workplace managers, to limit the impact of a range 
of software systems on workloads and collective union-based control mechanisms. Not 
only does this accentuate the limits of direct managerial control (Sturdy et al, 1992), its 
outcomes, in conjunction with the preceding arguments, make a timely contribution to 
current wider debates around union purpose. This is that workplace representational 
structures and challenges to management should form an important part of union 
debates around organisation, recruitment and renewal. These debates can themselves 
only benefit from greater in-depth, qualitative focus on events at workplace level by 
contemporary academic research in the field of industrial relations.  
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Appendix One:  Interviewee Profiles  
Key 
FT (s) - Full time substantive 
FT (t) - Full time temporary 
PT (s) - Part time substantive 
PT (t) - Part time temporary 
M - Member 
NN M - Non member  
WR -   Workplace Representative and/or Branch Official 
OPG -Operational Postal Grade 
 
Delivery Office 1 
Interviewee 
Number  
Gender Union status Contractual 
status 
Length of 
service in years  
OPG 1 Male  M FT(s) 8  
OPG 2 Male M FT (s) 15 
OPG 3 Female M PT (s) 6  
OPG 4 Male  M PT (s) 8  
OPG 5 Male  M FT (s) 20  
OPG 6 Female M FT(s) 12 
OPG 7 Male M PT (s) 3  
OPG 8 Male M PT (t) 1   
OPG 9 Male  NM FT (s) 4  
OPG 10 Male  M FT (t) 1  
OPG 11 Male NM FT (s) 11  
OPG 12 Male  M FT (s) 15 
OPG 13 Male WR  FT (s) 12  
OPG 14 Male WR FT (s) 20  
OPG 15 Male WR FT (s) 25  
OPG 16 Male WR  FT(s) 17 
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Delivery Office 2 
 
Interviewee 
number 
Gender Union status  Contractual 
status 
Length of 
service in years  
OPG 1 Male  M FT (s) 8 
OPG 2 Male  M FT (s) 12 
OPG 3 Male  M FT (s) 7 
OPG 4 Female M FT (s) 10 
OPG 5 Male  M PT (t) 1 
OPG 6 Male M FT (s) 22 
OPG 7 Male M PT (s) 4 
OPG 8 Female NM FT (s) 4 
OPG 9 Male NM PT (t) 3 
OPG 10 Male M PT (s) 3 
OPG 11 Male M FT (s) 12 
OPG 12 Male M PT (t) 1 
OPG 13 Female M FT (s) 17 
OPG 14 Male WR FT (s) 20 
OPG 15 Male WR FT (s) 23 
 
Mail Centre 1 
 
Interviewee 
number 
Gender Union status Contractual 
Status  
Length of 
service in years 
OPG 1 Male M PT (s) 7 
OPG 2 Female M PT (s) 6 
OPG 3 Female M PT (t) 1 
OPG 4 Male M FT (t) 2 
OPG 5 Male M FT (s) 16 
OPG 6 Female M FT (s) 22 
OPG 7 Male M FT (s) 15 
OPG 8 Male M FT (t) 2 
OPG 9 Male M FT (s) 18 
OPG 10 Male M PT (s) 9 
OPG 11 Female WR  FT (s) 14 
OPG 12 Male WR (Branch 
Official) 
FT (s) 12 
OPG 13 Male WR FT (s) 28 
OPG 14 Male WR (Branch 
Official) 
FT (s) 19 
OPG 15 Male WR FT (s) 6 
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Mail Centre 2 
Interviewee 
number 
Gender Union status Contractual 
status 
Length of 
service in years 
OPG 1 Male M FT (s) 3 
OPG 2 Male M FT (s) 2 
OPG 3 Female NM FT (s) 3 
OPG 4 Male M FT (s) 17 
OPG 5 Male NM PT (s) 6 
OPG 6 Male M FT (s) 7 
OPG 7 Female M PT (s) 2 
OPG 8 Female M FT (s) 1 
OPG 9 Male M FT (s) 8 
OPG 10 Male NM FT (s) 12 
OPG 11 Male M PT (s) 1 
OPG 12 Male M FT (s) 4 
OPG 13 Male WR FT (s) 3 
OPG 14 Male WR FT (s) 20 
OPG 15 Male WR FT (s) 17 
 
Other interviewees 
Interviewee Position Length of time in office in 
years 
Official 1 Local branch officer 6 
Official 2 Area representative 10 
Official 3 Assistant area representative 4 
Official 4 Local branch officer 12 
 
NB. The above held office in the same geographical region which covered both Delivery 
Offices 1 and 2.  
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Appendix Two:  Interview Topic Guide 
List of indicative interview questions:  
1     What do you understand about the term ‘the modernisation of Royal Mail’? 
2  How, has your job changed over the last few years? 
3  What would you say are the main differences in your workplace now as opposed to 
when you started? 
4  What are your views on the CWU within your workplace? 
5  Do you believe that unions still make a difference within the workplace? 
6  Are you able to ‘make any time’ on the job, and if so what does this involve? 
7  How often do you find time to discuss issues and interact with your work mates? 
8  What are your views on Royal Mail management and some of the changes that are 
being brought in to the workplace? 
9  What is your opinion on strike action? 
10  How often do you see or come in to contact with the trade union? 
11  What sort of things do you talk to your workmates about? 
12  Do you see your position here as long term? 
13  How do you feel about work time learning sessions? 
14  Do you feel that the union and management should ‘work together’? 
15  Where would you say that your primary loyalties within the organisation lay? 
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Appendix Three: Ethics Information Sheet and Consent Forms 
 
Pre-Interview Consent Form 
 
Title of Project:  ‘Modernisation and the Royal Mail’. A case study of management strategies 
and the collective and individual responses of workers to restructuring. 
 
Name and contact details of Principal Investigator:  
Michael Pender 
Research Institute of Social Sciences 
C/o Keele Management School 
Keele University 
Staffordshire, ST5 5BG 
 
Phone:  01782 733982 
E-mail:  m.a.pender@keele.ac.uk    
 
Please tick these boxes if you  agree with the following statements: 
 
1 I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the 
above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
□ 
2 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time. □ 
3 I agree to take part in this study. 
□ 
4 I understand that data collected about me during this study will/will 
not* be anonymised before it is submitted for publication. 
 
□ 
5 I agree to the interview being audio recorded 
□ 
6 I agree for any comments I make to be quoted in any subsequent 
publication of the study’s findings. □ 
 
_______________________ 
Name of participant 
 
___________________ 
Date 
 
_____________________ 
Signature 
 
 
________________________  
Researcher 
 
 
___________________ 
Date 
 
 
_____________________ 
Signature 
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Post-Interview Consent Form  
 
Title of Project:  ‘Modernisation and the Royal Mail’. A case study of management strategies 
and the collective and individual responses of workers to restructuring. 
 
Name and contact details of Principal Investigator:  
Michael  Pender 
Research Institute of Social Sciences 
C/o Keele Management School 
Keele University 
Staffordshire, ST5 5BG 
 
Phone:  01782 733982 
E-mail:  m.a.pender@keele.ac.uk    
 
Please tick these boxes if you  agree with the following statements: 
 
1 I am satisfied with the way the interview was conducted  
□ 
2 I understand that data collected about me during this study will/will not* be 
anonymised before it is submitted for publication. 
 
□ 
3 I agree for any comments I make to be quoted in any subsequent publication of 
the study’s findings. □ 
 
_______________________ 
Name of participant 
 
___________________ 
Date 
 
_____________________ 
Signature 
 
 
________________________  
Researcher 
 
 
___________________ 
Date 
 
 
_____________________ 
Signature 
 
 
*please delete as appropriate 
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                                         Information Sheet 
Study Title: ‘Modernisation and the Royal Mail’. Workers’ responses to managerial driven change: 
the case of Modernisation in the Royal Mail 
 
Aims of the Research: To examine collective and individual responses of workers within the 
Royal Mail to workplace restructuring and the importation of private sector managerial strategies. 
 
Invitation 
You are being invited to consider taking part in the research study of worker responses to 
modernisation within the Royal Mail. This project is being undertaken by Michael Pender as part of 
his doctoral Studies at Keele University and is supervised by Dr. Steve French. 
 
Before you decide whether or not you wish to take part, it is important for you to 
understand why this research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to 
read this information carefully and discuss it with colleagues if you wish. Please do not 
hesitate to contact me if there is anything that is unclear or if you would like more 
information (e-mail m.a.pender@keele.ac.uk; tel. 01782 733982).  
 
Why have I been chosen? 
As a workplace operative you will provide insight into the ways in which workers perceive on-
going change within the Royal Mail. You have been selected as part of a representative sample of 
workers from your workplace.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
You are free to decide whether you wish to take part or not.  If you do decide to take part you will 
be asked to sign two consent forms - one is for you to keep and the other is for our records. You are 
free to withdraw from this study at any time and without giving reasons.  
 
What will happen if I take part? 
If you agree to take part you will be consenting to an interview that takes between 30 minutes to 1 
hour to complete. Any comments will be treated in the strictest of confidence and you will have the 
opportunity to preserve your anonymity.  
 
If I take part, what do I have to do? 
If you do take part you will be provided with a consent form to sign. You will then be invited to 
provide your opinion on workplace change and modernisation within the Royal Mail. 
 
What are the benefits (if any) of taking part? 
You will be contributing to a study which seeks to understand the ways in which workers respond 
to modernisation within the public services. The research is supported by the CWU and research 
findings may be used to inform future union policy.    
 
What are the risks (if any) of taking part? 
There are no risks in agreeing to take part in this interview.   
 
How will information about me be used? 
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During the interview the researcher will take notes (and if consent is given record the interview) 
and your answers may inform the PhD’s findings and any subsequent publication based upon the 
PhD. 
Who will have access to information about me? 
Only the researcher and his supervisor Dr Steve French will have access to the interview data. All 
data will be treated in the strictest of confidence and again, all participants will have the right to 
anonymity at all times.  
 
How will the data be protected ? 
All data will be protected by being stored on a private computer with a secure password that will be 
locked in a secure place on university grounds that has 24 hour monitoring in place. Any transcripts 
will be kept in the same location in a lockable filing cabinet. No such transcripts will be shared 
with anyone. They will be kept for a maximum of 5 years before being destroyed securely in line 
with university policy.  
 
The researcher is aware that handling such data has legal implications and is following Keele 
University’s policy on research data management. This policy can be found on the following Keele 
University website: http://www.keele.ac.uk/researchsupport/researchdatamanagement.   
 
Who is funding and organising the research? 
This research is funded by the Communication Workers Union and Keele University 
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you are unhappy about any part of this study you may wish to contact the researcher (Mick 
Pender – contact details above).  Alternatively, you may wish to contact the researcher’s supervisor 
Dr Steve French whose contact details are as follows: 
 
Dr Steve French 
Senior Lecturer in Industrial Relations  
Keele Management School 
Keele University 
ST5 5BG 
United Kingdom 
Tel 01782  733609 
Email  s.r.french@keele.ac.uk.  
 
If you remain unhappy about the research and/or wish to raise a complaint about any aspect of the 
way that you have been approached or treated during the course of the study please write to Nicola 
Leighton who is the University’s contact for complaints regarding research at the following 
address:- 
 
Nicola Leighton 
Research Governance Officer 
Research & Enterprise Services 
Dorothy Hodgkin Building 
Keele University  
ST5 5BG 
E-mail: n.leighton@uso.keele.ac.uk 
Tel: 01782 733306 
 
 
